JPRS 76580

8 October 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2196

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 76580

8 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2196

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Data on U.S., French, Soviet Made Tanks in Mid-East
(Tawfiq Nakhalh Ibrahim; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 21 Jul 80)..... 1

PDRY, Oman Diplomatic Moves Assessed
('Ali Hashim; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 20 Jul 80)..... 4

Top Palestinian Spokesman Disparages European Initiative
(Samir Sa'd-al-Din; AL-RIYAD, 29 Jun 80)..... 8

Briefs
Soviet Force in PDRY 13
Saudis Finance Weapons Purchases 13

AFGHANISTAN

Afghan Crisis Studied in Various Aspects
(POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE, Feb 80)..... 14

Afghan Crisis: Questions Abound
Can Detente Survive Kabul, by Renato Sandri
Reform, Islam, Tribal Society, by Giorgio Vercellin
'Normalized' Revolution, by Claudio Moffa

ALGERIA

U.S. Military Presence in Egypt Examined
(Ahmed Fattani; EL MOUDJAHID, 2 Sep 80)..... 55

Cooperation Intensified With Several Countries
(EL MOUDJAHID, various dates)..... 58

Meeting With Bulgarian Minister
Hungarian Delegation in Algiers
Industrial Cooperation With Hungary
Improved Relations With Italy
Harmonious Relations With Sweden, Nils G. Asling
Interview

First Party Cell Installed in Algerian Insurance Company
(EL MOUDJAHID, 31 Aug 80)..... 63

Prime Minister Insists on Link Between Wages, Productivity
(EL MOUDJAHID, 3 Sep 80)..... 65

Tlemcen To Have International Airport
(EL MOUDJAHID, 2 Sep 80)..... 66

Security Forces Active in Skikda
(Rachid Souilah; EL MOUDJAHID, 28 Aug 80)..... 67

Setif 1980 Harvest Season Analyzed
(Brahim Taouchichet; EL MOUDJAHID, 4, 5 Aug 80)..... 68

Briefs
New Impetus to Fishing 75
Kasma Coordinators Meeting 75

IRAN

Open Letter Accuses Qotbzadeh of Betraying Revolution
(Hosseyn Talebi; ETTELA'AT, 6 Sep 80)..... 76

Background of New Prime Minister Explored
(JAVANAN-E EMRUZ, 18 Aug 80)..... 80

Efforts To Pacify Fars Province Underway
(SOBH-E AZADEGAN, 30 Aug 80)..... 87

Guards Attribute Intelligence Network to Adm Madani
(KEYHAN, 18 Aug 80)..... 89

Majles Member Denounces Feudal Landlords
(KEYHAN, 18 Aug 80)..... 92

Army Undertakes Pay Reform
(KEYHAN, 3 Sep 80)..... 95

Former Supervisor Denounces Decision on Closing Universities
(Mohammad Malaki; KEYHAN, 20 Aug 80)..... 97

Goods Distribution Centers To Spur Economy
(JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 21 Aug 80)..... 104

Moscow Paper Advertises Transport Services to Iran
(MOSCOW NEWS, various dates)..... 107

By FESCO Vessels, Trains
By Baltic Vessels, Trains

IRAQ

Iraqi Ambassador Amash New Dean of Helsinki Diplomatic Corps
(Vesa Haapala; UUSI SUOMI, 2 Jul 80)..... 109

Nation's Many Social Development Programs Lauded
(AL-ANWAR, 17 Jul 80)..... 111

Nation's Massive Development Projects Reviewed
(AL-ANWAR, 17 Jul 80)..... 125

ISRAEL

Poll Evaluates Public Support for Ministers
(Hanokh Smith; MA'ARIV, 1 Oct 80)..... 134

Sharon Preferred as Defense Minister in Israeli Poll
(HA'ARETZ, 1 Oct 80)..... 138

Commander Comments on Army Size
(Ze'ev Schiff Interview; HA'ARETZ, 1 Oct 80)..... 139

Debate on Jordanian Option Ignores PLO Role
(Yehudah Litani; HA'ARETZ, 15 Aug 80)..... 141

Israel Seen Failing To Understand Arab Reality
(Kassim Zaid; AL HAMISHMAR, 8 Aug 80)..... 145

West Bank Residents View Jordanian Option
(Dani Tzidkoni; DAVAR, 4 Aug 80)..... 150

Breakdown of Authority in Territories Analyzed
(Dani Rubinstein; DAVAR, 15 Aug 80)..... 153

Bank Governor Offers Recession Cure
(Arye Lavi; HA'ARETZ, 12 Aug 80)..... 157

Finances Limit Police Activity
(Editorial; HA'ARETZ, 15 Aug 80)..... 159

Housing Shortage Said Cause of Resentment Among Young
(David Moshiev; DAVAR, 3 Aug 80)..... 161

Absorption Difficulties in the New Towns
(Shim'on Weiss; DAVAR, 7 Aug 80)..... 163

Briefs
Spokesman Denies Israeli Aid 167
Airfield Quality, Functionalism 167

KUWAIT

Iraqi Action Against Iran 'Righted a Wrong'
(Ahmad al-Jarallah; AL-SIYASAH, 22 Sep 80)..... 168

LEBANON

Soviet Relations With Lebanese Front Examined
(Ibrahim Salamah; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 12 Jul 80)..... 169

Soviet Reconciliatory Role in Lebanon Analyzed
(Ghassan Bayram; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 12 Jul 80)..... 174

LIBYA

Corruption of Members of People's Committees Disclosed
(AL-ZAHAF AL-AKHDAR, 30 Jun 80)..... 177

PERSIAN GULF AREA

Military Security in Gulf Nations Surveyed
(Philippe Rondot; DEFENSE NATIONALE, Aug-Sep 80)..... 183

SAUDI ARABIA

Mecca Governor Discusses Functions of His Position
(Majid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Interview; AL-SIYASAH,
16 Jun 80)..... 199

TUNISIA

Opposition Leader Talks About Internal Stability, Arab Unity
(Ahmad Ben Salah Interview; AL-SAFIR, 27 Jul 80)..... 205

UN Delegation Head's Reservations About Mexican Proposal
(LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 10 Sep 80)..... 212

Activities of Joint French-Tunisian Commission
(LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, various dates)..... 215

Tunisian Labor in France
Joint Communique
Joint Commission Meeting

Sixty Six Thousand Jobs To Be Created Each Year of Next Decade
(LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 9 Sep 80)..... 223

Minister of Education Discusses Various Issues
(LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 10 Sep 80)..... 225

Wheat Storage Problems Discussed
(LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 10 Sep 80)..... 227

Briefs
Mzali at UN 230

DATA ON U.S., FRENCH, SOVIET MADE TANKS IN MID-EAST

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21 Jul 80 pp 36-37

[Article by Tawfiq Nakhalh Ibrahim: "Tanks M60, T-72, AMX-30; Jordan Arms Itself with American Equipment, While Saudi Arabia Adopts French Equipment"]

[Text] Three tanks have been created for which the Arab nations are competing with each other: The American, the Soviet and the French. The Soviet T-72 has clearly superior charactersitics. Israel has entered the field with the MIRKAV, known for its low speed.

The Jordanian army is to be provided with two hundred M60 American medium tanks. These machines are equipped with a night vision system which operates on infrared rays.

The Israelis have protested this transaction, but this protest is unwarranted. On one hand, the two hundred new tanks will never make the Jordanian ground forces a power whch poses a danger to Israel. If the tank is of the M60 model, it is the most modern equipment which the American army uses, because the new X-M-1 tank has not yet been placed into actual service (its speed is 80 Km/h, and the American tank drivers liken it to a Cadillac). The Americans intend to provide the first batch of XM-1 tanks with new engines (Rolls Royce) operating on diesel fuel. The Shir tanks which Iran ordered during the reign of the Shah used to be equipped with these engines.

The design of the M60 tank is now considered obsolete. The tank's speed is 48 Km/h. However, never models of this tank, especially the M60-I-3 model, equipped with a strong engine and a rangefinder which operates on laser beams, aside from its great ammunition storage capacity, is considered among the best equipment.

However, what Jordan will be provided with, is not tanks of the M60-I-3 type. It should be noted that the M60 tanks, which Jordan will not obtain before 1981/1982, are not equipped with modern electronic firing systems, which could make them terribly effective. However, the positive point of this tank, of which Saudi Arabia owns 250 units, the thickness of its armor, (its weight is fifty six tons) and its type of gun (105 mm), is that it is made in the United States.

In the United States, the M60 tank is still considered to be a good medium-heavy offensive tank, probably thanks to the thickness of its armor, especially when it is driven by an inexperienced driver and exposed to hits by the enemy.

On the other hand, we find that the French AMX-30 tank has light armor. However, it is well-equipped with modern equipment. Its weight is 36 tons, its speed is 60 Km/h, and it is distinguished by tremendous mobility. However, it's relatively light armor requires that its driver be proficient in order to avoid exposing the tank to enemy hits.

This tank, designed in 1957, is equipped with a rangefinder which operates on laser beams, and with a semi-automatic 105 mm gun. It is possible for its projectiles to penetrate an armored wall 36 cm thick from a distance of 3 km.

Saudi Arabia (which owns 250 AMX tanks), Iraq, Morocco and Libya have chosen to provide their armies with this type of tank, also equipped with a 20 mm gun and with a 7.62 mm machinegun. In 1978, Lebanon ordered 30 AMX-30 tanks. The solution upon which Saudi Arabia has relied by equipping itself with American M-60 tanks and French AMX-30 tanks is considered an intelligent solution, because it adds defensive capability to offensive capability.

The primary concern of nations manufacturing the tanks remains to provide maximum protection for the tanks from enemy hits, in order minimize loss of armored equipment. Thus, research has been directed toward manufacturing new armor plate such as (Shobham,) or such as that which the Soviets introduced on the T-72 tanks. It is well known that the Soviet T-72 tank currently found in the Middle East theater of military operations is the most modern of armored vehicles in the region, and is much superior to other existing armored vehicles, in spite of certain defects found in it.

The T-72 tank, designed by the Soviets in the late sixties, with its special characteristics, is considered a technical success. It weighs around 45 tons and moves at a speed of 80 km/h (the Soviets claim 100 km/h, but this may be an exaggeration). It is equipped with a 125 mm gun, with a 7.62 mm machinegun, and with a "Doska" mounted on its turret. Its gun is loaded automatically, at a rate of 10 to 12 rounds per minute. It has a three-man crew.

The Soviet Union produces about 2,000 T-72 tanks annually. These tanks, over a period of two years, will replace the T-54 and T-55 tanks, and will replace a large portion of the Syrian and Iraqi T-62 tanks. Syria currently has about 100 T-72 tanks. Iraq and Libya have the same. One of the drawbacks of this tank is that ammunition storage is located on the sides, and that fuel (which practically under the right fender and part of the left fender) is vulnerable to enemy hits. Therefore, the Soviets are working on using nonflammable diesel fuel. However, it is difficult to store a new type of fuel for one type of armored vehicle in petroleum producing countries where regular fuel is available in abundance. Thus, it is likely that these tanks will operate in Syria, for example, using regular fuel. This makes them very dangerous.

The T-72 tank has the most modern of tank technology, especially the laser beam system and the infra-red system for night battles.

Future tank battles will be carried out for the most part at night, as modern tank divisions will not wait for daybreak to mount their attacks. At around 0300 hours, T-72, M-60 and AMX-30 tanks are capable of waging battle as though it were broad daylight. It should be noted that tanks such as the American M-47 and M-48, which date back to the period immediately following World War II (Jordan has 250 of them, Israel 650, Iran 400 and Morocco 100), can be equipped with infra-red systems for night firing and control.

In the past year, the Israelis have produced 40 armored vehicles of a new type called MIRK (Vehicle), equipped with a semi-automatic 105 mm gun. When these armored vehicles were demonstrated to Western experts, these noted that there were two small doors in the rear of the armored vehicle. The experts learned later that the small doors were used for storing ammunition. However, this armored vehicle is not fast, and this constitutes one of its most important defects in the theater of military operations.

9605
CSO: 4802

PDRY, OMAN DIPLOMATIC MOVES ASSESSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 20 Jul 80 p 8

[Article by 'Ali Hashim: "Moves of South Yemen and Oman; Oman Attempts to Avoid Isolation; Aden Mediates between Area and Soviets"]

[Text] The Arab Gulf is stifled by burning summer heat, 50 degrees centigrade temperature, and 100 percent humidity. On top of this, the month of Ramadan arrives to bring all activity to a standstill. Nobody receives guests, nobody discusses anything, and everybody abstains from food, activity, and conversation!

However, despite this calm, people in the Gulf are not tranquil. They are to some degree confident, but also afraid, hesitant, and questioning. What is going to happen to their area? What is in store? What will be the fate of the oil?

More and more talk goes on in private gatherings--more than in public ones. Questions follow one another. You try to ask questions, but others turn to you with their own, hoping to hear a reassuring answer.

Two moves took place in the area this week. A PDRY move by president 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, and an Omani move which did not attract too much attention.

There was silence in the Gulf following the revelation that Oman had given military concessions to the United States. No one had the courage to take a stand regarding it, with the exception of Iraq. There, a statement was published in AL-THAWRA, official newspaper of the ruling Arab Socialist Ba-ath party, attributed to Latif Nasif Jasim, minister of culture and information, and Hamid 'Alwan, minister of state for foreign affairs.

Of course, declarations are made rejecting the idea of granting bases to any major power and maintaining that the Gulf's security is the responsibility of its own people. But if any reference is made to the Omani concessions, it is made in whispers, and it never mentions or attacks the sultanate by name. It is as though the Omani bases concern Alaska, not the Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean.

The Omani Move

Yusuf al-'Alwi Abdullah, undersecretary of Omani foreign affairs, made a surprise visit to Saudi Arabia accompanied by Maj Salim al-Ghazali, undersecretary of defense and most powerful officer in the Omani armed forces after Sultan Qaboos bin Said himself. The communique issued at the end of the visit stated that the Omani delegation gave King Khalid ibn 'Abdal-'Aziz a message from Sultan Qaboos concerning the situation in the area and Saudi-Omani relations.

Al-'Alwi then returned to Muscat, while al-Ghazali went to Doha to give the Amir of Qatar, Shaykh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani, another message from the sultan.

In Jiddah, the Omani visit resulted in no official comments, and the visit of the Omani undersecretary of defense likewise drew no comments in Doha. When questioned, officials merely replied: "Just a friendly message."

"Friendly messages" exchanged between Gulf officials may carry news of "invasions" or may only contain greetings. These messages are part of tribal traditions, such as visiting and inquiring about a neighbor's health. But they may also express complaints, worries, and mutual requests.

The Omani move coincided with the move of the president of the PDRY. After 'Ali Nasir Muhammad visited Jiddah, he went to Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates, for lengthy discussions with its president Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan.

Therefore, the Omani messages and visits were not undertaken just to check on the health of neighbors. They were much more important.

Breaking Loose

What do knowledgeable Gulf sources say about these developments? A high official told AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI that the Omani visits were meant to break loose from the isolation of the sultanate following its unilateral agreement providing facilitations to the U.S.

While the Gulf countries did not rise in protest against this agreement, at least in the press, their silence did not mean recognition or acceptance of the fait accompli.

Oman was worried most about leaks that Saudi Arabia was taking steps to improve its relations with Marxist South Yemen, without South Yemen first improving its relations with Oman, as previously agreed upon.

The country closest to Saudi Arabia in the area is Qatar, because both follow the Islamic Wahabi doctrine. Therefore, the Omanis concentrated their efforts on Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

As to the United Arab Emirates, they have firm relations and old accounts to settle with the Sultanate of Oman. In light of this, the sultanate does not find that any steps taken in Abu Dhabi would affect it adversely, since such steps must take into account "sensitive issues" as well as common interests between the two, particularly the border issue which is still not a closed subject, although it is on its way to a final settlement.

What about Kuwait? For some time now, Kuwait has been seeking to resolve differences in the area. Based on its balanced foreign policy and lack of embroilment in marginal disputes, it has been trying to bring about a reconciliation between north and south Yemen, and, subsequently, between the Aden regime and Oman.

Therefore, the Omanis had only the Saudi and Qatar positions to worry about, and acted accordingly to thwart any move to isolate Oman.

The Road to Moscow

What about the objectives of the PDRY move? As hot weather and politics settle over the Gulf, observers continue to ask: Will there be war? Will the oil go up in flames? Or will there be a settlement? On the very day that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was in Jiddah, and about to leave for Abu Dhabi, 'Ali Muhammad Nasir 'Antar, PDRY minister of defense and strong man of president 'Ali Nasir's "group," was in Moscow.

The PDRY move was inevitable, because the resignation of the former president, 'Abd al-Fattah Ismail, created an easing of the situation between the Aden Marxist regime and the conservative Gulf states. Ismail was trying to outdo Moscow itself in socialism, nationalism, Marxism, Leninism and even Stalinism.

'Ali Nasir Muhammad changed things, though not totally. South Yemen took on an Arab nationalist stance and returned to Islam, though not the brand advocated by Khomeyni, the Kuwaiti religious reform group, or the Saudi Wahabis. 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's philosophy of government is grounded in the Arab and Islamic history of the Gulf area. But at the same time, he maintains an ideology based on scientific socialism.

Reservations in the Gulf countries about the Aden regime disappeared with Ismail's departure and Nasir's coming to power. Discussions based on common Arab aims were inevitable. Good relations between Aden and Riyadh are necessary, and 'Ali Nasir is expected to seek further improvements, particularly in developing good relations with the Emirates. The latter's president is an ardent nationalist who generously gives large amounts of aid to the non-petroleum producing countries of the area, such as Somalia, the two Yemens, and Djibouti.

Of equal importance to 'Ali Nasir are relations with Kuwait, for many reasons. Kuwait has a special section in its foreign ministry for providing aid to non-petroleum producing countries, including the PDRY. Kuwait did not stop aid to the latter in spite of pressures to do so on a number of occasions,

particularly at the Tunis summit, which recommended severing relations with Aden when forces of the latter invaded the Yemen Arab Republic (the north).

A common denominator between the PDRY and Kuwait is that they are the only two Gulf nations, aside from Iraq, which have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This brings us to the basic purpose of 'Ali Nasir's trip. Having been accused of turning his country into a Soviet military base, he wishes to deny these accusations and maintain that relations between countries can be based on mutual respect of sovereignty. He has the Kuwaiti example in mind. In the case of Kuwait, a conservative country is maintaining diplomatic relations with Moscow and Peking without becoming communist or being influenced by those countries.

Nevertheless, 'Ali Nasir's motives include explaining his version of reasons for establishing relations with Moscow.

Moscow's Road to the Gulf

'Ali Nasir began "evangelizing" to dispel the Gulf region's fears of the Soviets in the midst of events percipitated by the Iranian revolution and the "legitimate" Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He is playing the Afghanistan card and opening Moscow's road to the Gulf, even if at the start only diplomatically. This oepning will involve oil--for a price--at the final stage.

Several officials and observers in the Gulf are almost convinced that diplomatic relations with the Soviets are at hand, not to spite the U.S., which is assembling naval and strike forces in the area, but as a hedge against the future. Gulf nations would thus be following the example of West European nations. These are with the U.S. within NATO, but maintain a dialogue with the Soviets.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union could avert a war that the Americans may be preparing for in Don Quixote fashion, unilaterally and without consulting the rest of the world, including what Washington calls "the world of allies."

9669
CSO: 4802

TOP PALESTINIAN SPOKESMAN DISPARAGES EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 10

/Article by Samir Sa'd-al-Din: "The Head of the Palestine National Council Talks to AL-RIYAD: The European Activity Is Not Serious"/

/Text/ The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the secretaries general of various Palestinian organizations and a number of members of the Palestine National Congress recently held a joint meeting in Damascus to review setting the time and place for holding the new session of the Palestine National Congress, in order to discuss new developments on the Palestinian stage, including increasing the members of the Executive Committee and international and Arab influences on it. Those at the meeting decided that the 15th National Congress session would be held toward the end of August in Damascus.

AL-RIYAD had this meeting with Khalid al-Fahum, head of the Palestine National Congress, on this session, the political and organizational matters which might be discussed in the light of the program set out for it, as well as the official Palestinian view on the Venice declaration which, the Arabs had expected (as they had been promised by the European countries) would take the form of an initiative based on recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole legitimate representative and these people's right to return and determine their destiny, the theses which appear from time to time concerning future relations between Palestine and Jordan, in view of the organic and spiritual links and interests the two countries possess, and the popular revolution in the bank and the strip which has begun to take serious dimensions against the colonialist Israeli presence.

AL-RIYAD: There has been much talk about the place and the convening of the new Palestine National Congress session. When might that take place? What subjects are listed on its agenda? What is the truth of the statement that some resistance detachments which are not represented on the Executive Council will enter it for the first time, especially the small ones?

al-Fahum: At the last meeting it was decided that 31 August 1980 would be the date for the convening of the 15th session of the National Congress and that Damascus would be the site. As regards this session's agenda, a special committee consisting of our brother Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee, the secretaries general of the detachments of the resistance movement, and the chairman of the national congress will now proceed to hold continuous meetings to reach agreement on all political and organizational matters to be presented to the congress.

As regards political matters, there is total agreement over the importance of and unanimity on the political program which the National Congress approved at its last session. Thus the political program remains the firm basis for united Palestinian political movement on the Arab and international stage. Naturally, political matters which have arisen recently will be presented to the congress, especially European activity in the context of the statement issued by the Venice conference and Palestinian-Arab relations, so that united Palestinian positions may be taken with regard to these issues.

Here I have not referred to the subject of Camp David, which is without a doubt a conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian cause, on grounds that the political program ratified at the congress' 14th session deals with all the minutiae of this subject. As far as Camp David goes, our position is firm.

As regards the Executive Committee, it is natural that a new committee will be formed in which all the detachments of the resistance movement will be represented, especially since some of them, as everyone knows, are outside the Executive Committee--although in their totality they, that is, the detachments of the resistance, are represented in the Palestine National Congress. We hope that our coming congress will be the background in which better Palestinian relations may be realized, and that we will make large strides toward national unity, especially in the political, military and financial fields.

AL-RIYAD: What is the true state of current and future Palestinian-Jordanian relations, in the light of the ideas and plans that are presented from time to time regarding the future of the Palestinian cause?

al-Fahum: Any talk about future relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or any other Arab country assuming a constitutional form is premature before the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Priority, as far as the Palestine Liberation Organization goes, now goes to struggling with every means to realize the fixed national rights of the Palestinian people, that is, their right to return, determine their destiny and establish an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian soil. We are cooperating with all our Arab brethren, including Jordan, proceeding from the resolutions of Riyad in 1974, Baghdad in 1978 and Tunis in 1979. Therefore, any discussion about constitutional relations or any other form will not be made before establishment of the Palestinian state.

AL-RIYAD: What about the Venice declaration, and the observations the organization has adopted on it, especially since we had heard before it was issued that the Europeans would present an initiative founded on a basis of recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and these people's right to self-determination?

Answer: The Liberation Organization's official position on the declaration is that expressed by the official organization spokesman after the conclusion of the Executive Committee meetings, but to what the official spokesman said I would like to add that any serious European activity will have to take basic objectivity into consideration, if Europe wants to contribute to solving the Middle East problem.

First, any European activity must take into consideration that the Camp David agreement, and the results it produced, are unacceptable and must announce its failure in categoric, final fashion; any European activity based on the premise of Camp David, or acceptance of the results it produced, is something which cannot be accepted in the Palestinian or Arab context.

Second, no European activity can acquire a serious character unless it begins with recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole legitimate representative in this people's name. This is something the Europeans must carry out with utmost speed if they want to start serious, objective, realistic movement.

The statement issued at Venice did not achieve these two obvious things, and therefore we cannot state that the European movement is serious or that its premises for a comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem are correct. Our position regarding any future European movement can be defined only in the light of consideration for these two points. This is in addition to our conviction that the issue of investigating the facts which the Europeans will carry out, is only aimed at postponing all European activity until after the American elections. During his visit to the Arab Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, the French president received a clear notion of the Palestinian and Arab viewpoint, and the same was true when Schmidt, the West German chancellor, visited Saudi Arabia.

AL-RIYAD: How can we explain the organized wave of terror directed against the Palestinian people and their fighting men in the occupied territories, in the light of what the citizens and mayors are exposed to?

al-Fahum: The policy Israel is proceeding with, which its prime minister Menachem Begin is directing, is clear and well known to the Palestinians, the Arabs and the whole world. Begin the terrorist is stating publicly repeatedly, in earshot of the entire world, that he does not consider that the West Bank and Gaza are occupied territories but are an integral part of the land of greater Israel, and that greater Israel, as the Zionist

fanatics, headed by Begin, see it, has no specific borders but is capable of expansion whenever the opportunity arises. The Camp David agreements gave Begin the cover he required, I mean, the presence of a big Arab party which would make it easy for him to implement his aggressive policy.

Everyone knows the truth of the heroic role which our Palestinian Arab people and their national leaders in the bank and the strip are playing to thwart the Camp David policy and the agreements which resulted from it.

Everyone without a doubt knows that our people in the occupied territories have been the basic force preventing application of the autonomy agreements which will incorporate the bank and Gaza to Israel by law and permit them to be occupied militarily for an unspecified time.

Absolute Palestinian rejection of the autonomy agreement was basically what brought this agreement down.

Everyone knows that Menachem Begin's policy, which calls for the incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel, requires that both be emptied of their inhabitants so that incorporation will be easy and the absorption smooth. Therefore it is not surprising that Begin should launch an attack against the national leaders in the occupied territories by banishing them sometimes and trying to assassinate them at other times, as happened recently to the devoted sons of Palestine Fahd al-Qawasimah, Milhim, al-Tamimi, al-Shak'ah, Khalar and al-Tawil.

This is not new. The sequence of terror, banishment and assassination has been going on since 1967 and is a matter which is in harmony with the nature and personality of Menachem Begin as a terrorist with deep roots and a founder of the expansionist Zionist movement.

We urge our Arab nation and all Arab officials to continue their stand of support for the combatants and our people within who are in isolation challenging all the force Israel possesses, especially since information has it that the settlers in the bank have started to increase arming themselves and have received the agreement of a number of senior officials in the state of Israel that they may maintain law and order alongside the army within the West Bank, which means that our homes and our honor will be at the mercy of the settlers and the inhabitants in the settlements--settlements situated in the heart of the villages and towns of the bank and the strip and in direct contact with our people. Here I would like to point out that our people in the occupied territories are now embarking on a bitter struggle against the Zionist presence and that the first light of a popular revolution has now appeared. Proof of that is that there is a large rate of increase of molotov cocktails in the field which people are manufacturing, as well as an increase in mass acts of violence against policemen and Jews entering Arab sections and places. The source of the trouble the people are facing is not, as the friends of Israel state, Jewish extremists, and the assertion that the government has no knowledge

of it is contrary to the truth. They are facing an organized terrorist onslaught run by the government of Israel under the leadership of Menachem Begin.

As regards the . ghting men, they have full appreciation and greetings from us, which through the newspaper AL-RIYAD, I would like to send to them, especially our brother Bassam Shak'ah, whom I visited recently in Amman and who was without a doubt a source of inspiration to all of us and all the people of Palestine and the Arab nation in their splendid perseverance and adherence as Palestinians and Arabs to their positions of principle, their absolute rejection of all the Camp David schemes, and their rejection of all the pressures and conspiracies to which they and their brothers are exposed.

Each of us must be like al-Shak'ah, at the apex of challenge and determination to continue the holy war against the Zionist occupation which is passing through special severe conditions.

This was the end of the report, which took extensive time from an official who has time only for work.

11687
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

SOVIET FORCE IN PDRY--During his recent meeting with King Khalid in Riyad, the president of South Yemen, Muhammad 'Ali Nasir, tried to convince King Khalid not to attach too much importance to the military euqipment (surface-to-surface missiles, Mig-23 aircraft and T-62/72 tanks) obtained by Aden from Moscow. 'Ali Nasir informed the Saudi officials that the presence of a batallion of sharpshooters and a squadron of Soviet Mig-25 aircraft in Aden is temporary. However, King Khalid stressed to the South Yemeni offi.'als the need to honor the principle of barring the presence of foreign forces in the region. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21 Jul 80 p 37] 9605

SAUDIS FINANCE WEAPONS PURCHASES--Arab political sources here have told AL-SAFIR that the Saudi Arabian government recently agreed to finance a "basic portion" of Tunisia's weapons requirements. The sources say that most of the weapons will come from France and will consist of fighter planes, helicopters, and antiaircraft guns. The sources added that the Saudi government will also pay for training Tunisian military forces in the use of these weapons. They said that during a recent visit of the Tunisian foreign minister, Hasan Belkhodja, to Saudi Arabia several joint Saudi-Tunisian committees were formed to deal with "broad issues." These committees were headed by the foreign ministers of the two countries. [Text] [Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 27 Jun 80 p 1] 9669

CSO: 4802

AFGHAN CRISIS STUDIED IN VARIOUS ASPECTS

Afghan Crisis: Questions Abound

Florence POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE in Italian Feb 80 pp 3-28

[Text] Even without the diversity in ideological or alignment positions, of which there are clearly considerable, deciphering the Afghan crisis requires a number of keys. The most striking thing about it is the international reactions it has triggered: Carter called it the gravest crisis since World War II. Official U.S. reactions in areas ranging from disarmament (a freeze of SALT ratification) to economic relations (the embargo on 17 million tons of grain) and even to the threat to boycott the Moscow Olympics, which as we all know reached out to all kinds of people all over the world, even people with no politics to speak of, have combined to give top priority to international aspects of the crisis. In this context, in addition to the East-West dimension, with its impact on U.S.-USSR relations, there is the North-South dimension to consider, with the effect the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has had and may have on relations between Moscow and the Third World (and we have already seen some of this at the UN and at the Islamic Conference); also calling for assessment, though, is the part powers such as the European nations can play in keeping the processes of radicalization and polarization from inexorably smothering the last hopes of cooperation and detente. The Afghan crisis, however, has its own inner dynamics, very heavy-handed foreign interference has subverted, though not totally nullified, and which could, under less tense conditions, return to their own autonomous ways of dealing with the matter.

At the root of it all lies the coup d'etat in April 1978, which set off a "revolution from the top," perhaps limited in its actual consensus but nevertheless endowed with its own unquestioned capacity for innovation and an objective legitimacy of its own, and has as its protagonists the civilian and military cadres

that work together in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, out of which have come all the presidents who have succeeded one another in power in Kabul during these 2 years of strife and tragedy in Afghanistani history. The results of that revolution are still controversial, and in any case have not led to any visible stabilization. Still to emerge is any well defined social bloc to take the place of the one that had held power, first under the monarchy and later under Daoud, the prince-president who was overthrown in 1978. The reforms spelt out with remarkable clarity on paper but launched amid too much resistance from many quarters to be really effective, particularly since there had been no proper preparation for their implementation, met with opposition on all sides: with their impact on custom, on property, and on social relationships they affected traditions and power positions that had seemed immutable and naturally all who felt themselves dispossessed turned to whatever help they could find, from Islamic fundamentalism to armed efforts to reverse the situation. The combined upshot has been endemic guerrilla warfare which has only made the whole picture still more precarious by weakening the regime's ability to make changes and win support while inviting outside intervention.

There is a good deal of speculation as to how much or how little of such involvement there actually was. Was the 1978 coup spontaneous? or was it remote-controlled from Moscow, which had always had special ties with the small but homogeneous communist group there? And to what extent did China, Pakistan, the United States, and even Iran actively try to make the Taraki experiment fail? Because, in the event, it was the international scenario that took over, these are questions worth looking into in depth, not written off as irrelevant, on the argument, correct though it may be, that all revolutionary processes succeed or fail in the final analysis depending on how deep their roots reach into the historical, social, and cultural fabric upon which they must work.

POLITICA INTERNATIONALE dealt with the Afghan revolution in 1979 (nº4, pp 29-37) in an article by Gaetano La Pira, presciently titled "From Feudalism to Imported Socialism." Feudalism held out over the revolution thanks to the flame of Islam, and the high import duty on socialism, while Taraki was beaten by Amin, his second in command, and while Amin was abruptly ousted by a conspiracy in which Babrak Karmal, a victim of earlier purges, enjoyed the open and direct aid of the USSR, turned out to be even steeper than expected. The headlong rush of events requires that we update our analyses and check into the impact of the latest twists and turns. To do this, we are devoting three articles to the Afghan crisis; although they do not exhaust the whole subject, they do attempt to shed light on the various processes, domestic and foreign, with... regard to overlapping one

another if doing so will help provide a pluralistic and even a dialectical overview of a state of affairs as complex and confusing as this one.

Renato Sandri, a scholar and politician, not only wants to understand the reasons for the crisis but asks how Afghanistan might call upon its existing relations to avoid being drawn into the vortex of cold war. The superpowers have a logic all their own, which is not necessarily the sort that small and middle-sized powers, like those of Europe, should take as their model. The wound inflicted on Afghanistan's independence is still there, but the idea here is to figure out how it might be feasible to use a policy of detente to reconstruct those areas of autonomy in which even the Third World countries -- as the experience of non-alignment, now in very serious trouble, teaches us -- can find safer ground on which to play.

In Giorgio Vercellin's article, which centers primarily on the reach of Islam as the dominant cultural point of reference, seeks to show the impact of the reforms instituted first under Taraki and then under Amin, whose regime after all did not have all that much time to go further, if the reports and various versions now making the rounds even in Afghanistan are true, than recourse to the most brutal repression. Was Afghanistan, a desperately poor and wretchedly backward country, really impermeable to the "wind from the East" or was it clever orchestration by class enemies, whose historical ascendancy Vercellin traces with such perception, that brought about the rising tide? Afghanistan had ancient traditions of instability and perhaps even anarchy at the tribal level, and the Muslim guerrilla war fed on all these factors which predisposed it to "permanent counterrevolution." It was in order to put an end to this state of insecurity, at least formally, that the USSR's intervention was triggered, damnable though it was, whether you take your precedents from Budapest and Prague or from Saigon during the Sixties, where even presidents were attacked and overthrown on instructions from the secret services of a great power. Soviet intervention was partly the spectre that Taraki and Amin, but Claudio Moffa says the ax-grinding editorials of the Western media as well, both sought to avert and wound up making inevitable.

Claudio Moffa also looks at the power struggles within the regime, at the real potential in the reforms, and at their grip on the country's reality: the forcible action of December 1979 was, in some ways, a "moderate coup," in that it replaced Amin with the more malleable and reasonable Karmal. It is yet to be shown, however, if and how Karmal will be able to carry off the role of his country's Kadar, in which some have tried to cast him.

The alarm events in Kabol have set off all over the world is equal to the questions -- not all of them merely academic -- to which those events give rise. They have to do with the real balance of power inside Afghanistan, to measure the chances for success of a policy of swift transformation in a land of the Deep or Super-Deep South. They have to do with the way in which the relations between internal processes and hegemonic or sub-hegemonic policies work in an area like Central Asia, since the USSR is not the only protagonist in the foreign meddling, and in view of the fact that ever since last December's invasion and even today the Afghan rebels are at the core of "major maneuvers" that bring some very high-ranking personages to the Khyber Pass. They have to do with the thinking that might have driven the USSR to infringe so violently upon the sovereignty of a state which, no matter what its political system, had been picked to act as the "Asiatic Finland." And they have to do with the outlook for detente at a particularly critical juncture in international relations arising from the simultaneous explosion of situations that had for too long been artificially clamped under t lids. One more reason not to give up -- even in the teeth of an event so tragic as this one -- on the uses of sweet reason, because international relations are a very delicate blend of actions and reactions which a rash or divisive decision, no less than a misstep, can plunge into irreversible crisis.

Can Detente Survive Kabul

Florence POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE in Italian Feb 80 pp 5-10

[Article by Renato Sandri]

[Text] The military insurrection that toppled Daoud in April 1978 was in fact a "revolution from on high," confined to the urban perimeter and to small segments of society. Venturing outside the cities, the revolutionary process ran up against tooth-and-nail resistance of a religious and tribal nature, which further restricted the area of consensus. The factional strife within the Democratic People's Party opened the way for growing Soviet interference, culmination in the country's invasion. To save detente, Europe must refuse to get involved in the merits of the dispute and must offer itself as spokesman for the Third World countries anxious to break away from great-power hegemony and to be left in peace as they go about building a new international order.

The facts about the situation inside Afghanistan available to the observer who wants to understand the motivations -- relevant to that situation -- behind the Soviet intervention are far from complete, and yet they seem to be sufficient. Sufficient at least for a try at coming close that must be made: not merely an academic exercise, but an "operational necessity" in the face of the grave nature of that event and of the complexity of its consequences to every area of international relations.

The People's Democratic Party (PDP) government, born of the military and popular uprising of 27 April 1978 in Kabul, seized power in a republic which, in many areas, had been bogged down in national conditions -- social and cultural -- inherited from the monarchy stripped of power by Prince Daoud in 1973 with the bloodless ukase that turned Mohammad Zahir's Italian holiday to permanent exile. The monarchy had held the nation's international position in shaky balance since 1919, when Afghanistan was the first state to establish diplomatic relations with the infant Soviet Union, then proclaiming its neutrality during World War II, and lastly taking the initiative, among the five sponsoring countries, of the Belgrade Conference which in 1961 saw the birth of the non-aligned movement. At home, Zahir had started a timid reform in dress, ending the requirement that women wear the veil in 1959, and updating the country by means of 5-year plans beginning in 1957, whose end result was shattering shortages in 1971 and 1972, when about a million Afghans died (lack of irrigation infrastructures, drought, hunger, disease, etc.).

The first enormous problem the new republic had to cope with was that of making a nation of its inhabitants -- 18 million or so of them, of whom 55 percent were Pashtun, 25 percent Tajiks, and the rest were Uzbeks, Halzaras, Beluchis, and some 2 million were nomads: the Kochi. The choice of Pashtun (Afghan-Persian) as the nation's lingua franca and the primacy of the Pashtun ethnic group, backed up by the monarchy, marked the confines of the grouping, which remained fluid, prey to tensions and conflicts made even more intractable by their being part of a social structure at once heterogeneous and inflexible. Unwieldy traces of pre-feudal society, such as the nomadic shepherds, were part of the predominant feudal production relations in the rural areas, the owners of land and water which was channeled and sold to renters or small freeholders, along with the widespread practice of usury, extending over arable land that was in very scant supply, amounting to only 22 percent of the total. In the cities, embryonic capitalism was foundering in the fog of petty trade, an impoverished artisan class, and haphazard businesses, plus growing masses of a lumpenproletariat pouring into the cities from the rural areas. Its structures are typically bone-poor Third-World, with a single product for export

(the hides of millions and millions of karakul sheep, a.k.a. Persian lamb), and with a chilling fit into the parameters set forth by the UN for its list of the 29 "poorest countries" in the world: average yearly per capita income less than $100, industry's share of the GNP less than 10 percent, and an illiteracy rate of at least 80 percent of the population (actually the rate in Afghanistan is 92 percent).

The country had not been truly unified either by the monarchy or by such other institutions as the Jirga (a kind of senate made up of the highest-ranking notables), or the Grand Council consisting of more than 1,000 delegates from all parts of the country, from every province and every tribe; nor yet by the Pushtuwali (the unwritten law dating back to the dim, dark past which stipulates the rules of honor in peace and in war -- but the rules are those of the dominant ethnic group). The glue that held it together was Islam, practiced by 99 percent of the population -- the vast majority of them Sunni -- and in reality the bulwark of the unchanging and unchangeable order, with particular reference to woman's condition. And despite the legal abolition of the obligation to wear the veil, a dereliction from Koranic jurisprudence -- the shari'ah -- in force in other Islamic countries, the Afghan woman was deprived of all property rights, according to tribal custom, not to mention her subjection to polygamy, to imprisonment at hard labor, and illiteracy.

Daoud's regime was very swiftly brought to a halt by the immovable viscosity of this "social roadblock," the expression as it was of a low-level compromise between the old feudal sectors and the nascent urban bourgeoisie. Over the 5 years the efforts at reform petered out, while the country slowly drifted into Iran's sphere of influence, which the shah's paranoia was seeking to erect between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan into a pillar of imperialist domination of the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (look for instance at the plans and advance financing for the railroad that would have crossed the country to link Iran with Pakistan, as well as for a chain of airports, etc.).

From his quest for consensus, Daoud moved to repression of the progressive groups, even though they had supported the birth of the republic; among the hardest hit was the People's Democratic Party (better known as the Khalq Party) and the Parcham Party, both of them leaning toward Marxism, and subsequently merging to form the PDP, not to mention the straggly labor organizations in the towns. In early April 1978 the police shot down Amir Khyber, the Kabul labor leader, and went on to massacre more than 200 citizens during the protest demonstrations over the assassination and against the arrest of other labor leaders (among them Nur Mohammad Taraki). On 27 April, while Daoud, his family, and the presidential guard were put to the sword by the military uprising, a detachment of tanks and APCs was demolishing the

walls of the prisons, and in the process freeing Taraki, who with the PDP took over national leadership.

Of course this was a military coup, but it was touched off in the midst of determined mass movements in the capital by groups with their roots in the PDP with its years-long history of clandestine operations: it was the specific driving force behind a "revolution from above," both by virtue of the urban setting for its explosion and by virtue of the features of the party itself. The party had surfaced in 1965, then split into two factions before getting back together on the eve of the insurrection. Its Parcham wing, headed by Babrak Karmal, had been concentrating primarily on winning adherents among the military (a good share of its officers were graduates of Soviet military schools), among civil servants, students, and intellectuals; one very active member of the party's leadership was Anahita Ratebzad, a prestigious lady who for years had been fighting for women's liberation. The Khalq Party, headed by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, had done its recruiting not only among the petty bourgeoisie, but among activist worker nuclei, and had, albeit without much success, sought support among the poor peasants of the outlying provinces.

When you take over a government, your impact is not in the least diminished when you say that everything starts over with you, particularly in a backward and dependent country. And the new government did begin with a program that reasserted Afghanistan's position as a non-aligned nation, on the basis of its friendship -- not to say alliance -- with the USSR; in domestic policy the backbone of its program was agrarian reform, accompanied by two fundamental policy thrusts: one was equal social and legal rights for women, and the other was compulsory universal education.

On paper, this read like the program of a democratic, anti-feudal revolution; yet the first schism within the PDP, which set the Khalq wing against Parcham (with the ouster of B. Karmal, A. Ratzebad, and others from the government and their posting abroad as ambassadors in posts they quickly resigned to chose exile in Prague, Belgrade, and other socialist countries), above and beyond the rivalries which certainly had something to do with it, assuredly had its roots in the disagreement over the rate at which the revolution was to be stepped up; the winning side was the more radical, while those who lost were better attuned to the nation's "readiness" to accept revolutionary change.

As it ventured out of the cities the revolutionary process instantly ran up against resistance, which rose steadily all through the fall. First came the gusty winds from the South, stirred up by the Islamic movement in Iran; then friction

begotten by the agrarian reforms of 1 January 1979 triggered furious agitation by the dispossessed landowners. Meanwhile such measures as the abolition of dowries for women or the new law requiring that they be taught to read and write, by flying in the face of thousands of years of the dominant culture, helped stir up feelings against all these "new ways," stirring up the boiling lava of instincts, of habits, and of the fiery preaching of the mullahs.

Afghanistan's food relations with the USSR -- as already noted -- dated from 1919 and had improved still further even in the final period of the monarchy. In that connection, one need only recall that U.S. "aid," which up to around 1966-67 had constituted around a third of all international "aid" received by Afghanistan, by 1969-70 had declined to 3 percent of the total, not so much in reflection of its absolute decline (although that happened, too) as by reason of the steep increase in Soviet "aid," which over those 2 years ran up to 70 percent of the overall total of international "aid."

However, with the advent of the new regime, not only did Soviet aid grow steadily more generous: it underwent a qualitative change, taking a hand even in handling current affairs (we are sticking here to known facts: consider the involvement of Soviet personnel in the tragic and ill-fated attempt to save the American ambassador to Kabul from the hands of Islamic extremists -- or provocateurs? -- who killed him in the spring of 1979). There are two different but convergent reasons behind that change: one was the weakness of the domestic revolutionary movement which was looking for practical help in Soviet support, along with models for action and ideological counsel; and the other was the USSR's interest in beefing up its own presence and control over this crossroads of the enormous region that had suddenly moved into a phase of destabilization.

This poured more oil onto the embers of the nationalist-religious coals that had begun to glow and which were manifest not so much in occasional outbursts of xenophobia directed at Soviet citizens, civilian or military, in bazaars here and there, but in far more massive form, particularly along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The border region, known as Pashtunistan, had been divided when Pakistan was founded along the so-called Durand Line. Afghanistan had never been reconciled to this amputation of its territory, and the Pashtun population living astride that artificial frontier had continued to take an active part in Afghan life. And yet, only a few months after the birth of the new regime, the irredentist movement reversed its signals, sucked in by pressures from the "Islamic republic" in Pakistan (while the same thing was happening, although to a lesser degree, to the southwest, in the Iranian-Afghan Khorasan border region).

There, all of a sudden, was Islam which in the crumbling of the ancient state-to-society relationship was shaping up as a potent factor in a unification movement transcending more than one frontier.

It is a matter of record that the area of consensus in the infant revolution began to shrink back from its initial perimeters, not to mention its initial potential; the response from the group running things in the new regime to guerrilla warfare in the mountains and to creeping paralysis afflicting the urban masses was a steady forward fugue: repression, radicalization of government measures, uncontrolled and painful "personality cult" around Taraki, and ceaseless showers of propaganda lauding socialist achievements. These were surrogate responses, quite out of touch with reality; the infighting within the PDP leadership, drained by never-ending purges, did the rest.

We remember Taraki at the Havana summit meeting of the non-aligned nations. He held the spotlight at the press conferences, but he looked and acted like a sleepwalker. He spoke of stability, of advancement, of victory -- and all the while even the least informed among the reporters sent word back home that he was already dead. There is little point here in going over the record of events in the period that followed, all too familiar to all in the actual facts surrounding its end (and equally obscure and impenetrable insofar as the behind-the-scenes drama is concerned). From the assassination of Taraki (just back from Havana and after his stopoff at Moscow airport where he was welcomed with the highest honors by top Soviet leaders) at Amin's instigation, to the extension of guerrilla control over a good share of the provinces, the only response to which the government was able to come up with was a plea -- quickly acceded to -- for a larger Soviet military presence and thence step by step to the intervention of the USSR expeditionary force, with the execution of Amin, the "hard-liner" who never let a day go by without some flattering reference to his Soviet ally and with the return to government (one of history's dirty tricks) of Babrak Karmal, Anahita Ratebzad, and the others who had been exiled as "opportunists" or "bourgeois nationalists."

What we have here is the chronicle of the gradual isolation and defeat of a revolution. Naturally, pressures and infiltration and support of all kinds for subversion were brought to bear in Afghanistan from Iran, from China, and most of all from Pakistan. But this is the inevitable lot of every revolution (today often with the "Chinese factor" thrown in as an extra). It's all part of the rules of the game, in this particular Afghan instance further restored to balance by the far more massive and not merely geographical contiguity of the USSR.

The "revolution from the top" on 27 April 1978 never managed to get beyond the Kabul city limits; on the contrary, it merely heightened the city-country conflict, owing to its inability to find the right ways and means and pace to launch the process of unifying and integrating the country behind the task of organizing real democracy and hammering out a national identity. Mass social mobilization slipped gradually under the hegemony of enemy forces; the revolution's lack of creativity and the internal strife that ripped and tore at its leadership, then that leadership's retreat to the shelter of the USSR alliance as the prime guarantor of the process -- all of them combined to trigger the explosion of the endogenous causes (aside from the conflicts that had arisen out of foreign invasion) that led to the final collapse. Meanwhile, the Red Army's intervention, with the execution of Amin (who only a few hours after his bloody rise to the presidency had received the warmest of congratulations from the Soviet government) emerges as the end result of a commitment which, in the hellish cogs and wheels of events, gave the upper hand to the strategic factor, to reasons of state, right up to and including the occupation of Afghanistan. A slice of history, if you will; but was it also the heavy price of a revolution defeated so that the hope of one could be saved?

We are not even ready to venture a guess now as to whether that revolution, or some tenuous shred of it, might find expression in the Karmal government. Why? Because in the practical context of the regional situation, and in that of the no less troubled world situation, the occupation of Afghanistan turns out to be something quite different: the conquest and holding of a geopolitical outpost of tremendous importance to the socialist superpower, in the global confrontation that pits it against the capitalist superpower and its network of alliances.

Giuseppe Boffa (see UNITA, 13 January) quite properly reminded us of the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to Afghanistan, India, and Burma in 1955, which touched off the "great policy" of detente, feasible just insofar as it might prove possible to find a toehold in the Third-World non-aligned movement (and this is where you will find those alliances with the "national bourgeoisies" of the nations just then emerging from their colonial past that took up so much time in the CPSU's 20th congress). We should like to add a reminder of the Tashkent Conference in 1966, while Kosyghin was chairman, which led to the peace between India and Pakistan and thereby marked one of the high points in the USSR's role vis-à-vis the Third World and, more generally, in active coexistence on an international scale.

Now that relations between the USSR and the Third World are running out of the scope and the specific objectives they had in those days, are those relations beginning to settle back into

concepts and practice of "tightening the ranks?" And still another question arises out of the events in Afghanistan, which are unquestionably having serious impact on the non-aligned movement, coming on top of the countless centrifugal pressures to which they are subjected by imperialism (ranging from penetration by the multinational corporations to power-plays by medium-size nations like France, to official U.S. threats to OPEC. Is the menacing hint of dislocation in the nonaligned movement one more open clue to the collision course upon which the two superpowers are embarked (along with their respective systems of alliances) in the crisis that is shaking every corner of international relations, as the inevitable outcome of the very logic intrinsic to counterposed blocs?

Whatever the answers may be, here we see taking shape the tasks for us Europeans (not only in the EEC meaning); for us as the democratic forces in Europe, in government or in the opposition.

First of all, vis-à-vis the Third World. Down through the past 30 years the nations of the Third World, committed to the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism for the conquest of their own political independence -- in the more radical forms thrust upon them by oppression -- which was objectively incompatible with the dominant system: help from the USSR which, proffered in the heat of competition between the rival social systems and politico-military blocs (which are one of its expressions), wound up begetting the bloc logic even in those countries, with all its inherent evils: rigidity, interference, and docile compliance with one model and one policy. (To see the process in action, just glance down the list of nations that voted either against or abstained from voting on the motion introduced on 14 January deploring the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and calling for withdrawal of "foreign troops.")

And should such a country openly break out of the Soviet sphere, it either moves into or goes back into the U.S. sphere as a prime candidate to be used as the conflict between the superpowers starts to heat up again: just as Sadat's Egypt was in this tragic situation.

The Vietnamese people's battle, fought just to be their own masters and to speak and act for themselves, acquired as it went on extraordinarily broad autonomy; but the Sino-Soviet quarrel (I do not intend to go into its causes and dynamics here), eventually involving tormented Indochina, showed us how truly the big game in which the stakes are the peace and the future of the world is still one in which only two can play. Make that two plus one.

between the two extreme wings wavers the "center" zone of the Third World -- and of the non-aligned movement -- torn at once between solidarity and alienation by its own internal and growing disparity, by the need for its "second independence," by the burden of its backwardness, by its need for the West, despite the blows the West has dealt it in the past and just recently -- from the aggression in Vietnam or the occupation of Santo Domingo to the strangulation of Unidad Popular -- and by its mindless greed that keeps digging the chasm between "development" and "underdevelopment" deeper and deeper.

Looking back over the past 30 years, particularly the most recent ones, we see how for Vietnam and, on the opposite front, for Egypt, not to mention the entire "central" area of the Third World, what has been missing is a sympathetic listener who would help them get out of the suffocating confines of the contest between the superpowers; who would restore practical content and hence validity to the original motives of the non-aligned movement, which emerged as an independent factor in international relations specifically to leave politico-military blocs behind, to foster the full unfolding of the dialectic between classes and nations into true independence, as well as into cooperation among nations. That sympathetic listener, that pole for diversification in the Third World's economic and political relations should have been Europe, and the sudden acceleration in the current crisis in Afghanistan (while the world's economy is in disarray owing to the "irresponsibility" of the dollar) is interfering with North-South and East-West relations alike, underlines with unmistakable force that it cannot go on missing the rendezvous, playing the idle onlooker, as it is, to the march of events governed by a logic whose inevitable outcome would be "the unthinkable."

These days there are leaders and groups listening to one another who until yesterday were leery of any revisionist, philistine, reformist talk, of any hint of a Europeanist discourse, who are calling now for "Europe's role" with the contrite fervor of activists in the dawning hours of the Federalist Movement. The fact of the matter is that we must not be misled. Western Europe today swings back and forth between subordination and squabbling, between resignation and awareness of its destiny, which would be crushed by cold war and by its divorce from the deepest needs and aspirations of the Third World.

Europe's democratic parties, in and out of government, must seek out the ground for understanding where they can turn a hand to building the new world economic order rooted in cooperation among equals. In Europe, its principal pole for dialogue with the Third World lies in furtherance in the West, according to whatever timetable the march of history may impose, of the transition

from the culture based on the "American way of life" to another culture, one that would consume different goods and enjoy greater human wealth; one that would not allow every "opening" to the Third World to be more hypocrisy and more plundering in a new disguise. Inseparably linked with this effort -- and with all there is of immeasurable greatness linked with it in every area -- cultural, political, productive -- stands Europe's second fateful rendezvous, to which it is summoned by the tiny margin of time left for negotiations between the superpowers: that from the restoration of the minimum climate of trust and confidence it rise once again to the challenge of nuclear disarmament, to the abandonment of any perverse trend toward the creation of "axes" or "encirclements," and of the crude effectiveness of the usual responses to that sort of thing. There are only a few months between us and the Madrid Conference.

We have been alerted just recently to the fact that the very prospect for global coexistence is rooted in general principles: in respect for the sovereignty of states and in recognition of the United Nations as the supreme forum for negotiated solutions to international differences.

No less acute, though, as we measure the perilously narrow ridge along which the world is moving, is our perception of the need for every one of us to shout out his refusal to go down into either line of bunkers in the cold war. Should this not happen. the collision routes would eventually, perhaps very soon, proliferate out of all control. Clearly, that refusal must be translated from an ethical stand into positive political positions on the part of parties, social forces, and governments. This, though, iswhere we must start from, from a refusal to choose between trenches. And that is exactly where the world crisis seems, yet again, to be leading us.

Reform, Islam, Tribal Society

Florence POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE in Italian Feb 80 pp 11-20

[Article by Giorgio Vercellin]

[Text] The author, a teacher in the Iranian and Afghan Affairs seminar at Venice University, argues that the reforms introduced by the Taraki government did not conflict with Islamic tradition or the people's religious beliefs, but were a response to widely felt social needs. Opposition to the regime was not motivated so much by religious issues as by ethnic and tribal quarrels. Refusal to accept the dominance of the ruling ethnic group by the other groups that make up the

ethnic mosaic called Afghanistan, combined with opposition from the privileged classes, explains the gradual weakening of the revolution.

The year 1979 began in the Middle East with an event which unquestionably marked a turning-point in history: on 11 February the last of the "javidans," the "immortals" who formed the personal guard of Muhammad Reza Pahlevi, King of Kings and Light of the Aryans, surrendered to the people's revolt that had been going on for more than a year. At that moment, the embryo of the future Islamic Republic of Iran was born. Such a reversal, though it was a consummation devoutly wished by the Iranian people, seemed until a very short time ago, in the view of almost every international political commentator, a most unlikely eventuality.

The pundits based their predictions on a set of apparently sound assumptions: the immense wealth available to the shah and to his ruling class were adequate to fund development programs that would satisfy the needs of the population; the interests of the U.S., Japanese, and European corporations that had invested capital and were involved in local projects provided an umbilical cord for economic, cultural, and political exchanges between Iran, only now emerging from backwardness, and the developed world; furthermore, and most important, the geographical and strategic position of the country, allied with the West, on the border of the Soviet Union and in the richest oil-producing region in the world, made the shah seem untouchable, because his overthrow would be too traumatic and destabilizing at the global level.

Despite the initial reaction of dazed disbelief, however, Pahlevi's downfall did not give rise in the West to any major questions or attempts at analysis which might be, as the saying goes, equal to the situation. On the contrary, all, or almost all of them very swiftly settled on the "Islamic" factor in the revolt, while some even drew superficial parallels between the leader of a revolution that had the support of millions of Iranians, the Ayatollah Khomeyni, and Savonarola, as TIME magazine did in February last year. This certainly not accidental demonization of a new movement full of promise, purposely overlooked by the Western mass media, is still dominant in the most disparate forms which involve political forces on both the right and the left (1), and which continue to gain currency in a situation that is steadily deteriorating (or was it actually taken for granted from the outset that it would be?).

Then in 1979 there were other chances to observe that the problem of which the Iranian revolution was a factor, perhaps the most visible, could not be dismissed as merely an unforeseen and

historically meaningless revival of Islamic fundamentalism. To any who cared to understand it was increasingly clear that in relations among states we were in a crucial phase, at a turning-point and a redefinition of reciprocal relations.

To add to this already complicated picture of conflicting tensions came the USSR's December military intervention in Afghanistan. Immediately the commentators began scurrying about for more or less pro- or anti-Soviet explanations, either kind, of course, still seen primarily through the prism of the two blocs taking advantage of one another to move into the "grey areas." These analyses, though -- which might have contained some portion of the truth -- are obviously inadequate to respond to all the variables moving across the Middle East chessboard.

In fact events over the past few months force us once again and in increasingly unavoidable fashion to look at and deal with the world of today from a lay point of view, free from any ideological prejudice and from any preconceived notions. This holds true particularly for those who for the last several decades have at least shared in the management of international power. We must, in other words, reread carefully and perhaps a bit self-critically the record of events hitherto dismissed out of hand as unimportant, once and for all jettisoning that bogey now conjured up by everybody (perhaps to exorcize it) known as "Eurocentrism."

Islamic Tradition and Revolution

One of the prime requisites for reaching that goal is the most accurate and thorough knowledge of the individual realities in the process of change. To do this, for example, it is wrong to perceive in Islam alone the driving motive behind everything happening in the area, let alone reading the Islamic phenomenon from a schizoid angle. In Iran, it is indeed painted as the vector element in all that is most backward, reactionary, regressive, and xenophobic, while in Afghanistan it is protrayed as the bulwark of respect for healthy primitive traditions and customs against the godless reforms of a regime in alien bondage. And yet for the media people, who see opposition to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as consisting of "Islamic guerrilla fighters" warring against the anti-Muslim measures promulgated by the Kabul government, such as abolition of the dowry, it would be enough simply to read Decree number 7, readily available in English [2], to realize that nothing of the sort is in fact going on.

Then there is the fact that, even before getting down to the heart of the matter, we must bear in mind the meaning of the issue in Afghanistan, with at least a touch of historical perspective: for many men of modest income, the dowry (it would be

more accurate to call it the price the groom pays to the bride's family) used to mean, because of the large amount of money involved, enforced celibacy that could last to age 40 or 50, if not longer. In a country ranked by the United Nations among the 20 poorest in the world, this writer was told in the Kabul bazaar that a Hazara or Turkoman woman would cost 300,000 or 400,000 afghani, which is something like 7-8 million lire. A Kabul bricklayer then earned around 60 afghani a day (1,200 lire): clearly, for him to contemplate spending that kind of money meant he was absolutely forced to go into debt, if he could. For this reason the isaue had already been considered in various ways by other rulers, but never to any practical end.

One of the first acts of Nur Mohammad Taraki's government after it took power with the coup d'etat on 27 April 1979 was precisely in that direction (perhaps partly owing to the work done in the women's rights field by Anahita Ratebzad, then minister for social affairs, and back in the Kabul government today along with the other members of the Parcham group). True, the dowry decree does prohibit the sale "in exchange for money or goods" of any woman (Article 1): specifically, though, it is Article 3 that deals with the marriage gift, the one we actually call the dowry, which is sanctioned for Muslims by the Koran itself, which says: "Freely shall ye give women dowries" (Koran, LV,4). It is, in Islamic canon law, a "God-given right," making it a fundamental part of the social order which cannot be waived. And in fact the policy laid down by the Kabul leaders had carefully avoided violating that principle, relying instead -- and theirs was a strategy we shall encounted again elsewhere -- on the elbow-room provided by Islamic jurisprudence itself. Since, unlike other instances, neother the Koran nor the sunna, the "body of tradition," stipulates any economic definition of the size of the dowry, the RDA lawmaker took advantage of the law's silence. The decree sets a limit on the dowry, an act which is, Islamically speaking, the clear right of any ruler, and for which many precedents may be found in similar governmental measures both ancient and modern.

Briefly, what the government did was to set 300 afghani as the upper limit of the dowry or bride-price -- a sum within the reach of any citizen. In so doing, and in keeping within the most complete and unimpeachable compliance with Islamic law, against which neither canon judges nor mullahs could adduce logical argument or pertinent precedent, the new regime made it practically possible for anybody to marry. Clearly in some cases this decree had what might be called unfortunate results: for families with a lot of daughters, it meant a net loss of capital. But over and against such cases stand the spectacularly opposite cases of families blessed with many sons, not to mention those of a lot of men (and somen) who can now see their way to forming a family without going into debt for the rest of their lives.

Be that as it may, it did avoid a different danger, and this was something the RDA leadership perhaps had in mind, once again to dodge giving any practical pretext for attack by the religious conservatives. I am referring to the risk that, with the bride-price fallen so low there might be a rise in cases of polygamy (the decree says not a word about that).

The same argument holds, even more specifically, with regard to agrarian reform. Afghanistan, like most of the developing countries, is a predominantly agricultural state; even in 1975 85 percent of the population lived in some 10,000 villages, four fifths of which with less than 500 inhabitants, with no links whatever to the outside world -- if we except mule-drivers and transistor radios. There are very few big landowners, while most lesser freeholders had farms too small to support a family, no matter that Afghanistan's farmlands are potentially good.

Furthermore, in the years just prior to the April 1978 coup, the situation had deteriorated markedly, partly as a result of the 1970-1971 famine which, according to FAO, brought death to more than 500,000 people, partly because of the use of tractors and other mechanical devices to bring land under cultivation but which only the richest farmers could afford, and partly because of the constant shrinkage in plot sizes owing to repeated land division for purposes of inheritance.

When Taraki took to the radio on 9 May 1978 to announce the broad outlines of RDA policy, he gave first place to "completion of democratic land reforms, in the interests of the workers on the land and with their active participation." A few months later came ammouncement of the legislation that would do this: here again, as had been hinted, the lawmaker had tried to forestall any pretext for criticism from religious quarters. In fact, one of the law's articles provided that "no family may own more than 30 giarib of prime land or its equivalent" (Art. IV).

As we know, the life of every Muslim true believer is governed by five duties which he must perform to prove that he truly belongs to the Muslim community, and which are indispensable but not sufficient to his soul's salvation. Among these five duties is almsgiving, which is the canonical tithe paid by the believer on all he possesses, by means of which an ordinary tax is replaced by a religious obligation which enables the entire community to perceive itself as a whole in its institutional patterns. There is nothing more sacred than such "almsgiving," no obligation more binding on a Muslim. However, according to Islamic jurisprudence, it must be given only by those who can give or, as we would put it, only those with the "minimum tax liability": this is the nisab mentioned in the Afghan agrarian

reform act. In introducing this concept, the RDA lawmaker showed his sensitivity to the religious aspects of the issue, in that, by allowing ownership of the minimum required for almsgiving, he was guaranteeing that every true Muslim would have the means to fulfill his own spiritual life.

But there is more: lay society calls for sacrifice only upon those who are also bound by the demands of the religious society, placing no burden upon those who are considered "poor" by both. And here we have what looks like a paradox, if we look at it from the usual approach of the western pundits: the lay Afghan leaders showed that they were far more in sympathy with indigenous (Islamic) feelings than the "intransigent" propounders of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran were to do. What they did in fact, as grounds for the shari'ah (cf. note 6) deduction on the basis of the ijtihad or reasonable procedure, feel the need -- unjustified by anything except western acculturation -- to cite as remedy a latter-day "supplement" to that ijtihad to wit: "utilization of the latest in science, technology, and experience, and of whatever is designed to improve them."

In my view, this clearly indicates extreme care on the part of the Taraki regime in dealing with the whole corpus of problems that add up to Islam in its juridical and legal aspects. In short, this was no "godless" government, but an ordinary "laic" regime striving to force the religious strata in Afghan society to come to terms with itself on the grounds of practical choices. And that laic position was decidedly modern and far more advanced even than the one tested or implemented in the "Islamic" republics of the USSR (which, by comparison with countries like Iran, Libya, or Pakistan, are not, from the legislative point of view, "Islamic" at all any more).

If these were then the "religious" aspects of the agrarian reform law, the technical side of it looked just as sound. In a debate on the theory of agrarian reform (5) an English scholar argued that "the question of feasibility demands a bottom limit on the size of farmland holdings," and that therefore "it is better to give small landowners enough land to provide them with a decent living rather than to turn the landless peasants into mini-freeholders without a chance of making even a subsistence living." Furthermore, this same savant suggested that a 5 to 1 ratio between the maximum allowable (in land grants) and the subsistence level (for a single nuclear family) would cushion the impact on large landholders who are also good farmers, and would give the farmers in general no incentive to stick with inadequate habits of husbandry."

This writer is in no position to make a critical judgment between such arguments: this does not conflict with the fact that they

sound to him like views with facts and figures to back them up. sound, and worthy of sharing. And positions of this kind were taken into consideration in shaping Afghanistan's agrarian reform act, whose Article 3 in facts provides that every family shall have the right to own "no more than 30 giarib of prime farmland, while Article XII stipulates that "to every person having the right and to his family land shall be granted free of charge according to the following procedures" etc. Article XXIV, which sets down the levels of priority for land grants, gives top priority to "landless peasants or smallholders who work the land to be distributed [and to] landless peasants and smallholders whose lands have been taken by the government under condemnation procedings."

A problem often encountered by governments that have launched agrarian reforms has been the choice of deeds upon which to base grants; this hurdle of course sprang up before the RDA leaders, too, since they had no registry of deeds to refer to because the previous regimes had kept none. This is why, in the enabling regulations for Decree number 8 on land (meaning the agrarian reform act) considerable space is devoted to property deeds. Once again, we must admit the groundlessness of the allegations that the Afghan People's Democratic Party (PDPA) had strayed from existing tradition. Article IX of the enabling legislation says, in fact: "property deeds shall include: 1) governmental and ministerial decrees and bills of sale of government property...; 2) shari'ah records of sale, transfers of ownership, and inheritance...; 3) tax records...; 4) records in customary law..." As you can see, in status the Islamic records and deeds come second only to government acts and ahead of administrative action, and their religious nature is reemphasized again in the clause in Article X stating that [administrative actions] must, in order to be valid, be "recorded with the Court of the Cadi." Not does it affect the opinion stemming from the final limitation, which provides that "the person holding title (shari'ah title) as of the date of issuance up to the date when said title is produced, or a year prior to that date, shall have paid taxes [thereon]", inasmuch as a like provision applies to all property deeds, be they Islamic, civil, or customary.

Yet further evidence of the good will and care devoted by the RDA leaders to dealing with the problem of altering economic and social relationships in the rural areas came, in fact, from the publication in September 1978 (3 months prior to promulgation of the agrarian reform act) of the model charter for cooperatives, whose aim was to "organize small landowners, improve agricultural production, raise the social consciousness of the peasants, elevate the standard of living for the gallant and noble classes that labor in the fields and eliminate feudal-style relationships dating back to the Middle Ages" (Article I). This is not

the place for a critical examen of the content of this model charter for cooperatives. Nevertheless, using only the brief excerpts from it quoted here, it seems clear to me that the RDA government had drafted a reform plan which was not utopian or demagogic -- the kind that too often emerges from regimes that have come to power through a coup d'etat and who thereafter go searching for mass support from the people; rather, it looks to me like a plan that could be the start to practical solutions to the problems of the peasants.

Only trouble is -- the plan never got off the ground. There were numerous reasons: the difficulties in implementing it in almost inaccessible regions, where the old landowners often stirred up the peasants against the government agents, many of whom were actually killed; there was a bitterly hard winter in 1978-79, which destroyed the harvest at a particularly critical time; and, most of all, the lack of the required capital. Aggravating this last factor, and multiplying its effects were the problems ignited by Decree number 6, the first act of the new government in the economic area, which abolished both mortgages and usury.

This, mark you, was a practice harshly condemned in Islam, although it was widely practiced (through solutions we should call "jesuitical") -- so widely that in the early Seventies an expert studying the country's agricultural situation wrote that "the mullahs would find in this (the fight against usury) a good pretext for declaring a holy war, rather than inveighing against miniskirts or hurling anathemas at the few inns that dispense alcoholic beverages." (7) This does not alter the fact that in the socio-economic structure of the Afghan village, this kind of loan, even at very long term, did perform a useful function in that it was a way for the poor peasants to find seed-money for their annual planting, and also the wherewithal to put food on the family table in cases of extreme need. After the ban on usury this form of credit -- illegal but a realistic response to local realities -- suddenly disappeared, to be replaced, in the PDPA plan, by cooperatives. Unfortunately, the RDA's economic and political situation right then made it impossible for the government to solve the peasants' problems.

The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare

All of this was of course aggravated by the guerrilla war that called itself "Islamic." As far back as the Twenties, the experiments at reform tried by King Amanullah (1919-1929) were violently cut short by an insurrection brandishing "Islamic" slogans against the king's "godless" measures. The fact is, as recent research has proved (8), that then, as now, the fight was mounted to keep economic and political power in the hands of certain groups (tribes, landowners, religious leaders) who opposed the changes that curtailed their hitherto free hand.

the clue to the continuity between the events of 1929 and what we are seeing today is provided, physically, by the presence at the head of the rebellion of descendants of the leaders of 60 years ago! we find among those who rose up from the start against the Kabul government such dignitaries as Sibqatollah Mogiaddadi, president of the National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (FNSA), a descendant of Hazrat-e-Saheb of Shor-Bazar. His ancestor was a religious leader who, after escaping from the Soviet Union where he had fought in the anti-communist uprising of the Basmaci, had settled at Jalalabad (one of the areas in which the anti-RDA resistance is most active today), where he quickly won himself fame, veneration, and large estates. In 1929, he even threw in with his country's traditional foes, the English, and successfully fomented the tribes and the most conservative strata of the Afghan population to revolt against the sovereign's reforms which -- here again -- threatened his political and economic power far more than it did religious orthodoxy.

As for the opposition forces ranged against the Kabul government right now -- since the Soviet military intervention and the consequent higher level of attention on the part of the international media to developments in the area -- we hear that there is a merger afoot among various and sundry movements (nobody seems to know precisely how many: TIME magazine sets the number at 60, no less [9]). This is hardly a recent trend, inasmuch as in the 2 years that have elapsed since the April 1978 coup d'etat there has been one merger after another under one unified command after another, just as there has been one split after another. The reasons behind all of this are numerous; first of all, ethnic and tribal feuds, which -- as we shall see -- severely hamper the Kabul government, are visible in the ranks of the opposition as well. For instance, there is the Afghan Islamic Union (Jami'yat -e-Eslami, or UIA), said to be led by Seyyed Rabbani, which apparently is made up exclusively of Pashtun, the majority group that for 2 centuries held power in Afghanistan. Then there are the people who speak Dari (Afghani Persian, the mother tongue of a good many ethnic groups and widely used as an inter-ethnic lingua franca), who are to be found in the Afghan Islamic Party (PIA or Hezb e Eslami) head by Muhammad Nabi, who some observers say -- but cannot prove -- has ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Pakistan.

In addition to this first element, and to social distinctions (many refugees are peasants fleeing from the food shortage due in part to the failure of agrarian reform and in part to the very inclement harvest season, who find themselves sharing the lot of rich landowners and religious leaders who managed to get part of their wealth out in time and are now, on top of all that, speculating in foreign aid materials), there are still

further subdivisions caused by the conflicting goals of the individual groups: the UIA seems to want a republic along the lines of the Iranian one, and the PIA hopes for the return of King Zahir, overthrown by Daoud's coup d'etat in 1973; and then the FNSA "is trying to create an economic and social order consistent with the Islamic concept of social justice." There is of course no lack of mutual accusations of collusion with the enemy, who is not necessarily identified either with Kabul or with the Soviets: frozen out of a very recent -- perhaps the nth merger was the Islamic Revolution Movement (Enqelab-e Eslami) because it was accused of being "in contact with the CIA." (10)

These groups, running on religious slogans, are not the movements really active in the fight against the RDA: in it as well are pro-Chinese and Marxist-Leninist groups, like Setam-e Melli (Oppression of the People). As for the former, active in the country since the Sixties with the Shol'e-ye Giavid (Eternal Flame) group, they were split into two or three factions, one of which collaborated with the Muslim Brotherhood, to the point where, as early as April of last year, Indian sources, picked up by Moscow and Kabul as well, were reporting that guerrilla fighters were getting training on Chinese territory, and that among them were 200 Muslim Brotherhood warriors. It is more than likely that now, under pressure from Peking, the pro-Chinese groups have got together again and are strengthening their ties with the Islamic movements.

Setam-e Melli, though, is a group that surfaced after a split in the ranks of the PDPA itself at the end of the Sixties: back in 1975 they put together an uprising, quickly put down, in the Badakhshan region, where even now the fiercest fighting is centered, and they were also accused by the Kabul government of responsibility for the February 1979 kidnaping of U.S. Ambassador Dubs, ending in his death, with the cutoff of U.S. economic aid to Afghanistan and deteriorating relations between the White House and the Kremlin, and were under suspicion of direct involvement in the tragic conclusion of that episode. Setam-e Melli says it is Marxist-Leninist, its main article of faith is that "the main conflict in Afghanistan is not class conflict, but conflict among nationalities," and it denounces the PDPA as "an agent of Pashtun hegemony." From this position stems its practical coincidence of interests with Peking, which has always viewed the problem of Pashtunistan (the region the English colonials split into Palkistan and Afghanistan and in which the great majority of Pashtuni live, as a tool devised by Moscow to dismember its own ally in the area, the Islamabad government.

Still another element can be attached to the "religious" rebels and the political groups already mentioned in the ongoing struggle against the Kabul government, although coming from quite

another direction: I mean the tribes. What they are actually doing is taking advantage of existing tensions to reassert their own autonomy with regard to any central government (Kabul today, but tomorrow it might just as well be Islamabad, should they feel threatened from there) and also to capture more modern weapons than the ancient Enfield rifles they captured from the English in 1839 and in later conflicts.

In view of all this, it is altogether natural that when the RDA government launched its reform program, the situation immediately radicalized. It could hardly be otherwise, given the fact that at the same time there was a heating up in the never-settled conflict we just mentioned between any central government seeking to impose its authority and the centrifugal forces of a tribal society whose life-style requires total freedom from any domestic ties. Actually, the tribes rose up at the very time when they became aware of the fact that the new regime in Kabul, owing to weakness connected with its internal stabilization, with the troubles encountered in implementing the reforms, and with the problems created by alien forces, could not maintain control (except in the very random fashion it had been trying to do so) over the outlying areas. However, I would stress once again, this came about in response to reasons of tribal policy, not because of religious issues.

I referred earlier to the problems stemming from the variety of ethnic and linguistic groups. Since 1747, when the chiefs of the Pashtun confederation of the Durrani declared their autonomy of the Persian kingdom of Nadir Shah Afshar, who after centuries had reunified the territories of what is now Afghanistan, whatever government sits in Kabul has been run either by Pashtun or by Pathans, also known simply but incorrectly as Afghani. These people, who live mainly in the eastern and southern regions of the country (as well as in the northwest province of Pakistan known as Pashtunistan) are nomads organized into tribes, with an agricultural-pastoral culture they feel beyond comparison with that of the sedentary Tajiks who live in Herat and in the other areas bordering on Iran.

These people, who make up the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, feel toward the nomadic herdsmen the mistrust and condescension they would show toward anybody with no fixed address, and reputed to live a primitive or backward life and suspected of religious laxity into the bargain. Mutual hostility is further deepened by the fact that the Tajiks for centuries have played a major economic role in trade between the towns and the country districts, whereas of recent years Afghanistan's rulers have given preference in the foreign trade that has been taking on increasing importance in local life with the hated Pashtuni.

Nor is that all: during the Sixties, for instance, the experts sent out by the international organizations were utilized mainly in the capital or in the Pathan zones where development projects were under way, whereas in the Tajik city of Herat, even though it is in the middle of an oasis with tremendous agricultural potential, there were only four foreign technical experts.

Nor is this merely a recent state of affairs: back in 1863, a Hungarian traveler wrote that "never has any ruler or conqueror been so loathed by the inhabitants of Herat as the Pashtun; in a region where they are called upon to play a major role, these Afghans have made themselves the objects of hatred. This is why the people of Herat would immediately plunge once again into a desperate struggle rather than recognize Afghan supremacy." (11)

So here, in my view, unlike what is taking place along the Pakistani border, is where the underlying cause of the rebellions that have occurred in the western regions of Afghanistan lies: now, just as it did a year ago, when in March 1979 a rebellion swept the city of Herat and was strangled in blood. This is above and beyond other factors, which unquestionably have been accumulating steadily (provocation on the part of the Tehran regime; occasional anti-Soviet feeling -- which in any case was not very widespread in the country; revolt against agrarian reform and the other decrees; pro-Shiite and anti-Sunni religious sympathies spreading beneath the surface throughout the area), but which were only the detonator for hostility already centuries old. What I mean to say is that the uprising last March, like the tensions still running high along the Iranian border, where most of the people are Tajiks, was simply but tragically the outbreak of popular hostility not so much directed against the RDA as -- above all -- against Pashtun domination, however historically represented.

Proof of this can be found in the very pattern of last year's revolt: insofar as we know, and unlike the situation on the Pakistani border, the rebels here sought no aid from any quarter, and were supported by no one (possible Iranian intervention was not absolutely decisive, nor have there ever been reports of the formation in Iran of organizations of exiles from Herat comparable to those active in Peshawar), nor yet have they indicated any desire to join with Iran or of wanting to form a "Greater Khorasan" (the geographical region which historically included the city of Herat, the city of Mashhad in Iran, and the town of Marv in the Soviet Union) as an independent entity.

The March 1979 uprising in Herat came about despite the RDA's leaders' having taken a series of steps in favor of ethnic minorities in a radical break with the policies of previous

rulers. Those governments had always given privilege of place to the Pashtun language, despite the fact that the latest constitutions (those of 1964 and 1977) declared Dari an official language as well, but totally omitted any mention of all the other languages (no fewer than 34) spoken in the country. Only 3 weeks after the 27 April 1978 coup d'etat, the RDA government gave the"(relevant) ministries a mandate to begin broadcasting programs in the Uzbek, Turkoman, Baluchi, and Nuristani languages and to introduce the cultures of all the tribes and nations of our one land, our beloved Afghanistan." Nor were these early measures the only ones: magazines in the various languages were published; an Academy of Science was opened in which there were provisions made for the various minorities; textbooks were printed (initially only in Turkoman and Baluchi).

In short, contrary to all allegations in the foreign press, the RDA's action during the early days of its power was aimed at implementing measures designed to help the social strata and the social and ethnic groups that had been most underprivileged heretofore and also, because of that, the easiest prey to the influence of the conservative sectors. But who were the RDA's leaders? Who made up the cadres of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan?

A Party Divided

Alone among all the states sharing borders with the Soviet Union, in which, after 1917, "a mixture of refugees, students, prisoners of war, and emigrant workers succeeded in forming organizations under the tutelage and inspiration of the Russian revolution, no communist party was created in Afghanistan during the Twenties," partly because "there was no point, for the Bolsheviks, in setting up a separate Afghan communist party (in that) their main concern was ... to consolidate relations with Amanullah, who ruled the only country in the world that was willing, in those days, to cooperate with the Bolsheviks." ([12]). This did not mean that various "leftist" movements of one kind or other have not always been active in the country, particularly in the late forties, when for the first time some of the RDA's leaders-to-be, including Taraki and Karmal, emerged upon the national scene.

The official birth of a progressive, pro-communist movement in Afghanistan is usually dated as 1 January 1965, when the PDPA was founded. Its advent must of course be viewed within the context of the Afghan situation at the time: just the year before, a new constitution had been promulgated in order to lay down the guidelines for more up-to-date national development and for political integration of the new classes emerging as the fruit of Daoud's work during the previous December (the military, the bureaucrats, teachers, import-export dealers, and the like).

In that basic law of the land provision was made, for the first time in Afghan history, for political parties: that meant that the PDPA was part of a general trend in offering progressives a channel for voicing their own demands.

There is no record of the identities and numbers of those who came together in the semi-official PDPA (since King Zahir never got around to issuing the enabling regulations for the 1965 constitution). Other clues would indicate, however, that its size was by no means small -- by Afghan standards, of course (but in any case its membership was confined to intellectual and urban middle-class circles).

There is, however, one major problem in connection with the PDPA in the causes and extent of the differences between the Khalq (People) faction, headed by Taraki, and the Parcham (Banner) faction under Karmal. On the basis of material available in the West it is not possible, for the time being, to grasp the practical motivation that led in 1967 to the split (probably only at the summit, and in any case a relative thing, since we do know that the two factions worked together even afterwards), or above all what their relations were with the Daoud regime (it would appear that Khalq backed him only at the outset, whereas Parcham was actually part of the governing group, but was ousted from it for good in 1975). Nor is it clear whether the USSR ever expressed or indicated a preference for one faction over the other: outright support would seem, however, to be ruled out, in that the Kremlin preferred, for so long as possible, to deal directly with the governing leaders in Kabul. Only after 1976-77 did it become clear that Daoud was growing increasingly dependent on the shah of Iran (who had not only promised tremendous amounts of financial aid -- which was never forthcoming -- to Afghan development, but had used his influence in Kabul to the point that members of Savak -- the Iranian secret police -- were serving in the Afghan army); only at this juncture, then, does there seem to be specific direct Soviet intervention in connection with the PDPA (which in July 1976 "officially" reunited).

And so it was that in April 1978, when the coup came that overthrew Daoud, and everywhere you looked the symptoms of the impending revolution were rife in the pervasive bloody uprisings, the first RDA government embraced both Parcham and Khalq members. That collaboration was not long-lived, however. In July of that same year Taraki ordered a purge, in the course of which he sent several Parchami -- including Karmal and Ratebzad -- out of the country as ambassadors.

To go into the details of occurrences in Afghanistan during the months that followed, illuminating though it might be, is most assuredly impossible: in brief, it may be said that while the

"out" faction went underground and refused to return home even when Taraki ordered them to do so in August of 1978, just as news broke of the discovery of a conspiracy (this, according to a number of commentators, handily providing Moscow with a second team should Taraki's programs fail) the domestic political situation centered, in the opening months of 1979, on the split between the RDA president and his prime minister, Hafisullah Amin. Amin has been fingered by some observers as the government's strong man, more pro-Soviet than his rival: the one thing that is certain, though, is that when reunification between the warring factions was under way, he was the one entrusted with the job of political activity inside the army, which since the Fifties had been commanded by cadres trained in the USSR, and hence conditioned to accept a message along the PDPA's progressive lines. While he was engaged in this task, Amin must have made intimate contacts with certain military circles which were subsequently to serve him well: unequivocal proof of this can be found in the fact that the one and only PDPA member who was not arrested by Daoud's police on the eve of the 1978 coup d'etat was -- Amin.

Be that as it may, Amin's shady dealings seemed to be matter for concern in 1979 for the Soviets as well. On his way home from Havana where he had been a delegate to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, Taraki stopped off in Moscow where he was granted an audience with Brezhnev: rumor had it, even before the recent Soviet intervention, that Amin's banishment and the return home of Karmal and his group were decided upon at that meeting. Karmal was being recalled to support Taraki, who still enjoyed some support in the Kremlin, partly because the problems it had encountered there had proved more serious than anticipated. The catch was, though, according to these same sources, that Amin had got wind of the fact, while he was setting up Taraki's overthrow, just a few days before he returned home. Clearly, this contretemps not only gave rise to considerable irritation in the Kremlin at the elimination of a leader it had just lately pinned considerable faith on, but also at the need to review its own Afghan programs. There you have the "Afghan" motives for the Soviet intervention, which, in my view, cannot be adequately explained either in the strength of the guerrilla forces (the Kremlin was already providing the Afghan army with ample supplies of weapons and advisers) or in Kabul's economic woes (it is much harder now to provide food as aid to Afghanistan than it was before, when there were no United States restrictions on grain sales). Any reading of events must perforce turn at this point to the global options of the superpowers, and their "need," in the void left by the fall of the Iranian keystone, to redefine the boundaries of their respective areas of influence.

FOOTNOTES

1. I could cite countless examples, in Italy and elsewhere: I shall cite only one among the many here, "Ayatollah's Christmas Message," which appeared in NEW STATESMAN magazine (21-28 December 1979, pp 992-993). In it, the author (David Caute) puts Khomeyni in the stocks by offering, as answers to economic and political questions, quotations from the French translations of (mainly theological) works by the Ayatollah, with results readily imaginable.

2. Hadi Rabban, "Decrees of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," Kabul 1979. An Italian translation of the decrees -- from the original Dari and Pashtu -- is to be found as an appendix to Giorgio Vercelli's "Afghanistan 1973-1978: from Presidential Republic to Democratic Republic," Venice 1979. Quaderni del Seminario di iranistica, uralo-altaistica e caucasologia dell'Universita degli studi di Venezia, nº 4, distributed by Herder, Rome. The reader is referred to that paper for a more detailed discussion than this one.

3. One giarib = 1,952 square meters.

4. Article 2 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

5. Michael Lipton, "Toward a Theory of Agrarian Reform," in Italian translation in POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE, 7, July 1979, pp 51-70.

6. The Shari'ah is the behavioral code of the Islamic community, unwritten but not the same thing as customary law because it derives from "divine will," which is deduced in parallel with direct revelation (Koran); from the opinion of the prophet (hadith) for Sunni Muslims, and those of the prophet and of the imams for Shi'ites; from community consensus and rational procedure (analogy for Sunni, reasoning for Shi'ites).

7. Gilbert Etienne, "Afghanistan ou les aleas de la cooperation," Paris, 1972, p 102, nº 1.

8. Leon B. Poullada, "Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. King Amanullah's Failure To Modernize a Tribal Society," Ithaca, 1973.

9. TIMES, January 1980, p 31.

10. LE MONDE, 8 January 1980.

11. Arminius Vambery, "Travels in Central Asia... Performed in the Year 1863," London, 1864 [reprint New York 1970] pp 271-273.

12. Fred Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," in NEW LEFT REVIEW, 112, November-December 1978, p 10.

'Normalized' Revolution

Florence POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE in Italian Feb 80 pp 21-28

[Article by Claudio Moffa]

[Text] The roots of the conflict are to be sought in the Democratic People's Party, split from its beginning in 1965 into a moderate, pro-Soviet wing, known as Parcham, and a radical wing, the Khalq, which was internationally independent, and headed by Taraki and Amin. Long story of internal feuding and the clash between the two lines. The Islamic guerrilla war and its function in the strategy of the dispossessed interests. Soviet intervention put a stop to the radical turn taken by Amin's guidance of the revolution and returned the moderate Karmal to power.

Overwhelmed by the tidal wave of dispatches filed on the varying fortunes of the war and by the reams of commentary on the actual or assumed strategies of the superpowers in southern Asia and the Middle East, the overthrow of Hafizullah Amin, Afghanistan's president from 16 September to 27 December 1979, and member of the central committee of the PDP since its founding, went almost completely unnoticed, as if it had been a minor "incident"in what the Soviets had been up to in the midst of their massive intervention in Afghanistan. And yet, it is our opinion that in that sudden change at the summit lies one of the principal keys for understanding the complex and sanguinary game the Soviet superpower is putting together in the area, with its eye not so much on Afghanistan as on neighboring Iran with its latent civil war; and for understanding, on the other hand, the U.S. reaction against a Soviet military presence in Kabul dating back, although in far smaller dimensions, long before 27 December 1979 (not to mention those economic ties of much older vintage).

Just who was Amin, who is now branded by Soviet propaganda and by the new Afghan government -- Stalinism dies hard -- as "an

agent of imperialism" and a "mass murderer"? What sort of quarrel set him against his successor Babrak Karmal, leader of the PDP's Parcham faction?

While available material on Afghanistan is scanty([1]), it is adequate to provide fairly exhaustive answers to these questions. The People's Democratic Party (PDP) was founded on New Year's Day 1965, the day when a whole string of Afghan intellectuals -- including Amin, Karmal, and other such lesser lights as Dastagir Pandjsheri, Akbar Khaybar, and Sherai Giawgezani -- got together in Kabul at the home of Mohammad Taraki to hammer out the policy foundations for the nascent organization. With its eye on a monarchy that had enjoyed Stalin's open support through the Twenties and that still maintained not unfriendly relations with the Soviet Union in the context of the region's geopolitical balance, the PDP went on record with the statement that it was too soon to abolish the crown, at least "in this phase of the nation's development"; but at the same time it took a stance against feudalism, calling for the abolition of large land-holdings and for agrarian reform that would redistribute the land among the destitute peasants.

These economic goals were a natural part of the "nationalist democratic revolution, the first and necessary phase in the socialist revolution" typical of all revolutionary processes in the emergent world.

Yet it was on precisely this point, on the interpretation to be placed upon the "nationalist democratic" phase of the revolutionary process, that, a scant year later, brought the first open dissent among the leadership and set off the first split in the PDP. Arrayed on one side was the minority Parcham (Banner) wing headed by Babrak Karmal, who argued for what amounted to a moderate interpretation: all the anti-feudal classes on a footing of equality, around a program of cautious, "modernizing" reform. On the other side was the Khalq (People) faction, led by Taraki and Amin, advocating a more radical strategy, symbolized by the postulate of hegemony for the working class over the rest of the democratic and anti-feudal united front as it already existed and as it would develop. In view of the fact that the working class in Afghanistan was and is practically non-existent, this statement of principle was to be understood as a more resolute and muscular leadership of the anti-feudalist movement on the part of the party which -- as a Marxian-inspired group -- was the true repository of the proletarian ideology.

The basic strategic difference was reflected later on in other aspects of the political line. At the level of internatonal alignment Parcham was always identified as the pro-Soviet component of Kabul's revolutionary intelligentsia; the Khalq

faction under Taraki and Amin, on the contrary -- and never mind the countless gross inaccuracies in the Western media after Daoud was overthrown in 1978 -- held firmly to "by common recognition, an independent position." (2) This is not to say that Khalq was not part, root and branch, of the "Soviet-Leninist" tradition in its ideological and policy sense, which rejected the Mao-Lin Piao strategy of war by the country people: a tiny splinter of Khalq was openly pro-Chinese, and argued that the rural areas should be the strategic center of revolutionary action; its members broke with Taraki and Amin in 1968, but never did manage to rally any serious mass following. (3)

Khalq and Parcham had their differences, too,on the practical action level: while Khalq urged a complete break with middle- and upper-middle class circles, to which most of its members belonged, and directed its mass work toward the lower classes in the capital and in the outlying rural areas, Parcham -- which was not idly dubbed the "communist monarchical party" by its foes -- was preaching infiltration of the feudal state apparatus, including the military hierarchy. In this connection it should be remembered that the royal army's officer corps had traditionally been trained in the military schools of the neighboring Soviet Union.

Behind these strategic and practical differences, too, there are those who perhaps rightly see the stamp of Karmal's and Taraki's personalities: Karmal, son of an army general, came from a rich and influential family; Taraki was a child of poverty (a Pathan tribe, the Ghizlai clan), who had to work his way through school.

The Parcham-Daoud Alliance (1973-77)

At first events seemed to prove Parcham right: although it had always espoused the more cautious position in the PDP as to the type of regime and the monarchy-republic option, Karmal's faction suddenly and unexpectedly found itself with an edge over the rival Khalq faction when in 1973 the "Red Prince" Daoud took power, announcing major reforms that were to change the face of the country, and the creation -- more or less in line with Parcham's own program -- of a "broad front of all nationalist, progressive, and patriotic forces."

Daoud's experiment, however -- in which Parcham had a first-hand part with major positions in the ministries and in the civil service in general -- soon proved a failure: the promised democratic elections would never be held. Further, the quasi-traditional option of non-alignment in foreign policy seemed shaken when Daoud paid a visit to neighboring Iran, eliciting an indignant protest from Parcham.The understanding with the shah, most important of all, involved some watering down of Kabul's claims

to Beluchistan, which it had claimed from neighboring Pakistan for longer than anyone remembered. Above all, as a close relative of the deposed monarch, the prince could not find it in his heart to break with the landowning class: that meant that the argarian reform plans boiled down to a little "green revolution" with disastrous consequences, which, combined with the effects of the world economic crisis, further impoverished the already bone-poor masses of the Afghan people. From 1970 to 1975 the annual growth rate in the GNP, which during the Sixties had been 1.6 percent, dropped to 0.2 percent; a wave of inflation hit the towns and cities, particularly the food markets; about a million unemployed were driven to emigrate to neighboring Iran and the Arab Emirates, or stayed home to swell the ranks of the urban lumpenproletariat. Kabul's population rose from 450,000 in 1970 to 740,000 by 1976.

As the crisis deepened, it swallowed up whatever margin of time there had been for the effort to transform the country gradually that Parcham had been preaching: and so conditions grew ripe -- Afghanistan is not the only country to have experienced this sort of thing during those years -- for the radical shift of 1978. The year before, called to account by Kabul's intelligentsia and students, Parcham duly recited its mea culpa and rejoined the Khalq-PDP in a minority position. At the same time, Khalq had been revising its line of action, and launching -- this too is a symptom of the bankruptcy in long-term strategies -- a campaign of inflitration among the armed forces: this was the only way out for a revolutionary party which, considering ways of overthrowing the feudal monarchy, at the same time rejected, as we have seen, the route of armed struggle and of a people's guerrilla war.

Daoud's Overthrow and PDP Reforms

The positive effects of the break between Parcham and Daoud and of mending the breach between the two PDP factions came on 27 April 1978. The prince, after trying partial liberalization of the system, had once more turned the screws of repression on his country's politics, and his police had arrested, among others, Taraki himself. He was overthrown in a PDP-led uprising, in which several army detachments openly took part. It was a coup d'etat, yes, insofar as its "Blanquist" and insurrectionary technique was concerned, but it was decidedly not a military coup nor yet one engineered by the USSR, as the western media would go on repeating day after day. It began with an all-but-unforeseen -- though obviously organized by Hafizullah Amin for one -- reaction to Daoud's order for a wave of arrests: "The leftist coup d'etat of 27 April was more the upshot of an impromptu action than of any formal plan" (4) In the second place there were only three military men among the 21 members of the new

government. In the third place, despite Parcham's active participation in the rebellion, the Khalq faction swiftly took the situation into hand. "Despite numerous allegations to the contrary, we believe that the Soviets were not directly involved in the random operation of 27 April." (5)

For that matter, Taraki went on repeatedly, in the course of the weeks following the seizure of power, stressing the new government's loyalty to the principles of non-alignment, and the "homegrown" and "new model" nature of the "Afghan revolution."

The convulsive events that followed the revolutionary turnabout, at least until Taraki was overthrown by Amin (September 1979), can be boiled down to three fundamental givens.

1. In the first place, the moderate wing of the PDP, and the one with the closest ties to the USSR, Parcham, was soon squeezed out of the party by the Khalq under Taraki and Amin. As early as July 1978 Babrak Karmal was removed as prime minister and made ambassador to Prague while, a few days later, Gen Kadir, a moderate nationalist-Muslim, was politically eliminated and arrested on charges of conspiracy. It should be noted that Parcham's alienation from the government occurred concomitantly with the PDP's promulgation of revolutionary decree nº6, which abolished usury, a traditional scourge in the country, particularly in the rural areas: with one pass of the sponge a total of 600 billion lire in debts -- debts owed by millions of peasants -- were wiped out by that law.

2. In the second place, and conversely, the radicalization of the social class and the revolutionary process was beginning to chip away at the non-alignment stance officially reiterated by both Taraki and Amin: as the new government was tightening cooperation agreements with the USSR to finance the forthcoming reforms, Pakistan and Iran -- the latter already shaken by the popular uprising against Reza Palhavi's dictatorship and, furthermore, already economically involved in Afghanistan -- were steadily stiffening in their attitude toward events in Kabul. The Federal Republic of Germany -- to which earlier regimes had followed the practise fairly widespread in the pro-Western Third World and entrusted the training of its police -- voluntarily withdrew its military advisers once the corps had been suitably neutralized by the new government for fear of reactionary coups. And thus the groundwork was laid -- under the aegis of the western media campaign against what was a purely imaginary "pro-Soviet" switch in Kabul (in 1978) -- for the pro-Soviet switch that did indeed come to pass a year later, thanks to Amin's overthrow and Karmal's takeover with direct support by Soviet tanks. The Soviet military presence was to increase steadily, keeping pace with the feudal "vendée" organized or at least financed by the CIA from Pakistan, spread and thereby imperilled

the nation's stability and implementation of agrarian reform programs.

3. The third of our basic givens: the reforms launched by the new government and their impact on the social and ethnic conflicts inside the country. Of the eight decrees issued by the revolutionary government between April 1978 and July 1979, three were truly fundamental: one was the abolition of usury, which we have already mentioned; the second was the one calling for equality between the sexes, for reduction of the bride-price (total abolition would have conflicted with Islamic tradition), and banning forced marriages -- a practice widespread in rural areas, with the approval of the religious authorities (decree-law No 7); and the third was agrarian reform, which took effect on 1 January 1979 (nº 8). It was the keystone in the revolutionary process in a country where 75 percent of the population works on the land. The "democratic agrarian reform" called for confiscation of large land-holdings and redistribution of title to family plots among the landless..."Something halfway between Mao-style cooperatives and the Yugoslav type based on individual ownership of the land." (6) In September of 1979 a count showed that 600,000 hectares had been redistributed to a total of 300,000 families.

Along with these revolutionary decrees, the new government launched a set of measures also designed to break up the country's old social, political, and cultural order. Thousands of political prisoners were freed and members of the royal family and of the nobility jailed. A campaign for multilingual literacy was launched (abolition of Pa'han as the "official" language applied to radio broadcasts as well), under which more than 600 new schools were opened and more than a million adults were involved. A start was made at overhauling the ancient government bureaocracy through wholesale purges and arrests of the old regime's civil servants, and the insertion en masse of party cadres into the central and provincial administrations. The work of providing political education to the armed forces went on from its timid start under Daud; and, as we have seen, the police force was neutralized by disarming it mere days after the 27 April turnabout.

Islamic Opposition

And so it was that Afghanistan, through a "revolution from the top" typical of so many Third World countries, struck out on the road to far-reaching transformation. Clearly, though, it was inevitable that any such process would run into widespread obstacles and resistance. The problems the new regime had inherited from the past were as numerous as they were thorny. There was the heavy burden of underdevelopment: industry -- except

for textiles and a few cement factories and sugar refineries -- was practically non-existent. As for agriculture, of the potentially arable land (14 million hectares) only a tiny share (3 million hectares) was actually under cultivation. Cultural and sanitary conditions were the most backward imaginable: 90 percent of the population illiterate, 30 percent suffering from one or another form of tuberculosis, and tens of thousands of lepers. The social stratification was only partly "simple" and dichotomous: in the rural districts the landless masses (30 percent of the peasant population) was "easy" to win over to the revolution when the big estates were broken up and redistributed. But there were also millions of smallholders (45 percent of the peasantry) who, although they too were poor (their holdings were never more than 4 hectares) were nevertheless hierarchically arrayed among themselves, and were relatively privileged by comparison with the rest of the rural population. Also at work in the country districts was the age-old web of patterns of control by the old feudal establishment over the peasant population, which operated through the traditional village headmen (mirab, malek, arbab, etc.,) and the Islamic mullahs.

Lastly, the government was also facing the manifold unresolved national questions in the country: the artificial offspring of British imperial policy in southern Asia, Afghanistan is a mishmash of disparate ethnic groups. The Pathans (or Afghani) are by far the majority ethnic group (some 7 million of them); then there are more millions of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkomans, Hazaras, etc. Many of these populations are nomadic (2.5 million in all) or semi-nomadic, and they are an obstacle to agricultural development.

It was out of these complex problems we have listed here that there began to emerge early in 1979 a mass opposition to the regime: significantly (PDP members are mostly Pathan in origin) it takes on tribal characteristics in non-Pathan regions, but feeds on the religious factor where Pathans predominate. The latter brand is far more widespread: of the ten or so anti-government guerrilla groups on which there are hard data today, most are Islamic in orientation.

The Islamic-tribal opposition to the regime -- bearing in mind the opinions provided us by the western press on the matter -- raises at least two problems of interpretation. The first has to do with the opposition's real nature, its "social" and political stamp: from this point of view the often-drawn comparison between the Iranian revolution and the Afghan feudal "vendée" emerge as the really superficial and hasty judgments they are. They fail to allow for the fact that the Islamic opposition in Afghanistan, unlike that in Iran against the Reza Pahavi regime, has a decidedly reactionary tinge. There are a number of clues

pointing that way: it was first openly manifested shortly after the issuance of the decrees for liberation of women and for agrarian reform; there is the spread of reaction against the reforms which, although it is indeed a "grass-roots" thing, is hard to share and hard to estimate: "In many cases husbands, urged on and manipulated by religious spokesmen, have turned out en masse to "get their wives back," set fires to schools, and driven away or actually killed agents from the ministry of education." (7) And then there is the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Afghan population (12.5 million out of around 17 million) are of the Sunni rather than the Shi'ite persuasion, meaning that they profess the most conservative variety of the Islamic faith. The only shi'ites in Afghanistan are the Hazara nomads: but that ethnic group's opposition to the central government -- in October 1979 its tribal chiefs set up an Islamic Revolutionary Council -- is based on nomadism, on their anything but "progressive" refusal to accept the new government's still very tentative plans to get them into permanent settlements.

If to all these facts we add the vaporous and ambiguous nature of the Islamic organizations' programs (the struggle against "atheism" and against "Marxism") which are held up as rivals to the solid practicality of the government-sponsored reforms, not to mention the international support and connivance these same organizations enjoy (the U.S., China, and Pakistan: symptomatic is what can only be called the lukewarm support they get -- at least thus far -- from Iran), the reactionary and pro-feudal nature of the Afghan guerrilla war emerges clearly, even in the few cases where it does not openly call for the return of the Zahir monarchy.

The second problem has to do with the real strength of the rebellion: the impression one gets, bolstered by the pictures we have been getting from a number of recent and very recent TV specials, is that once again the western mass media have failed to convey an objective picture of the situation. The Afghan Islamic opposition is certainly a mass phenomenon: and yet, at least up till the Soviet intervention, it was never really shown to be widespread. The 40 to 50,000 strength attributed by the western press to the anti-government organizations (figures obtained from Pakistani sources) is not all that big for a country with a population of 17 million, particularly when set against a PDP which (according to American sources) has 10 to 50,000 active members. As for the large numbers of "refugees" in Pakistan -- 300 to 500,000 -- they also cloak a more complex reality, particularly the nomadic habits of large segments of the population: "Often semi-nomads, the Pathans drift more or less freely back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan," reported LE MONDE on 26 September 1979. On the other hand, it is the very lack of any widespread Islamic opposition to the new government -- at least

prior to Amin's ouster -- that makes the Soviet intervention still more unacceptable and "imperialistic."

Even with all this, we would repeat once again with emphasis, the guerrilla war was a mass phenomenon, and constituted a serious problem -- particularly in hindsight -- for the new government; it was no accident that from the moment Daoud was toppled, it took a pretty cautious attitude toward the religious problem (typical, a propos, of some of Taraki's tactics: going to the mosque for prayer, refraining from too outspokenly Marxist terminology in official pronouncements, etc): in effect, the underlying "dualism of power" between the old state in the process of demolition and the new one being built made the solution to that question an absolute necessity, the more so in that the armed forces -- and this was indeed "opposition" often underestimated -- were a long way from enthusiastic over the new direction, and had repeatedly shown that they were the prime focus of possible reactionary countercoups. Between April 1978 and September 1979 there were numerous coup attempts and desertions, sometimes by entire military units.

The Taraki-Amin Clash

So we see that the Islamic opposition in any case posed a serious problem to the Taraki government, and it became the focus for all the other issues clustered around the "phase" of the revolutionary process: from restructuring the armed forces to agrarian reform and its advancement -- apparently -- from the individual family farm to the cooperative stage. And this was precisely the point, contemplation of this vast array of issues, where dissent and all the divergences that seemed to have been got rid of when the moderate Parcham wing was severed in the summer of 1978, floated to the surface once again. This time the polarization resolved itself around Taraki and Amin: it was Amin's increasingly swift climb into the upper reaches of the party hierarchy and of government (in March Amin became prime minister, while still holding fast to his place as PDP secretary general and his foreign affairs portfolio) that increasingly worried the then president. On the one hand Taraki, who favored some softening in the process and compromise settlements with the Islamic opposition, and on the other Amin who -- after having been the man mainly responsible for the breach with Parcham -- sought to make the revolutionary process still more radical.

This is what emerges from three illuminating reports in IL MONDO on 17, 19, and 20 September 1979. From them we extract another crucial given: Amin was not the "pro-Soviet" sympathizer we had been given to understand from several quarters. His coup had taken the Soviet Union "by surprise," and thereby had made him

an inconvenient ally in the geopolitical context of western Asia. Actually, secure in his own power support network that was beyond the reach even of the Soviet advisers already on the scene in Afghanistan, Amin successfully parried Taraki's attempt to cut him down to size (on Amin's own admission according to a report quoted by LE MONDE on 22 December, to assassinate him) and thus to do unto his adversary as he had been done by. And he succeeded in doing just that against the desires of the Soviets, who were supporting the Taraki-led moderates. The western media error was no accident, either; it was part of an already familiar pattern, in which the object is to aim at the "pro-Soviet" until -- as happened in the Karmal case -- the "pro-Soviet" eventually appears. In the meantime, though, ignorance and failure to understand the real internal dynamics of the pro-Soviet bloc prevailed over any objective approach.

According to LE MONDE, Amin, "aware of opposition from part of the army, tended to rely increasingly on the armed civilian militia" (20 September 1979): once he had held firm in defense of his commitment to revolutionary reforms, he had perforce to set up a strong people's force to protect those same laws. A dispatch dated August 1979 had already reported that the peasants were being armed in the Herat zone and in the regions north of Kabul. Amin, according to reliable sources, was apparently trying to play on the U.S.-USSR conflict to make his country more independent of Moscow, following a nonalignment dodge fairly common among "Soviet-leaning" countries these days.

As things turned out, though, events took another turn, culminating in an attempt to turn things around completely: the Soviet-engineered "coup" on 27 December 1979 represented a complete break with the radical course upon which Amin wanted to strike out, and an attempt to restore dialogue between the Islamic-feudal opposition and the government, under the aegis of constituting what Karmal himself had borrowed the old Parcham program's language to style "a broad front, with participation by all the nationalist and democratic forces." The statements in favor of the new government emanating from the Kabul ulema only a few days after Karmal had taken power, are symptomatic. In much the same way, the very recent hints at the possibility of some revision in the agrarian reform laws (or is this merely a breathing-stop at the status quo, an indication that the reforms will go this far and no further?) shed some light on the anything but secondary scope of the infighting at the top echelons of the PDP. Defeated after the failed Daoud experiment and consigned to outer darkness after April 1979, Parcham was restored to full power within the Afghan People's Democratic Party.

Some conclusions can be drawn, then, if we purposely skip over all considerations of the tragic consequences triggered internationally by events in Afghanistan.

1. First of all, the ouster of Amin, the Soviets' embarrassing ally, was something the Soviets themselves wanted. Carter is unquestionably quite right in charging the Kremlin with lying when it says that "the Afghan government" had asked for its intervention. If by that he means intervention against Islamic reaction, this is absolutely true. Yet in the process of their intervention the Soviets violated the sovereignty and legitimacy of the only real Afghan government in existence on 26 December 1979, which was Amin's.And so what the USSR could not bring off in Angola (the Nito Alves business) or even in Ethiopia (there have been many reports of the Kremlin's mistrust of the "radical" Mengistu) worked in Afghanistan: the country's geographical placement -- 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers of it borders on the territory of the Soviet superpower -- transformed it, with the help of that domestic instability for which the American secret services are at least partly to blame, into a "Warsaw Pact country." Even so, be it added, the rhetorical comparisons with Czechoslovakia really don't stand up all that well, in view of the fact that those taking issue today with the new pro-Soviet government have very little in common with Dubcek's democratic socialist option. The "principal contradiction" in the Afghan revolutionary process in this phase is still the one between the anti-feudal front and pro-feudal reaction.

2. The pro-Soviet coup in Kabul is an attempt at a moderate change of course by comparison with the social conflict in that country: evidence to that is the Parcham story, Karmal's statements on the morning after the seizure of power, the ulema's official recognition of the new government, and the coolish Iranian attitude to the whole thing. In this context, the heightened tension in the U.S.-USSR confrontation immediately following the turnaround of 27 December 1979 is not quite so paradoxical as it looked at first: superpower policy, apparently, does not necessarily or invariable automatically reflect class conflict inside this or that country. However, it may be tending toward "automation": Soviet tanks in Afghanistan to back a moderate switch at the top of the Kabul government are, for the United States, far more of an immediate threat than any "radical" leadership such as Amin's might have turned out to be.

3. All this can be explained by the real motives behind the Soviet intervention, which have a lot more to do with the regional situation -- neighboring Iran -- and with an "imperial" logic of operations on one of the planet's basic strategic chessboards --

the Middle East -- than with domestic events in Afghanistan. The Soviets overthrew Amin -- the same Amin who in August had delivered a blistering attack on the "fanatics in power in Tehran," accusing them of supporting the Afghan guerrilla war -- with an eye and a half on Iran. Not so much in the sense that the American impasse in Tehran had left them a free hand in the Kabul coup (this too), as in the sense that the policy of compromise with Islamic reaction in Afghanistan was useful to the USSR in getting a firmer toehold in among the internal tensions of the Iranian revolution, during a phase when it is radicalizing and when the likelihood of a full-scale civil war is mounting.

4. That still leaves open the question as to whether the Soviet-Karmal ploy will work or not: apart from western reactions to the USSR's move -- clearly unforeseen in the Kremlin -- a great many obstacles lie in the way of success for "operation Kabul;" those obstacles might well thwart the attempt to turn the Afghan revolution off its moderate course. Here are the main obstacles in its way: from the tough reaction to Karmal's softness toward Islamic reaction -- which can now claim the "solidarity" of the western media as grounds for upping its price -- to the possibility that even the Iranians and Khomeiny himself -- with the issue of anti-Iran economic sanctions by the UN out of the way -- might be driven to take a tougher stand vis-à-vis Moscow; to the no less significant fact that in view of the scarcity of trained Parcham cadre in the "renewed" PDP, Karmal may well have to come to terms with the Khalq apparatus once run by Amin, only part of which has been purged or jailed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Among the sources we consulted, we would acknowledge Fred Halliday's "Revolution in Afghanistan" in the NEW LEFT REVIEW, November-December 1978; Gaetano La Pira's "Afghanistan from Feudalism to Imported Socialism," in POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE nº 4, 1979; two reports in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (July 1978 and January 1979); a lengthy article by L. Dupree, "Afghanistan under Khalq," in the July-August 1979 issue of PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM; an official interview with a PDP leader in the NUOVA RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE, January 1979; a single issue of the Italian review IL VELTRO devoted to Afghanistan (no 5-6 October 1972); as well as LE MONDE's periodical coverage over the past 2 years and the extremely rare articles appearing in the Italian press over that same period.

2. PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, cit., p 34

3. This was Rahim Mahmudi's Shu'la (The Flame" organization.

4. PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, cit., p 40.

5. PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, cit., p 42.

6. Giancarlo Lannutti, writing in L'UNITA on 9 September 1979.

6182
CSO: 4404

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Sep 80 pp 1, 5

[Article by Ahmed Fattani: "What Is Behind Egyptian-American Cooperation?"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the Afghanistan affair, Carter's America has set up several support points for possible military intervention in the Near East and the Indian Ocean. Only recently, Washington and Cairo announced the establishment of the third U. S. base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea in Egypt. It is American dollars that will pay for the construction and facilities of this naval air base, just as they have elsewhere in Oman, Somalia and Kenya. The Pentagon has not concealed the fact that it plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to modernize the base from which the B-52 strategic bombers and the KC-135 supply planes could take off and land.

Since the Camp David accords, the United States has had two bases, one located near Cairo, housing about 15 F-4's, and the other on the Nile at Qena. It was from this base some 500 kilometers from Cairo that the planes which were to make the attack on Tabas in Iran took off. A wide range of sophisticated equipment, radar and other detection devices have been installed there and have been operating for several months. Observation missions, especially satellite spying, is carried out by American pilots. The F-4 that recently crashed was stationed there and revealed to public opinion that the American bases in Egypt had a different objective than the one officially announced by Egyptian and American officials.

It is a secret to no one that Sadat's Egypt is destined to be a military base of aggression serving the United States.

Dollars are raining down on the Nile. The proof? The Pentagon has just officially admitted that it will spend some $400 million on modernizing the Ras Banas military airport alone. Once completed, the base could accommodate 16,000 men, according to statements made by the Americans themselves. Ras Banas would then be a decisive element in controlling the straits, the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. It would be a relay station strengthening the U.S. bases at Berbera (Somalia), Monbasa (Kenya) and Massirah (Oman). These are definitely preparations for war in which Washington is zealously engaging from Sadat's Egypt.

What is concealed behind the sudden generosity of Uncle Sam toward a country which until 10 years ago was the leader of Arab nationalism, the epicenter of the fight against imperialism and support for Third World liberation movements?

After the disappearance of Nasser, America succeeded, with Kissinger's help, in taming the Arab country having the strongest army in order to drag it into the most condemnable undertaking in history: surrender to the Israeli enemy. It came about because one man was ready to offer his services and become America's factotum in the region. Today he wears his Harlequin costume, like a cowboy in the West seeking new adventures.

In 1980, political observers easily discovered that the Camp David accords were nothing more than a screen for a new American plan of military offensives in the world, shrewdly put together by Pentagon strategists. This new plan would respond better to the strategic needs of a United States constantly showing its teeth rather than looking for real peace in the region.

After being booted out of Southeast Asia, the United States saw its sphere of influence diminish over the years. In the Third World, it is the scapegoat blamed for everything and to which all ills are attributed. In Angola in 1975, the agents of American imperialism were brought to bay and did not even put up a fight.

Neither Savimbi's UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] nor Roberto Holden's FLNA [Angolan National Liberation Front] were able to contain the people's force led by Agostino Neto's MPLA.

The rise of the socialist current on the African continent and in the Arab Machrek is perceived in Washington as an alarming sign for the future of the influence exercised throughout the world by the United States. Ford is gone and the new White House tenant, Jimmy Carter, calmly readies his weapons. He sees that the geopolitical map has undergone profound changes since 1975. In the Pentagon, the losses are counted: Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, the Iran of Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, the departure of British forces from South Yemen, which opted for a people's democracy and Afghanistan.

On Egypt's western borders, it is Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's Libya that arouses the ire of the American-Israeli-Egyptian trio.

All of these factors affected Carter's decision when he invited Sadat and Begin to work out the Camp David accords.

The Egyptians, who in October 1979 -- at the time of the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the Ramadan war -- saw American F-4 planes for the first time, had already understood that Sadat was offering Carter all of Egypt to serve as a base from which aggression would be launched against future objectives in the Maghreb, Africa, the Machrek, the Gulf and Asia.

The Americans entered Egypt by the front door. Under pressure from the White House, the American Congress approved a military aid program amounting to $4 billion over 5 years, while the Pentagon agreed to supply Sadat with new weapons: 550 troop transport vehicles, 240 tanks and 40 F-16 planes. Gen Kamal Hassan Ali had already received 800 troop transport vehicles and 86 campaign trucks.

After long negotiations, Douglas-McDonnell concluded an agreement to build F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 bombers in Egypt.

It goes without saying that in order to defend Israel better, the United States prefers to invest billions of dollars for the establishment and maintenance of their military bases in Egypt. The Israelis have understood this very well, recognizing that "the American bases in Egypt are an advantage (for Tel Aviv) if President Sadat should die or be overthrown."

11,464
CSO: 4400

COOPERATION INTENSIFIED WITH SEVERAL COUNTRIES

Meeting With Bulgarian Minister

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 29-30 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] (APS)--On Thursday, Abdelaziz Khelef, member of the Central Committee and minister of commerce, and Ali Oubouzar, secretary of state for foreign trade, met with Assen Stamenov, deputy chairman of electronics and electrical equipment of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The meeting dealt with the evolution of commercial relations and cooperation between Algeria and Bulgaria and prospects for further development.

Special emphasis was placed on preparations for the 12th session of the Algerian-Bulgarian joint committee, which will be held in the coming months.

Hungarian Delegation in Algiers

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Istvan Soltesz, minister of metallurgy and the machine industry, accompanied by a large delegation and the Hungarian ambassador to Algiers, met yesterday with Abdennoun Bekka, minister of posts and telecommunications, who was assisted by the secretary general of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

In the course of the meeting, the possibilities of developing cooperation between the Algerian and Hungarian Posts and Telecommunications ministries were discussed.

The two ministers expressed their satisfaction with the quality and level of cooperation and said they were optimistic about the consolidation of the cordial bonds existing between officials of the two countries in the field of posts and telecommunications.

Industrial Cooperation With Hungary

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5-6 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] (APS)--Thursday afternoon, Mohamed Nabi, secretary of state for professional training, received Soltesz Istvan, Hungarian minister of metallurgy and the machine industry, at the Ministry of Labor and Professional Training. Istvan is in Algeria to attend the 17th International Fair in Algiers.

The meeting was also attended by the Hungarian ambassador to Algeria. The officials examined possibilities of broadening cooperation between the two countries in the different areas of professional training.

On Wednesday, Secretary General Boudjemline of the Ministry of Light Industries, met with Istvan Soltesz, Hungarian minister of metallurgy and the machine industry, and the delegation accompanying him for the purpose of attending the 17th International Fair in Algiers.

The meeting dealt with Algerian-Hungarian relations in the field of light industries and on prospects and the expansion of industrial cooperation between the two countries.

Improved Relations With Italy

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5-6 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by A. Z.]

[Text] With the official visit to Algiers which Minister of Foreign Trade Enrico Manca began Wednesday, accompanied by a large delegation of high officials from his ministry, Italian participation in the 17th International Fair in Algiers seemed to augur well for Algerian-Italian relations.

During his visit, the Italian minister was able to examine real possibilities of developing those relations and measure the quality of our ties, which began before our independence and which are favored by many historic and geocultural affinities.

Taking these prospects for cooperation into account, Italy's participation in the International Fair was expanded to 80 firms, which exhibited a diversified range of products from all priority sectors of the Five-Year Plan: machinery and equipment for public works and the construction industry, valves for water, gas and steam, tractors and power-driven cultivators, facilities for water treatment, machinery for the processing and packing of agricultural products, prefabricated buildings, naval shipyards, the electronics industry, engineering, machines for bottling, and so on.

Covering an area of 5,500 square meters, the Italian pavilion is filled with the very latest equipment from Italian industry, which generally covers the Mediterranean market.

Their competitiveness is such that it incites Italian manufacturers to further intensify their presence in regional fairs.

In his successive talks with the Algerian ministries of Commerce, Energy and the Petrochemical Industry, Transport, Light Industries, Finance, Public Works, Heavy Industry and the Office of Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, Manca reviewed cooperation between our two countries and provided a note of optimism concerning its growth under better conditions, thereby confirming the spirit of the recent visit to Algeria by the president of Italy, Sandro Pertini.

On the occasion of Italy's "national day" Thursday, the climate was most cordial between ministers Manca, Khellef and Oubouzar.

Harmonious Relations With Sweden

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Sep 80 p 3

[Interview with Swedish Minister of Industry Nils G. Asling, conducted in Algiers by A. Zouied; date not given]

[Text] In Algeria since Sunday on an official visit to the 17th International Fair in Algiers, Nils G. Asling told Abdelkader Zouied, during an interview granted us, that "Our discussions (with Algerian officials) have been fruitful, concrete and have even covered specific projects." Asling had met with high officials from the ministries of Commerce, Finance, Energy, Housing, Transport and Heavy Industry.

"It is my impression that our relations are bound to enjoy harmonious development," he said.

In answer to a question about good prospects for our relations, Asling said: "We are of the opinion that it is not merely a matter of stepping up commercial trade, but also of achieving technological transfers that will truly contribute to the Algerian development effort."

Evoking the image his country has of Algeria, the Swedish minister of industry said: "We view Algeria as a modern nation whose struggle is watched with enormous sympathy by the Swedish nation." He underlined the need to "demonstrate our common political determination to cooperate" in the spirit of the new international economic order -- thereby hailing the move of the Group of the 77 -- by engaging in concrete overall negotiations.

[Question] Mr Minister, can you tell us anything about relations between Sweden and Algeria in the light of the meetings you have just had with Algerian economic officials?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to emphasize the warm welcome extended to me and the open attitude I found among the Algerians. Furthermore, I would like to mention the common basis we have on both sides for cooperation between our two countries, especially as regards fundamental principles.

Our discussions were fruitful, specific and even dealt with individual projects. My impression is therefore that our bilateral relations are very positive and assured of harmonious development. This can be seen from Sweden's participation in the International Fair in Algiers.

[Question] In the course of your talks, did you consider giving them new impetus in keeping with the objectives of our Five-Year Plan?

[Answer] At the time of the visit to Sweden of Algerian Minister of Finance Hadj Yala, we began fruitful discussions on improving conditions for financing Swedish exports to Algeria.

These efforts were crowned with success because we reached an advantageous framework credit agreement and we firmly believe that it can serve as a framework for the development of our economic relations. I am optimistic and I still have the impression that our Algerian colleagues share our hopes about the future of our cooperation. We also believe that it is not solely a question of increasing commercial trade, but of effecting technological transfers that will truly contribute to the Algerian development effort.

That is why my visit to the International Fair in Algiers is important because it shows the interest the Swedish Government has in furthering our relations.

[Question] What image do the people in Sweden have of Algeria?

[Answer] First of all, I must remark that the image Sweden has of Algeria was sealed once and for all by the Algerian people's fight for their independence.

It was a struggle that was followed closely by the Swedish people with enormous sympathy. It generated lasting respect and admiration for the Algerian people.

The efforts which Algeria has made, despite all the difficulties, to achieve development have only reinforced our impressions.

I was able to see that these feelings were well founded when I visited the international pavilions at the Fair in Algiers.

In Sweden, we regard Algeria as a modern nation that is rapidly industrializing with the help of its large gas and petroleum deposits, which ensure its growth and the development necessary for the well-being of the Algerian

people. We are also closely following its international action along the lines traced by the late President Boumediene, particularly regarding the establishment of a new international economic order.

[Question] In this connection, Mr Minister, the Algerian and Swedish approaches to the major international economic problems seem to coincide in some ways. Could you tell us more about the attitude of Sweden toward the overall negotiations on international economic cooperation demanded by the Third World countries at the current special session of the UN General Assembly?

[Answer] We are living in an indivisible world, in which no one can resolve his problems alone. For a better future, we must therefore have a dialog with all partners. The need for such a dialog amidst solidarity is deeply anchored in the Swedish people, who fully support the government in its effort to contribute to the establishment of acceptable economic and social justice within an overall framework.

With that backing, our government has already made its contribution in public aid to development countries in the amount of 1 percent of our GNP.

We believe that with such a level of resources transferred, the industrialized countries could considerably change the international situation and thereby increase the purchasing power of Third World countries, benefiting the world economy as a whole.

We therefore all need one another. We are interdependent and hail the overall North-South negotiations as an important opportunity to solve together the problems that concern all of us.

Finally, since I have the honor of being in Algeria, I would like to tell you of my impression that Algeria and Sweden have a great deal in common. We are fighting on the same side of the barricades for greater economic and social justice and are both following a policy of national independence. In the final analysis, we must express our determination to cooperate in our bilateral relations.

11,464
CSO: 4400

FIRST PARTY CELL INSTALLED IN ALGERIAN INSURANCE COMPANY

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by R. S.]

[Text] In keeping with the recommendations of the Fourth Congress of the party, political and administrative officials in the district of Bab-El-Oued proceeded yesterday morning to install the first party cell in the banking and financial sector. The ceremony took place at the headquarters of the general directorate of the Algerian Insurance Company (SAA).

Attended by local officials, the general director of the company, representatives of mass organizations and members of the workers assembly of the enterprise, the ceremony provided officials with an opportunity to review the scope of this undertaking, which will serve to heighten the degree of political awareness of workers in this sector of services and prepare them to face the new requirements of the national development plan.

For the coordinator of the FLN kasma in Bab-El-Oued, this party cell in the SAA will be an ideal framework in which members and workers will forge their destiny and mobilize all their energies to give the company the right image while accelerating the process of settling cases submitted by the insured.

For his part, the general director emphasized the role played by the party cell, while stressing the close cooperation of members with all workers in carrying out the mission assigned to the insurance sector.

Ensuring the political role, the insurance sector remains an indispensable tool in preserving our economy from obstacles to its development.

In conclusion, the company official formulated the hope that he would see the installation of the cell further strengthen the ranks of company workers in order to fulfill all objectives set forth by the revolution.

The last speaker, the coordinator of the Bab-El-Oued FLN Federation, outlined the true context of the installation, whose main purpose is the participation and effective involvement of workers in everything done in the country.

He then stressed the encouragement that will be given to the cell to act as its field of endeavors is broadened and as the basic laws of the revolution are carried out.

Through these installations of party cells in enterprises, the exercise of democracy is promoted and there is expanded reflection on the search for the most effective means to ensure that the institution will play its true role in participating in the vast and noble task of nation building at all levels and in all fields. The ceremony came to a close with the presentation of the council made up of 17 members and the appointment of the cell bureau.

11,464
CSO: 4400

PRIME MINISTER INSISTS ON LINK BETWEEN WAGES, PRODUCTIVITY

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Sep 80 p 1

[Article]

[Text] Algiers (APS)--The debates on the social situation, begun Monday, continued yesterday in the interministerial council chaired by Mr Mohammed Banahmed Abdelghani, the prime minister.

Work relations between the different partners within the production units was the subject of special attention.

The participants stressed that the mechanisms for consultation and concertation set up in the framework of the GSE [Socialist Management of Businesses], and in a more general way the trade union organs, were conceived to create a climate of dialog and confidence in the work world.

In his remarks, the prime minister reiterated once again that the decisions announced by the president of the republic and secretary general of the FLN in December 1979, with a view to readjusting the wages of certain vocational categories, as also the measures linking wages and production ordered in May 1980, must imperatively be implemented and with the least possible delays.

As to protecting and improving the purchasing power of the workers as a whole, this constitutes a permanent priority objective of the political leadership.

This important matter will be submitted for review by the next council of ministers.

9516
CSO: 4400

TLEMCEN TO HAVE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Sep 80 p 4

[Article]

[Text] Tlemcen (APS)--Starting on 1 November of this year, Tlemcen will be linked directly to France with the launching of air connections with Paris, in the first phase, and with Marseilles in the second phase.

The Tlemcen-Zenata airport, completely renovated and enlarged with the construction of a modern terminal endowed with all the appropriate equipment, will have a reception capacity equal to that of Oran-Es Senia.

The regional representative of Air Algeria said that the opening of the new airport to international air traffic will make possible an easing of the congestion at the Oran airport, toward which all travellers from western Algeria converge. With the inauguration of international flights originating from Tlemcen, beyond the advantage that will redound to the [local] populations thanks to this policy of decentralization, other voyagers from neighboring wilayas will transit through Tlemcen in order to go abroad.

Also, the touristic and historic attractions of Tlemcen should add to the flow of foreigners drawn by the remains to be found in the region. In this respect, the airplane turns out to be one of the most practical means of transport for traversing the Mediterranean.

However, putting this program in operation is not going to be without problems, notably those linked directly to infrastructure for Air Algeria, the national company. The only [ticket] agency operating in Tlemcen is no longer adequate to the ever-larger needs of the population. The very tiny premises can no longer hold the hundreds of people who form a long line every day in front of the doors of the agency.

With the establishment of the international program which will add to the normal quota of national flights and those leaving Oran for abroad, thrice-weekly guaranteed flights from Tlemcen to Algiers, the Air Algeria agency, which also houses the regional delegation (Tlemcen-Bel-Abbes) will no longer be able to cope with the situation.

Moreover, this situation is known to the local authorities, and their energetic efforts will clearly be required to make possible a rational utilization of air traffic starting from this region of the West.

9516
CSO: 4400

SECURITY FORCES ACTIVE IN SKIKDA

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Rachid Souilah]

[Text] Launched several months ago throughout the country, the campaign of sanitation and struggle against social ills is continuing in an effective way in Skikda where the security services of the wilaya and of the Darak El-Watani are making proud efforts in this direction.

In effect, since the launching of this felicitous national operation which aims at assuring the security and tranquillity of the citizens, very good results have appeared.

These results, moreover, can be actually seen in the calmness and normalcy which has returned to the town of Skikda, once troubled by disorder and insecurity, once characterized by incidents and provocations on the part of "black sheep" who victimized innocent citizens.

The beneficent activity of the security services has thus borne fruit, if one considers that order, hygiene, and tranquillity reign everywhere, both within the city and on the coast, which is under permanent surveillance--both day and night--by units of the police and of the Darak El-Watani.

In the face of such efforts conducted in the public interests, there must be general satisfaction. It is, however, to be hoped that the sanitation operation will be permanent, for everyone knows that its objectives aim at the radical elimination of the social ills that constitute a very serious danger for society.

9516
CSO: 4400

SETIF 1980 HARVEST SEASON ANALYZED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4, 5 Aug 80

[Article by Brahim Taouchichet: "A Harvest of Hope"]

[4 Aug 80, p 1-2]

[Text] A silver lining to the clouds. That is the characteristic of the harvesting-thrashing 1980 season. The growers who were pessimistic at the beginning of the year because of the lack of precipitation have regained their hope. Improvements of precipitation conditions in April and May eliminated the threat of a poor cereal crop harvest as had been the case in the preceding 3 years. Worse, "400,000 hectares in grain crops would have been lost."

In Setif Wilaya the spring rains accounted for a great deal of the enthusiasm of the farmers encouraged by the prospects of a good crop assessed at over two million quintals. The harvesting-thrashing campaign, which started on 15 June, is 80 percent completed. Preliminary estimates confirm the forecasts and call for an average of 10 quintals per hectare. In the central area of the wilaya and in the semimountainous north some varieties of cereal crops have yielded 30 quintals per hectare. In order to insure the best success of the harvesting and thrashing campaign material facilities were increased: 459 harvesting-thrashing machines are at work in the wilaya; mobile ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] workshops take care of equipment breakdowns.

Paradoxically, this year the harvest has created some problems. In addition to that of manpower which, today, has reached full size, an urgent problem of transportation has arisen. The inadequacy of the rolling stock of the OAIC (Algerian Interprofessional Cereal Crops Office) has been reduced by resorting to the services of the producers themselves, thus mobilizing a manpower which is far more needed for harvesting and thrashing.

Storage facilities as well have not matched the output. A major shortage has been revealed in this area. The DWA in Setif has pointed out that

no investment has been made in the development of the infrastructure of storage facilities. This failure is not limited to the Setif Wilaya alone. On the national level there is a shortage of storage facilities for 6.5 million quintals. Yet, the projected output is 22 million quintals of cereal crops.

"In April we were quite worried by the poor growing of the wheat. Everyone was expecting a catastrophic harvest. However, improvements in precipitation eliminated this threat." This assessment of the development of the growth cycle of cereal crops was provided by Toufik Nait Dahamane, an agronomical engineer in charge of crop production for the agriculture office of Setif Wilaya. It sums up the entire period of apprehension and almost of discouragement experienced by the farmers in the area whose last harest was disastrous The proof is that the yields in this area, reputed as the "granary of cereal crops" dropped to under three quintals per hectare. It did not exceed six quintals at best. Actually, this shortage of cereal crops did not affect the Setif Wilaya alone. Since 1976 the national output has been declining steadily. Weather conditions played a primary role in this decline. The harvest of the previous year was no more than 1.4 million quintals, a ridiculously low figure compared with domestic consumption needs. In comparison, the current harvest appears more promising. On 20 July last the initial crop estimates for 57 percent of the harvested areas (the total surface under cereal crops is 3.2 million hectares) called for 13.5 million quintals. At the same date last year 44 percent of the harvesting was over, whereas this year's estimate was 57 percent. This percentage, showing two substantially different rates, is, above all, an indication of the development of the current campaign, described as positive, particularly in terms of the speed of harvesting operations. Yet, "no new measure has been applied." Therefore, the reasons for such progress achieved in the 1980 harvesting campaign should be sought elsewhere.

The Producers' Enthusiasm

In Setif, Mr Zitouni, wilaya agriculture director (DWA) mentioned the enthusiasm of the growers. The latter are showing great motivation in their work "for," according to the director of the Merazga self-managed farm of the Ain-Oulmane Daira, "this year's output is good." He added that, "Last year the farmers were discouraged from the very beginning of the harvesting campaign by the very low output." Indeed, this is a determining factor for the results of the efforts of the fellah. Suffice it to walk through the huge cereal crop fields of the Setif Wilaya to see an unusual excitement in the wheat fields.

In the torrid heat and despite their fasting the peasants are methodically harvesting. Like giant ants, the harvesters are gobbling up the hectares in crops, followed by the tractors which pick up the wheat bags.

This operation is no less difficult. It is even more trying in the month of Ramadhan, bearing in mind the physical effort it requires. At a first glance, lifting a one quintal bag of wheat or barley may not seem difficult. However, it does become difficult when the operation is repeated several times daily. Thus, in Ras El Oued Daira, a fellah who was assigned the job was unable to withstand the effort and had to be urgently taken to the hospital. Despite such difficulties, however, the growers work conscientiously. Work begins very early in the morning, far before administrative offices or plants open their doors, and ends late in the evening. At dawn the farmers make the equipment ready by maintaining and lubricating the harvesters, and so on. No harvesting is possible in cool weather (the jaws of the harvester cannot grip moist wheat stalks). That is why the growers were forced to stay idle for 3 days at the beginning of July (because of the coolness). They start toward 1000 hours. Harvesting stops at 1800 hours, after which the night work begins: the gathering and hauling of the hay and the bags of grain.

The Setif DWA points out that "compared with the two previous years there is greater work motivation," adding that, "We are receiving a lesser number of claims even from private growers." In the fields this evaluation is quickly confirmed by the growers who give the impression of enjoying better working conditions. This remark applies to a number of farms in the Setif Wilaya. The frequent answer of the peasant to the question of what are the difficulties in the work is "no problem."

Anyone accustomed to seeing the grower facing a large number of all sorts of problems would consider such an answer unusual. Boukel, director of crop production at the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, claims that instructions were issued "so that the grower will not be left to cope by himself but will be given the necessary help." In accordance with a memorandum issued by the MARA [Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Revolution] a practical stipulation is being applied in Setif. The harvesters used in a specific area may be moved elsewhere only after having finished with the entire harvest in all farms, regardless of their status.

Original Features

Despite its geographic location which puts the Setif Wilaya behind, the rate at which the harvesting campaign is advancing has reached, according to initial estimates, 80 percent of the total. There are greater delays in the harvest in the semimountainous areas north of National Highway 5. This makes the use of machinery if not dangerous at least more difficult, therefore encouraging the use of traditional harvesting methods. This poses the problem of gathering data on the harvest in private farms.

"The organization of municipal offices," explains the official in charge of crop production in Setif, "should enable us to surmount this difficulty thanks to better cadres put at the disposal of the growers."

In Setif the harvesting campaign is developing on the basis of an organization which takes into consideration the specific features of the area. That is why the campaign was initiated in the Ras El Oued and Ain Oulmane da'iras whose climate is hotter. Gradually, it was extended to the central area along National Highway 5, ending in the semimountainous northern part of the wilaya. Generally speaking, this year's output is considered "satisfactory." The average yield per hectare for barley, hard grain and soft grain ranges from 8 to 10 quintals. However, yields vary substantially from one zone to another. Whereas in Bougaa overall cereal crop yields do not exceed seven quintals per hectare, a different situation prevails in the other dairas. Thus, in Mahdia, in the Ras El Oued Daira, in Setif and in El Eulma, the average has been 27 quintals for barley, 22 quintals for soft wheat, and 17 quintals for hard wheat. Such yield differences among zones is caused by the different climate and soil structures which have a great impact on output, according to Lounes Hachemi, member of the National Institute for Major Crops in El Harrach. He has stated that "the Setif Wilaya has original features based on the existence of "spots" of rich crops and high yields, surrounded by poor and primitive crops." The same characteristics may be found in the Bougaa area. However, south of National Highway 5 the production of cereal crops is lower, with the exception of several farms which have averaged 10 quintals per hectare. Here, as a farm director in Ain Oulmane explained, "working the land is a vital factor. It insures one-half of the output." The accuracy of this statement becomes obvious by looking at the area south of the Setif Wilaya.

In addition to the natural poverty of the soils and the lack of water, both of which are not very helpful in terms of soil irrigation, extensive areas have been salinized and calcified. Land which only a few years ago was productive has been abandoned today because of lack of reclamation. Whereas the production of cereal crops is based on proper and properly balanced precipitation [part missing] is also largely determining. The example is provided by two self-managed farms in Ain Hadjar in the Ain Oulmane Daira: They have the same amount of land. One of them is straggling behind the other because of less experienced manpower.

[5 Aug 80, p 2]

A Basic Target: Obtaining Self-Sufficiency

In Setif the harvesting and thrashing campaign of 1980 brings with it hope, thanks to the April and May rains, as the farmers acknowledge. "Without the rains," emphasizes Lounes Hachemi, from the National Institute for Major Crops in El Harrach, "from 350,000 to 400,000 hectares in

cereal crops would have been lost this year." The whims of the rain directly affect the growers. Discouraged by the results of the three preceding harvests, the latter were displaying an openly pessimistic attitude as to this year's output, particularly after the droughty period at the beginning of the year. The future of the plowing and sowing campaign was determined by the rains which fell from mid-April to the end of May. Their effect would have been null had they fallen after that time, as the growth cycle had been completed. The official in charge of crop production of the Setif DWA claims that several farmers surmounted their hesitation to sow their fields following the rains.

Today they are frenetically plunging into harvesting and threshing campaigns. They are also motivated by the concern for gathering the crops before the Aid El Fitr. The harvesting campaign is quite advanced in Setif. According to initial estimates, the cereal crop harvest should total 2,138,917 quintals, of which 1,017,372 quintals of hard grain and 620,860 quintals of barley. On the national level, the crop estimate is 22 million quintals, compared with 14 million last year. Rough assessments are more optimistic, calling for 30 million quintals. However, we must take into consideration a 7-8 percent loss due to the inadequate handling of machinery (tuning, etc.) and domestic consumption. The 16 million quintals allocated for consumption would barely meet one-half of overall domestic demand. This has led the director in charge of crop production of the MARA to state that even though this year the output will be good it will nevertheless be below target which calls for reaching self-sufficiency in terms of cereal crops. Algeria, in effect, remains dependent on wheat imports. It is within this perspective that the battle for production assumes its full importance. Success in the harvesting campaign is an element of this battle.

More harvesting-threshing machines have been supplied to the Setif Wilaya: 459 of them are in operation, 105 of which were received in June. "This year," claims a DWA official, "we received the machinery on time. It has already happened that harvesters may be sent to us at the end of the campaign." Even though the rate of one harvester per 300 hectares has not been reached as yet, the fleet of such agricultural machinery makes it possible to cover adequately the needs of the wilaya. This does not prevent some owners of harvesting machines to offer their services at the rate of 120 DA per hour. We know, however, that the CAPCS [Communal Multiservice Agriculture Cooperatives] lease such machinery for 70 DA per hour. The service for repairing machinery on the spot, in operation over the past several years, seems to be functioning properly.

The wilaya is crisscrossed by four mobile workshops of the ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] along with three cars belonging to the same organization for the purpose of repairing equipment on the spot. The most frequent breakdowns are due to broken transmission belts, which happens all too frequently. Some farms have taken the precaution

of stockpiling spare parts. The intervention of cruising ONAMA teams has proved its effectiveness in cases of minor repairs. Whenever they are called by the presidents of farm enterprises, ONAMA technicians go to the place where the machine has broken down. It has been pointed out, however, that the rate of breakdowns has been reduced in the wilaya. Furthermore, the delivery of new harvesters has eliminated difficulties this season. It is worth noting, furthermore, that the training of the users of such machinery will make it possible, unquestionably, to extend the service life of the harvesters. It has been pointed out that improper handling and maintenance of such machinery is frequently the reason for breakdowns, the more so since the imported machinery is more sophisticated.

Lack of Manpower

Like the other wilayas, Setif Wilaya has not escaped a phenomenon which keeps repeating itself year after year on a large scale. Even though considered a lagging area in terms of harvesting and thrashing, because of its rugged topography, Setif Wilaya has shown an appreciable progress in crop growing. Nevertheless, this improvement cannot compensate for the strongly felt lack of manpower, regardless of an average level of mechanization (one harvester per 780 hectares). "The problem arises above all during peak periods," a grower said, adding that "we are forced to use retirees." Seasonal manpower is hard to recruit when the pay is 35 DA per day. Sixteen-year-old adolescents, high school students in particular, used during this exceptional period, may be available. However, they are handicapped by their inexperience for which they are silently blamed by their elders. Another grower has even pointed out with some bitterness that, "The young would rather swell the ranks of the unemployed or sell knick-knacks on the parallel market rather than work in the fields." However, the peasants are not caught short by this difficulty. They have organized themselves in order to complete the harvest on time. Occasionally they stop the harvesting and thrashing to haul the grain bags. Yet, this work is done by the rolling services of the Algerian Interprofessional Cereal Crop Office. Nevertheless, according to a grower, the office haulers do not risk going into the fields. The use of tractors, in addition to the fact that it requires additional manpower, is tiring and inefficient because slow.

On the other hand, there is the risk that, once hauled, the grain may not be fully stored under normal conditions of safety and hygiene. Whereas the crop has been assessed at two million quintals, storage capacities at the Setif Wilaya could accomodate no more than about 1.2 million quintals. Twelve storage units have been opened in Setif and nine in Bordj-Bou-Arreridj, whereas no such facilities are available at the Ain Oulmane, Ras El Oued and Bougaa dairas. The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Revolution is considering some temporary means to remedy the shortage of storage facilities which, on the national scale,

amounts to 6.5 million quintals. That is why open air storage is contemplated "under safe technical conditions."

The cereal-crop harvest of the 1980 season is considered encouraging. However, bearing in mind the already known results we already have a storage problem. What would happen should the output come closer to the targets?

The Problem of Overgrazing

Let us point out that the 1980 cereal-crop harvest is not exceptional in the least. Equally good harvests were recorded in 1972 and 1976. Even though the harvest benefitted from adequate precipitation, it was also the result of the work and the steady treatment of the soil. This should be intensified even further. The mastery of farming technology largely determines yields. This is exemplified by a variety of "Mexican wheat" introduced in a number of areas in the Setif Wilaya with poor results. This was due, on the one hand, to the difficulties in adapting this variety (which, in the best of cases, yields six quintals per hectare) and to the lack of follow-up work, as the official in charge of crop production of the Setif DWA explained. He also mentioned the need to instruct and inform the peasants. Following is one of numerous examples confirming the usefulness of this suggestion: Some growers continue to oppose the spreading of fertilizer from the air, believing that it was an error in the dosage of the fertilizers that resulted in the loss of serveral dozens of hectares. Others, nevertheless, recognize that this method yielded concluding results. Actually, the quality of output in areas where cultivation technology was applied is obvious. The contrast between it and crops to which lesser attention was paid is significant.

Within the framework of possibilities to improve the production of cereal crops, Mr Hachemi, from the National Institute for Major Crops in El Harrach, formulated the hypothesis of the development of a local variety. To accomplish this "experimental teams must be set up, for it takes 10 years to develop a local variety which could withstand the hard weather conditions and be adapted to the nature of the soil." The first experiment attempted in this area, said he, has begun to yield results only this year. "We must also struggle," he added firmly, "to have such innovations accepted." In accordance with weather and farming conditions, the natural reproduction of elements which would promote fertilizing of the soil is a feature which must be taken into consideration. However, this will be challenged by the moving of the flocks. The harvesting and thrashing will be followed by overgrazing. . . .

5157
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

NEW IMPETUS TO FISHING--(APS)--A meeting of cadres was held in the Office of the Secretary of State for Fishing yesterday morning, presided over by Benfreha Ahmed, member of the Central Committee and secretary of state for fishing. In remarks made on the occasion, Benfreha Ahmed recalled the recommendations of the Fourth Congress of the FLN and presidential guidelines, emphasized the strategic and economic importance of the fishing sector and outlined action to be taken to promote it within the framework of the 5-year plan. The secretary of state urged cadres to work in close cooperation with the nongovernmental sector with the single common objective of meeting the people's needs. "We must not only develop the state sector," he said, "but at the same time provide our aid to small fishermen because our goals are one: development of our 1,200-kilometer coast." Benfreha Ahmed emphasized the importance of effective decentralization and recommended the establishment and promotion of new fishing units in coastal governorates. "Our work must go beyond the bureaucratic compartmentalization and extend to the very field of production so as to make up for the lag allowed to accumulated in the sector for years," he added. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Aug 80 p 1] 11,464

KASMA COORDINATORS MEETING--Oran (APS)--The general situation of kasmas in the governorate was examined Thursday morning in Oran by kasma coordinators meeting under the gavel of Ali Riahi, deputy national commissioner of the party. In the course of the meeting, members of the assembly reviewed problems existing in the nine kasmas in the city of Oran and in the districts of Arzew and Mers El-Kebir. The major problems raised by the different coordinators had to do with social and cultural questions which citizens face. Among them are the drinking water supply, electrification, road repair, public hygiene and the limited number of cultural clubs. Members emphasized the predominant role which the APC [People's Communal Assembly] must play in settling these problems. In addition, dossiers will be prepared to take up the different points discussed so as to plan for the next meeting of the kasma-APC coordinating council. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5-6 Sep 80 p 3] 11,464

CSO: 4400

OPEN LETTER ACCUSES QOTBZADEH OF BETRAYING REVOLUTION

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Sep 80 p 7

[Open letter by Hosseyn Talebi, computer specialist and member of the Islamic Association of the General Tire Company to Qotbzadeh]

[Text] At 11:00 pm of 2/6/59 [24 Aug 80], in a seemingly well-calculated TV program on channel 2, you (Mr Qotbzadeh), in a violently strong tone poured slander against popular and revolutionary elements. You, who with your well-tailored clothes and cleancut appearance, still smelling of French, British and American boutiques, and you, who once used to talk about the barefooted, are not perhaps aware that 70 percent of Iranians lacked the most elementary necessities of life, and some have not yet seen a pair of shoes or even ties. You are not perhaps yet aware that groups after groups of our peasants die because of lack of food and medicine, doctors and basic elementary health services.

Yes, had you looked at yourself in a mirror with your western clothes on, you would have never felt yourself to be so close to the Imam of the nation, who is a perfect example of the simple leader and supporter of the oppressed. You should have realized at the very beginning that your line and that of the Imam are 180 degrees apart. It seems as if you have not even seen the oppressed on a TV screen.

Unfortunately, we observed you on TV, how, with your innocent look, you tried to describe popular revolutionary institutions as being opposed to knowledge and specialization, even calling them reactionaries and sterile, while, at the same time, considering yourself to be as virtuous as Abazar, and the best, as a specialist. You described the action taken by the student followers of the Imam as nothing but show, claiming the hostage-taking had been condemned by all governments. To emphasize your point, you recounted an anecdote which indirectly slandered the students.

Mr Qotbzadeh--the man who is least concerned with people but supporting governments all the time--should be asked, was it not this revolutionary action by the militant moslem students which disgraced the criminal U.S. throughout the world? In addition to make the world hear the rightful

cries of our innocent and oppressed people, the action made all the oppressed and innocent people and liberation organizations realize that the United States was not capable of doing a darn thing, and that the criminal superpowers could be resisted and brought to their knees through faith and clenched fists. Is the action taken by the militant students just a slogan? If so, why is the U.S. challenging us with all its might and why does it create events and incidents such as the unsuccessful air operation of Tabas and the recent abortive coup d'etat?

What is more important, Mr Qotbzadeh, views of governments which are dependent on the East or the West about the "spies" that you refer to them as hostages, or the opinion of oppressed nations and liberation movements? Which liberation movement has condemned the action of our militant student followers of the Imam? If you do not consider views of liberation movements as being important, then why is it that in connection with the breaking of diplomatic relations with Argentina, you reasoned that it did not occur because it had not been asked by the Argentine Liberation Movement?

Why is it that in matters that are not in the interest of the United States, you consider government views as important, and where the interest of the U.S. is involved (such as not breaking diplomatic relations with Argentina), views of liberation movements become important?

You are not even prepared, Mr Qotbzadeh, to call spies by their correct names and always refer to them as hostages.

Has not the Imam always supported these dear students and their action, Mr Qotbzadeh? If you are so close to the Imam as you claim to be, why are you challenging them (the students)?

Which institution and school of thought, Mr Qotbzadeh, has ever considered and claimed knowledge and specialization to be worthless? Even if they have, it is not the specialization that they condemn. It is the specialization of the likes of Amir-Entezams, Nazihs, Bakhtiars, the Savakis, the westernized and the conspiring aristocracy and supporters of committed governments. They most certainly do not have in mind the knowledge and specialization of such people as physicians who serve in rural areas and other honest and devoted individuals who strive in the direction of non-commitment, or the students who give their lives for their people, their Imam, and their ideology.

Mr Qotbzadeh, I am an educated specialist myself and must confess that I discovered my real worth after the revolution and through revolutionary and ideological institutions. It is true that this humble soul does not wear Yeves St. Laurent ties and Pierre Cardin clothes or shoes to match the color of my hair or tie, but I am capable of feeling the pains of a child who does not have clothes to wear or the cries of our sisters and brothers in the remote rural areas who are dying because of lack of medical attention. Under no circumstances can I tolerate the type of nonsense uttered by the likes of you, aimed at smearing all these actions.

Why don't you, Mr Qotbzadeh, leave this long-oppressed nation and those - a very few - who enjoy popularity among them, alone? Why don't you heed the Imam's words, urging the support of the ideology, Islam and the revolutionary institutions?

You, Mr Qotbzadeh, who now insult the radio and the TV, perhaps remember that when you were running them, you used to appear on TV at least a few hours every week so that people could see you. You used to take part in radio debates often and said all you wanted to say. During the presidential elections, too, your photographs adorned the streets all over while you were making speeches about yourself at every occasion. Why don't you look back at your presidential election record? Why don't you admit that because of your thinking, your approach, behavior and your views on foreign policy, you have no bais among the masses. Why do you continue to spread so much poison, brother?

Your Aims

As an analytic viewer of your recent interview on channel 2, let me tell you bluntly, Mr Qotbzadeh, that these are your aims?

1. Attacking and weakening of individuals and institutions that enjoy popular support by slander and charges that they deny value of knowledge and specialization, thus depicting them as reactionary and simpleminded. Nowhere have I read or heard that revolutionary institutions and responsible individuals have denied the value of knowledge and specialization, except from American, Israeli and London radios, and sometimes from local aristocrats.

2. To defend your nonideological foreign policy which caused our revolution remain unknown outside the country and consequently isolating Iran and preventing exportation of our revolution.

3. To convince people that hostage taking was condemned by all governments and, as a result, open the way for the release of the spies.

4. To demonstrate that the fate of the Islamic Republic depended on the Imam, meaning that after the Imam was no more our revolution will face certain defeat and that people should pin their hopes on you and follow your line and obey you (while the Imam, in all his speeches, tries to create hope and confidence in people, and thus punches in the face of those leveling our revolution).

5. To discourage people who, in spite of the poisonous propaganda, join demonstrations and marches in the millions, defeming Islamic ideology and revolution, and prepare the way for intervention by superpowers.

6. To change the direction of attack on the U.S. and, as a result, help make the number one enemy and the great satan be forgotten through untimely and unusual attacks on the Soviet Union (while, in all his speeches, the Imam has always called the U.S. the principal enemy, and as long as Soviet intervention is not proven, it should not be attacked. This, of course, does not mean that we should lean to the East. As we observed, the Imam's response to the message of sympathy sent by Brezhnev in connection with Gachsaran tragic incident).

In conclusion, I would like to know why the responsible officials of channel 2 TV allow the airing of such unfair and well-planned programs? Is this freedom or a plot? If this was freedom, then why the revolutionary organ that were slandered were not allowed to be present during the same program so they could defend themselves?

9561
CSO: 4906

BACKGROUND OF NEW PRIME MINISTER EXPLORED

Tehran JAVANAN-E EMRUZ in Persian 18 Aug 80 pp 6-7

[Text] Who Will Be in the Future Cabinet--Iran's First Post-Revolution Legal Government?

Where Does Raja'i Come From? How Old Is He? Where Was He Educated? What Were His Struggles? What Services Has He Rendered?

What Does the Man on the Street Say About Raja'i and What Are His Expectations from Raja'i's Government?

After a lot of tug of war and long drawn-out debates and suggesting many names as nominees for prime minister, finally Mr Raja'i was appointed Prime Minister upon the President's proposal and on the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles). Although Raja'i has been recognized as the Acting Minister of Education after the revolution, yet he is not quite known to the entire population and not a familiar face to the public. This [obscurity] is attributed to his piety, lack of hypocrisy and unpretentiousness. With a view to the importance of the momentus duty he is to be charged with as Prime Minister, we decided to present to our readers a glimpse of his life so that our dear readers may get better acquainted with him.

Born in Qazvin city region (shahrestan) in the Year 1312 of the Solar Hegira Calendar [21 Mar 1933 - 20 Apr 1934], Mohammad Ali Raja'i completed his primary education in his birthplace and received his six-year primary education completion certificate there. In 1327 [21 Mar 1948 - 20 Apr 1949] he left Qazvin for Tehran. In 1328 [21 Mar 1949 - 20 Apr 1950] he entered the Air Force and served there for five years, during which period he pursued his study in night classes until he received his high school graduation diploma. At the age of 21 he left the Air Force and enrolled at the Teachers Training College to obtain his Bachelor of Art degree. Upon completion of his study in 1339 [21 Mar 1961 - 20 Apr 1961] he was employed by the Ministry of Culture (Education). In 1342 [21 Mar 1963 - 20 Apr 1964] Mohammad Ali Raja'i became a member of the

Freedom Movement of Iran (Nahzat-e Azadi) and became intensely involved in political activities. He was arrested and imprisoned the same year. After his prison term he taught at Kamal, Refah and Tarbiat schools. In 1353 [21 Mar 1974 - 20 Apr 1975] he was arrested for his link with the Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq and was turned over to the so-called Anti-Subversion Joint Committee. He was subjected to the longest interrogations and tortures in the solitary cells of the Committee prison for about 2-1/2 years. In 1354 [21 Mar 1975 - 20 Apr 1976] he dissociated himself from the Mojahedin-e Khalq while they were in the process of embracing Marxism. He started struggling against the Mojahedin for their "borrowed" ideology. Finally, at the crescendo of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1357 [21 Mar 1978 - 20 Apr 1979] he was released from prison and joined the tumultous sea of the resurgent people of Iran.

After his release from prison, Raja'i took up struggle again and in Mehr 1357 [23 Sep 1978 - 22 Oct 1979] he succeeded in officially creating the first underground Islamic teachers organization called the "Iranian Teachers Islamic Association." During the Revolution the Association played a major part in multiplying and distributing the Imam's statements as well those calling on educators to strike. Upon the Imam's return to Iran, he had the honor of playing host to the Imam at Refah School. In 1358 [21 Mar 1979 - 20 Apr 1980] Raja'i was appointed Acting Education Minister. A noteworthy feature of his incumbency was that he succeeded in making all schools public and uniform. Thus he took a step in the direction of equitable distribution of educational resources throughout the country. Of course, this policy met the opposition of some people at the time and even Mr Yadollah Sahabi, Minister of State in Bazargan's government--now a member of the Majles--issued a statement to call his action "the firming up of the footing of communism in Iran!" Another point of interest about him is that during the rule of the provisional government, the Revolutionary Council was receptive to the idea of appointing him Education Minister for his revolutionary stature. However, Mr Bazargan was against this promotion and the plan was not translated into practice; he remained Acting Minister of Education.

Finally, Mr Raja'i ran in the elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles) and got elected as deputy from Tehran. Mr Raja'i is characterized by his fondness of Dr Shari'ati and of children to whom he takes quickly.

Concerning the formation of the cabinet, Mr Raja'i has said that whoever is to become a member of the cabinet should be a follower of the Imam. In this effort [for appointing the cabinet ministers] he will enlist the assistance and cooperation of all the revolutionary institutions. He relies particularly heavily on the Revolutionary Guards Corps and on the Reconstruction Campaign Organization. He says if he finds a suitable person there he [that person] shall be appointed minister. This is a very positive and hope-inspiring point, one which is indicative of the fact that he abides by the statement of the Imam and intends to appoint

among, faithful revolutionaries. It shows that he pays attention to the young people who have proved their revolutionary sincerity afield, in the arena of martyrdom, in the farthest villages of Iran.

Of course, there is a lot of talk making the rounds. But one of the persons named as a most likely candidate for membership in Raja'i's cabinet is Dr Assadi, an old friend of Raja'i's over the past 15 years. Dr Assadi himself has spent a long time in prison. It is narrated about him that when he heard the news of the arrest of his daughter, he took it most stoically, so much so that the only effect on his normal daily routine was that he missed his morning exercise on that day. From among other likely members of Raja'i's cabinet mention can be made of Dr Sorush, currently the Minister of Energy; mention is also made of Musa Kalantari. It is said that Jalaleddin Farsi is slated to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs or of National Defense in the cabinet--but this is not highly (because the President is against it). Others named as likely candidates are Shams Ardakani, currently Iran's Ambassador to Kuwait, for Foreign Minister, Mirsalim for filling the position of Interior Minister, and Chamran for Defense Minister and Zali for Agriculture Minister.

The President's View

The selection of the Prime Minister was concomitant with some differences of views which made the process very difficult. But agreement was arrived at over this problem in the long haul. It is in place at this juncture to air the opinion of President Bani-Sadr of Mr Raja'i. In his letter to the Majles about Mr Raja'i, he has described Mr Raja'i's characteristics as under: ". . . As far as his adherence to the Islamic ideology, sincerity and integrity are concerned I accept him and rate him even more highly than the other candidates. But Mr Raja'i is the kind of person to whom you expound what you want him to do and he may even acknowledge his acceptance, but when he leaves the meeting he pursues his original thoughts. Secondly, his knowledge of national affairs is scant. Therefore, his administration is bound to be weak."

However, as it has been reported in the news that the misunderstandings that existed between Bani-Sadr and Raja'i were removed after a meeting they held.

Opinion of Tehran Prayer Leader

The Prayer Leader of Tehran, Mr Khamene'i, on the Fetr festivity, had the following to say about Mr Raja'i: "He is fortunately a decisive, devout and zealous person. I do not forget the tortures and hardships he suffered over months on end in the horrid prisons and torture chambers of the previous regime. After the Islamic Republic was established--thank God--he has been engaged in tasks, services and activities."

Hashemi-Rafsanjani's View

One of the key problems, after the formation of the government, is the harmony required between the government and the Majles. But Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Majles spoke about this matter in an interview and said that with the uniform mood governing the majority of the Majles deputies and Mr Raja'i, the progress of the matters would be facilitated.

What Do the People Say?

We asked a number of people their views on Mr Raja'i's Prime Ministry. The following are their views:

Mr Khodai, Primary School Teacher:

[Question] What is your view about Mr Raja'i as Prime Minister?

[Answer] Well, I believe that I cannot find in Mr Raja'i's person the good and competent prime minister I want. He is a revolutionary individual but he is not as incisive in foreign affairs as he should be. Dr Peyman would have been a better choice.

[Question] What Do You Expect From Him?

[Answer] Security and welfare must be ensured. Primarily the security and secondly the livelihood of the workers, farmers, merchants and, categorically, all strata should be ensured.

[Question] Which persons should in your opinion be selected for membership in the cabinet?

[Answer] Persons who are devoted to the Revolution; people who can preserve freedom in the country.

Hamid Reza Tayyebi, Student:

[Question] What is your view about Mr Raja'i as Prime Minister?

[Answer] Were there to be so many differences about the appointment of Mr Raja'i, it would have been better to nominate Mr Jalaloddin Farsi. Mr Raja'i is a good person but I am not so confident that he will achieve anything. All the same I hope he can choose good ministers.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] The most critical problem which has been a cause of worry for the people is the difference between the Majles, the government and the President. I believe that the first thing he should do is to create the needed harmony.

[Question] Which persons should in your opinion be selected for membership in the cabinet?

[Answer] Mostly from among revolutionary youths. For instance it would be really excellent if they were the same type of persons as the students following the line of the Imam.

Mr Mahmud Reza Najafian, Office Worker

[Question] What is your view about Mr Raja'i's Prime Ministry?

[Answer] Raja'i is a known person. But does Mr Bani-Sadr accept him or is he forced on Mr Bani-Sadr as his prime minister? They can work together only if their relationship is good. Otherwise, there will be filibustering. I feel uneasy about such a possibility.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] First and foremost, the nation's security takes precedence over all other considerations. So long as there is no security in the country things will be done half-baked. Another issue of importance is unity, accord and harmony. If there do not prevail, nothing gets done. Even if the statements of various groups vary they should be integrated.

Civil Servant (prefers anonymity)

[Question] What is your view about Mr Raja'i's premiership?

[Answer] Raja'i's selection means Bani-Sadr has been defeated. I do not think this is in the interest of the people. To be Islamic and religious is not enough. It is also important to be capable to run the affairs of the country.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] I do not believe he can put any plan into effect because there is a conflict between the Majles, the Prime Minister and the President.

[Question] Which persons should, in your opinion, be selected for membership in the cabinet?

[Answer] The cabinet should be effective, efficient and pursuant.

Mr Mohsen Zabih, Bank Employee

[Question] What is your view of Mr Raja'i's premiership?

[Answer] I think that he is a good person and a proper choice for this position.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] He must treat the path of true Islam. He should tend to the conditions of agriculture and economy. He should also put an end to the incoordination among various groups.

[Question] Which persons should, in your opinion, be selected for membership in the cabinet?

[Answer] Persons who apprehend the grievances of the workers and tend to them.

Ms Fatemi, Student

[Question] What is your opinion of Mr Raja'i as Prime Minister?

[Answer] When Mr Raja'i was Minister of Education, apart from a number of things that he did right, his performance was in most cases not correct. I do not think he is fit for the position of Prime Minister.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] To provide jobs for the jobless. To curb price hikes. To lower housing costs. Briefly, to solve the problems people face in their day-to-day living.

[Question] In your opinion, which persons should be selected as members of the cabinet?

[Answer] People-oriented persons who listen to others, who substantiate their opinions, who can drive home their message.

Mr Abdolkhaleq Paki, Jobless High School Graduate, now vending cigarettes.

[Question] What is your opinion of Mr Raja'i's premiership?

[Answer] Mr Raja'i is very suitable for prime ministry because he is in the line of the Imam and of the Revolution.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] To eradicate unemployment, later on to bring about security; to do away with the high costs of living.

[Question] Which persons, in your opinion, should be selected for being on the cabinet?

[Answer] Persons who are competent and in the Imam's line.

Mr Abbas Najafpur (an old man who says he has been a peddler for 40 years).

Sir, what can I say? What is it to me who is whose prime minister? They appoint whoever they want. I mind my own business here and win my bread. Why should I care who becomes the prime minister? And who makes him one? I have been leading this very life style for 40 years. So many prime ministers came and went. What did they do for me? Only promises. All gave but promises. So many prime ministers were appointed and dismissed. Which one of them ever worked for the good of the deprived class? Which one of them paid any heed to my plea for help? This one will be one of the same run. There was Mr Bazargan who put us in the lurch with his step-by-step policy. What has changed for us? Mohammad Reza's statue has been pulled down but its pedestal is standing. They have left the doors of the banks open so that the rich can send the monies out; these are the monies of this poor nation. Why? If the prime minister wants to be effective he must work for the benefit of the people, for the benefit of the lower class, lower income people. He must exterminate the species of the traitorous big shots. Otherwise nothing will work.

The voice of the old man rings in one's ears. As if his cries echo the wishes and hopes of the people. Yes, Mr Raja'i! So many prime ministers have come and gone that the nation has become indifferent to their coming and to their going alike. The people seek something else in you. They want you to be revolutionary and capable. After years of agony and suffering, our people want to regain, under the aegis of Islam, a decent life befitting the dignity of man. Therefore, no step-by-step policies! No compromise! We should act in a revolutionary manner. We should cast aside differences. That is what pains our people. As the Imam put it, "Is it your father's legacy for which you are wrangling?" You should shed the quarrels and heed the problems of the people. As our worldly wise old man said, "The generation of the traitors and of the big shots must be exterminated. Each minute of our time after the revolution counts as valuable as years. To waste even one minute of it would be ingratitude and a waste. It is throwing to the wind the hopes of the followers of the faith. We wish you good luck in the great mission that you have undertaken. We hope that you will succeed in your efforts in the path of God and in following the Imam of the Moslems.

9693
CSO: 4906

EFFORTS TO PACIFY FARS PROVINCE UNDERWAY

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 30 Aug 80 p 11

[Article: "There Is No Difference Between Khans and Robbers, and Their Slightest Move Will Be Put Down. The Activities of Khans and Highway Robbers Are Not To Be Confused With the Tribesmen--The Governor of Fars"]

The tribes and other oppressed classes of Fars do not condone the disruption of security in this province.

Eighty percent of the province's construction budget has been allocated to the villages.

[Text] Shiraz--The night before last several armed thieves fired upon and damaged a highway patrol car of the "Baba Hajji" pass on the Shiraz-Kovar road. The highway patrol personnel reported the incident to the Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Guards so that the guard and the military could go to the area immediately and take steps to clean up the aforesaid pass and road. Reports arriving from Shiraz indicate that the Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Guards are now pursuing the lawless armed attackers and that the sentries have been reinforced at Kovar, and people have been sent to help. An officer of the Shiraz Gendarmerie regiment, while confirming this news, announced: During this holdup the thieves stripped the passengers of one of the automobiles.

Highway Robbers Are Not To Be Confused With the People

In a press interview, Mohammad Bani-Habibi, Governor of Fars, also commented on the adventures of a handful of feudalist servants and people out to get more than their share on the province's roads. Mr. Habibi spoke first concerning the current year's construction programs in the province of Fars: Eighty percent of the Fars construction budget is allocated to the villages. In some areas, such as Lorestan, up to 85 percent of the construction budget is allocated to districts and villages.

In answer to a question concerning plans afoot in Firuzabad to stage a showing of activity in the area, the governor said: We are not optimistic about those who have surrounded themselves with riflemen, but until they make a move of some kind we will merely observe them.

We will respond decisively, however, to the slightest move against the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The only thing we are trying to do is make a distinction between highway robbers and common tribesmen, so that if the necessity should arise for military action, the government will not actually take these steps against tribesmen, but against those who are doing things aimed at destroying security. We advise our brother tribesmen that opposition to the Islamic government and blocking the roads is really opposition to the Imam and Islam, and the people of Fars. Military and law enforcement authorities will not permit such aggression.

There Is No Difference Between Khans and Highway Robbers

Concerning recent road robberies in the vicinities of main roads, the governor of Fars said: Highway robbery in the Province of Fars did not begin during the period of Islamic rule. Existing files show that highway robbery has been going on for years. We have seen no clear relationship between recent road robberies and the tribal khans, but in any case our view is that there is no difference between tribal khans and highway robbers. According to the governor of Fars, a decision has been made in the province security council to confront all kinds of highway robbery, whether related to the khans or not, with measures that have already been planned.

The governor of Fars asked the people to help government officials identify thieves in areas where these robberies are likely to take place. In another portion of his remarks, the governor of Fars commented on the unseasonal movements of some tribesmen: The unseasonal movement and the kinds of rumors circulating among tribesmen cannot be unrelated to persons who, in the name of khans, or on any other pretext have organizations and whose interests in the Islamic government have been threatened.

9310
CSO: 4906

GUARDS ATTRIBUTE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK TO ADM MADANI

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Aug 80 p 2

/Article: "Firuzabad, Army of Guards Commander: Madani Has Formed a Comprehensive Network of Tribal Chiefs in the South"/

/Text/ Dr Masha'ollah A'in, commander of the Firuzabad army of guards of the Islamic revolution,stated, in a conversation concerning the untimely migration of the Fars tribes," Following the disclosure documents on them, the tribal chiefs and spies have decided to form an overall system of chiefs in the southern region under the leadership of Seyyed Ahmad Madani, another American spy, and to foment trouble in this region."

Regarding the reason for the untimely migration of the tribes, he said, "the American spy-chieftains, that is, Khosrow, Naser and Abdollah Qashqa'i, following the disclosure of their espionage documents, have decided to set up a comprehensive system of chieftains in the southern region under the leadership of Seyyed Ahmad Madani, another American spy, and stir up disturbances in the souther, southwestern and southeastern area of Iran in the near future, thereby proving their devotion to their American masters. They have thus compelled the Moslem tribes to set out toward the warm areas directly and indirectly, by spreading rumors and creating an atmosphere of suppression and terror."

He added, "For example, they have spread the rumor 'if you stay along the borders the army of guards will bomb you.' They have also declared 'Anyone who stays along the borders and does not migrate to the warm areas is our enemy,' and in this manner the majority of the downtrodden masses of the tribes, in spite of their own desire, have been compelled to leave the borders a month and a half before the seasonal time and move their livestock and homes from the roadsides and their weapons from the hills toward the warm areas. The chieftains' agents falsely told them 'the army of guards has the intention of disarming you,' and have caused the tribes to move their arms from the hills or transfer them to the hills by means of these rumors."

Dr A'in added, "As a consequence, the suffering children and toiling women of the Moslem tribes are moving to the warm areas in the hot season, enduring heat and discomfort and bearing much suffering."

Responding to a question on the plans the government had for the welfare of the tribes, the commander of guards of Firuzabad said, "Because of the presence of the treasonous hireling elements who have been present in that region for the past 15 years, and probably are also there now, the government has unfortunately not yet done anything for the tribes, but now, with the approval of 200 million tomans in credits for the implementation of welfare, health and development plans for the tribes, if this money is spent in a revolutionary way plans can be drawn up for the welfare of the tribes. In this connection, we propose to the executive authorities of the province that they quickly spend these sums, with the participation of the committed young Moslems of the tribes, in order to eliminate deficiencies in the tribal areas and make roads, water, livestock fodder and welfare available to the tribes."

On where the tribal chiefs are now and what they are doing, Dr A'in, the Firuzabad guards commander, said, "At the present time the chieftain spies are encamped in a mobilization area situated in the hills to the northwest of Firuzabad with about 180 armed people. They control an area covering a radius of 20 kilometers and recently even stopped holy war of reconstruction automobiles in that area."

When asked "In view of the atmosphere in the region, do you predict that incidents will occur in the region in the future or not?" Dr A'in replied, "If the American chieftains' centers of conspiracy are not crushed quickly, scattered disturbances will arise in the future. For this reason the recommendation of the Firuzabad army of guards to the honorable Moslem tribes is that they pay no heed to rumors from the hireling chiefs and that they continue their migration without fear of being disarmed. I give assurance that the Firuzabad army has absolutely no intention of disarming the downtrodden tribes, is always brothers with it, and will mobilize all its resources in order to help them."

On what the tribal chiefs' agitations in the region were, he said, "The chiefs are constantly making rumors and are trying to assemble armed forces by creating an atmosphere of oppression and fear so that they may perhaps be able to attain their evil designs. However, they are falling on deaf ears, because the Moslem tribes will never perform an act against Islam and the country. With the help of God the committed Moslem tribes themselves will dig these chiefs' grave."

Regarding the persons to considered responsible for the incidents in the region, he said "Khosrov, Naser, Abdollah, Malek Mansur, Daryush and Vereydun Qashqa'i and also Seyyed Ahmad Madani."

Responding to a question on the program he had for strengthening the army, the commander of the Firuzabad guards said, "Programs are being carried out which are at present secret but the mobilization of the tribes and the people themselves against these American mercenaries heads the list of our activities."

As to whether aid is given to the Qashqa'i chieftains in the form of arms, equipment and financial affairs, Dr A'in said, "A quantity of arms and equipment, including some heavy weapons, recently arrived from the southern ports for the chieftains, but their volume is not yet significant. The criminal America is intending to give aid in the form of money and weapons to the network of chieftains in the south; in this matter Seyyed Ahmad Madani, the American spy, is carrying out an important role."

Regarding the army's cooperation with the people, he said, "The people in the region, especially the tribes, are cooperating with us to the utmost and are even in the process of forming an army organized through the tribes themselves to crush the spy chieftains. They constantly visit us and state 'Give us arms and we ourselves will strip off the beards of these mercenaries in the area.'"

11887
CSO: 4906

MAJLES MEMBER DENOUNCES FEUDAL LANDLORDS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Aug 80 p 3

/Article: "Most Arable Lands in Khodabandeh Are in the Hands of Big Feudalists"/

/Text/ After the views of the people's spokesmen in the Islamic Consultative Council were received regarding the presentation of their electoral districts' issues and problems and appropriate recommendations and solutions in this matter, Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Rahami, parliamentary representative of the District of Khodabandeh, who is a communications engineer in the microwave field, has studied in the Physics Department of the National University and is now a student in the Faculty of Law and Political Science of Tehran University, described the problems and demands of the people of his district in a conversation with KEYHAN'S correspondent.

At the outset, referring to the geographical location of this town he said, "Our area is one of the forgotten regions in the nation, to the point where and when I stated in the parliament that I was the representative of Khodabandeh, a group of people did not even know where Khodabandeh was. Ours is a deprived area surrounded by Abhar, Zanjan, Bijar, Qazvin, and Hamadan and has an area of more than 9,000 square kilometers, 400 villages, a town and a population of close to 200,000."

The representative of Khodabandeh then proceeded to describe the problems and needs of his electoral district and added, "The people of Khodabandeh and the villages around it derive their living from agriculture in a situation where the lands are in the hands of the feudalists and the so-to-speak heavies of the area. Since the Province of Zanjan is basically an area of descendants of tribal chiefs and feudalists, you cannot find a village where a tribal chief or feudalist does not have most of the fertile land at his disposal. On the other hand, since the people cannot live by other means and do not have an adequate amount of land or water, they are thus compelled to go to the towns and the capital to work in the factories and factory centers. Most times not only do these migrations not provide the wherewithal for their comfort and tranquility in the towns--to the contrary, as well as creating social problems, they cause the level of

agricultural and livestock output to decline noticeably. I recommend that the government put the establishment of industrial centers in this region at the top of its future developmental measures."

The representative of Khodabandeh then continued, "There is not even one hospital or one hospital bed for the region's population of 200,000. If someone needs a doctor or on occasion an operation he must be taken by minibus to Zanjan and a basic problem existed and still exists even in this matter, and that is the lack of ambulances. There is just one ambulance for the entire area and that is in the central clinic of the town. Aside from this, one can also count the clinics themselves on one's fingers and, again, those that exist lack adequate health facilities. Of course, important and vital as the consequences of these deficiencies are, it is clear to everyone that problems are created for the people when there are not numerous clinics."

He then criticized the state of education in his region and pointed out that there is one secondary school in the entire area of Khodabandeh and most of the time even that is closed because it does not have a principal and a teaching staff. There are also four or five guidance schools in the region; again, because educational resources especially teachers and principals do not exist, they are always facing problems. The cultural level of the region is therefore very low and one can perhaps estimate the proportion of illiterates of between 95 and 100 percent. It is natural that as long as this problem, that is, illiteracy exists, subsequent issues and problems will not be solved either.

The representative of Khodabandeh then referred to other problems of his electoral district and stated "The problem of the lack of a suitable road for rural inhabitants is more or less similar in all the deprived areas of our country; in our area this problem unfortunately seems many times greater and more intense, to the point where it has caused many resources which could be available to the villagers from the centers of the province to remain lacking and excluded. Then the issue of water, electricity and health, are also, in their own place, individually among the basic problems of the region. The problem of the lack of potable water is one of the main issues and one of the highest priority demands of the people of the Khodabandeh region and the villages around it."

Continuing his statements, talking about a small portion of the measures of the holy war of reconstruction in the Khodabandeh area, he complained about this institution and said, "The holy war of reconstruction has not been as active as it should have been in our area. Except for three or four cases where superficial activities have been carried out, no other measures have taken place. Of course the budget allocated in this field is also a problem, since the credits which have been set aside for the area of Khodabandeh and outskirts are very minor in comparison with the needs and requirements of the people. If adequate credits are set aside for the region of Khodabandeh, the conditions and manpower for creating many agricultural and livestock complexes also exist in adequate amounts and I think

that this is the best way to prevent rural inhabitants from leaving for the towns. Therefore we hope that investigation will also be made into this matter in the near future."

The representative of Khodabandeh then proceeded to describe the issue of security forces and the provision of security in his electoral district. Pointing out that few guards are engaged in carrying out their duties in the region as a whole, and that there is no sign of a committee, gendarmerie post or police in the area, he requested that the responsible authorities take immediate steps to strengthen the security and policy institutions and perforce the army of guards in this region. He pointed out "This matter possesses special importance since due to its special location Khodabandeh is at all times exposed to likely dangers of aggression and counterrevolutionary conspiracy. Of course I have mentioned this matter to the honorable minister of the interior, the revolutionary public prosecutor and the other relevant officials. On this occasion, the area is also faced with a problem in terms of judiciary courts. For example we in our region just have a district court, and the district court, in light of the judiciary laws of the past, cannot respond to the needs of the people. This region still does not have a revolutionary public prosecutor, an Islamic law judge or a Friday emam. Therefore matters related to law cases are referred to Abhar and since the revolutionary public prosecutor rarely goes to that town either big problems have always been and are being created for the people from this standpoint. Another problem which I consider it necessary to mention here is that of the telephone. In spite of the existence of a population whose statistics I already mentioned, Khodabandeh is deprived of an automatic telephone; the telephone which has been installed in the region is of the magneto variety and is usually out of order. So this is a problem which is added to the others, and so on."

In conclusion, expressing hope that the government and the parliament would devote priority in their plans to propounding and implementing construction and development plans in the rural areas, he said, "Certainly providing a living for the people, especially the rural inhabitants, goes along with Islamic justice, and the two complement one another. I believe that there is no possibility of establishing Islamic justice without providing a living for rural inhabitants; in such a situation, there is no justice and I will not consider the Islamic government to be more than a verbal state. We have promised people everywhere that what has happened so far, where justice has not been done, one should not consider the fault of Islam. God willing we will overcome the problems with the cooperation in the near future of the people and the Islamic Consultative Council."

11887
CSO: 4906

ARMY UNDERTAKES PAY REFORM

Tehran KEYHAN in Persoan 3 Sep 80 p 16

[Article: "In An Exclusive Interview With KEYHAN, Brigadier General Fallahi Announced: "A Plan for Increasing Salaries and Redressing Inequalities in the Army"]

[Text] The salaries and benefits of retired and active duty armed forces personnel in the Islamic Republic of Iran are being increased in order to redress existing inequalities.

Brigadier General Valiollah Fallahi, acting chief of the Joint Army Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran, said while announcing this news during a four-hour interview with KEYHAN: Bills concerning increases in salaries and benefits, and redressing inequality and discrimination among army personnel have been approved by Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of the Republic and Commander in Chief, and have been submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly by the Ministry of Defense for drafting and approval.

During the announcement of the salary increase for armed forces personnel in the Islamic Republic, Brigadier General Fallahi said: With studies that we have put into effect we have eliminated all forms of inequality. Concerning the amount of the salary increase for armed forces personnel, Brigadier General Fallahi said: The bill for increasing salaries of armed forces personnel is under careful study, as are all aspects of the Ministry of Defense. He said: Since this bill had already been prepared before the official beginning of Majles activities, the Revolutionary Council has submitted it to the Majles for drafting and approval. Fallahi added: The annual payroll increase for personnel in the Islamic Republic of Iran is about 12 billion tumans. Among retired people, the salaries of about 300 retired people will be increased by 30 percent, meaning they will collect about 80 percent of their active duty salaries. The acting chief of the Joint Army Staff of the Islamic Republic then added: The bill for salary increases will eliminate the only existing salary inequalities among armed forces personnel in the Islamic Republic. Fallahi said: In the new bill differences are only related to academic attainment or years of service. We have, however, taken a look at the value of academic credentials.

Salaries of personnel in the Islamic Republic will be increased on this basis. Fallahi added: Armed forces personnel drew various benefits. For example, technicians drew technical salaries, Air Force personnel had special privileges on the ground, the same as pilots or people working aboard warships. He said: All special privileges will be removed on the basis of the new bill. It will be left to the discretion of the army to distribute between 20 to 60 percent of salaries as technical, hardship, and hazardous occupation pay. In this way some of the inequalities will disappear. He added: Until this bill is approved, we have also submitted a number of other bills for eliminating inequalities. For example, after the triumph of the revolution we noticed that burial rights were unequal between non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and officers, meaning the officers drew the most, followed in succession by non coms and enlisted men. How bad it was that in the Islamic Republic of Iran, burial rights, which are a totally separate thing, and are absolutely religious and Islamic, should be unequal.

He also said: Allowances for food, quarters and clothing were also unequal between enlisted men, non coms, and officers. We also equalized these, and in order to redress all forms of discrimination and unequality, all officers' and NCO clubs have been consolidated. In another segment of his remarks Fallahi said concerning the changes that would be introduced into the army system by the new organization: Renovations by the new organization are from within, meaning it is a process that will guide the army closer toward a "divine" system. These renovations will place the army squarely on the side of the Imam, Islam, and the nation. If these basic changes of the new organization are completed, and we hope for that, and we must also strive to complete them, the army will not be so vulnerable. It will be an army that is not subject to influence, and a religious, Islamic, people's or in other words, a unified army, cohesive from within. An army that is cohesive from within will not take it as a major problem if its tools of war and weaponry are not in good condition. This is a problem when the army is not cohesive from within. If the organization renovation from within which has begun is completed, we will then be able to change the nature of war, meaning we will be able to carry on irregular activities, and we could fight in that way for months or years. In the army we want to form, if it is formed, it will have characteristics that are not outdated. The closer we come to war, and beyond war, the army will be more revolutionary and more aggressive. Meaning if the equipment deteriorates its spirit will not deteriorate. Such an army is a people's army, a well-established and enduring army. The army will not die. Such an army is within the nation, of the same color as the nation. Such an army can back the nation, and conversely the nation can support such an army. Such an army can begin reconstruction, and when such an army is founded it will be possible to sever dependence entirely. Otherwise, an army with ties on the outside can never completely sever dependence and it will not be an army that can change the nature of war. An army that is cohesive from within can be a military university for the nation, and within such an army the nation can learn. Solidarity between the army and the nation in such circumstances will be a true and spiritual solidarity, and this is the result of such organizational renovation.

9310
CSO: 4906

FORMER SUPERVISOR DENOUNCES DECISION ON CLOSING UNIVERSITIES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Aug 80 p 6

/Article by Dr Mohammad Malaki: "Open Letter to the Revolutionary Cultural Council: Special Characteristics of Islamic University from the Doctrinal Viewpoint"/

/Text/ When schools were started up in Iran through the efforts of the Great Amir and others, so that sciences such as physics and chemistry could be taught in these schools, what did they do, brother, when they resorted to the weight of religion to impose a class stamp on education and a faction rose to combat this activity and propagandized among the religious masses which had been able to put their children in school, stating "People, why are you staying quiet? They want to turn your children into irreligious polytheists, they are talking about chemistry, physics, sulphuric acid and similar matters in the schools, these ideas came from the West, and do you know what sulphuric acid means? It means that there is no God." The result of this pre-arranged plan was that most of the children of grocers and the like pursued their fathers' jobs lest they become irreligious, and the children of the top brass and the kings and politicians filled up the new schools and became doctors, engineers, specialists and politicians, seizing all the affairs of the country in their own hands, dealing in such a way with religion, the country and the people for about 100 years that people still feel the pain of their yoke on their backs. Today nobody is saying, "Look, chemistry and sulphuric acid did not come from the West and do not mean the negation of God but are rather the proof of God." The father of the science of chemistry, Jahir ibn Hayyan, was a Moslem scholar and, at a time when the Moslems considered the quest of knowledge, understanding, and the search for science to be an Islamic obligation, even if that was in the remotest corner of the world ("seek knowledge even if it is in China"), at a time when the leader of our creed, Emam Ja'far Sadeq, established the first Islamic university and established the bases of free discussion and the confrontation of ideas for us, and at a time when scholars like Jabir ibn Hayyan (to whose name the world of science still gives reverence) transformed society, no scholar in the West had the right

to think except within the confines of the sacred book established by the church, and people burned free thinking scholars and intellectuals alive. What did they do, brother, when, after the passage of several centuries, the situation changed to the point where, with the arrival of Western spies at the Safavid court, influence at the court, and the transformation of Alawite Shiism to Safavid Shiism, the scholars were the only persons who studied religion, and even that within the religion limited to the Safavid Schiism, and renunciation, threats and legal slaughter took the place of free discussion and the confrontation of ideas--to the point where the meaning of sulphuric acid became the denial of the existence of God? When people saw that they were compelled to open universities and higher institutes, even in this country, whether they liked it or not, all their efforts went to endowing the universities with two special characteristics, Western orientation and a class character. During the more than 40 years which have passed since the establishment of Iran's first university (the University of Tehran), the satanic regime, exploiting various techniques, tried to keep the universities from belonging to the people and stinted no form of treason to this end. But can one stop the movement of history? It was no longer the children of the prominent who occupied the universities--rather, the number of students who rose from the heart of the society increased year by year, to the point where almost all the students consisted of children of the middle and lower classes and the satanic government, subservient to imperialism and capitalism, prohibited any kind of radical structural change which would prevent the universities from being dependent on the West and would allow the universities to return "to themselves." It created a university whose job became to waste students' time on subjects which for the most part were not useful in meeting the needs of society and to give degrees whose recipients had no other distinction than to sit behind administrative desks.

The mistake of the political figures following the triumph of the revolution: The people rebelled against the satanic regime and were victorious. The imperial regime should have been replaced by the Islamic regime, which would only have been possible through a basic change. The temporary government came into office and the prime minister, before starting work with the University of Tehran, presented his statements to the people. He was not an unknown person; everyone knew what his thoughts and ideas were. The sentence "my ignorant brother, come and be free" indicated his policy and thinking in the government.

In those days no one objected or stated that the revolution would get nowhere with this conduct. I do not intend to defend anyone, since when Eng Bazargan was in power I myself made the most intense criticisms of him, but today, now that every party is subjecting him to attack, I consider it my moral, human and Islamic duty to state the facts. To those who today are apparently preparing a court to try the revolutionary government /I say/ are Bazargan and the temporary government alone responsible for the mistakes of the past? Why were you silent about the people who were running the country behind the scenes? If treason was committed,

many indeed participated in it. Eng Bazargan's big sin was to say, from the first day, "This is what I am," and never claim to be revolutionary. As if you performed much revolutionary activity after the resignation of the temporary government! Brothers, seek council with yourselves awhile and consider that God is the witness and the supervisor of your acts. I will now leave this question to its proper place, where I have statements to make in this regard. In any event, following the triumph of the revolution, we did not make much haste to open every place up and return work to its ordinary state, and not much insistence was placed on keeping the university open. At that time, benefiting from the revolutionary spirit of the people, we could have closed the doors of the university for a few months, sent professors, students and employees to rural areas and towns on such jobs as roadbuilding--something which other revolutionary countries have done--and organized a plan to transfer the university into an Islamic university during that period, so that, after about 16 months of the revolution had elapsed, the emam would not have cried out that "the universities must be unified," "the universities must be for us ourselves" and "the universities must become Islamic." The universities were kept open while there was no possibility of continuing the previous situation any longer; we began as many efforts toward structural changes in the universities as possible and, in spite of all obstacles, took steps in this direction to which reference will be made later.

What Have You Done To Islamize the Universities So Far?

Through a revolutionary act, they decided to close the doors of the universities and higher institutes, in accordance with a plan previously drawn up. It was their decision that this act would take place in May. The president intervened and, at a meeting which the university people did not attend, it was decided that the universities would be shut down on 5 June. No matter how much we cried out that they should not do this, that they should close the universities a month later at the most so that a large number of students could graduate and go to work for the country and not go about in a daze, they not only paid attention to our words but also laid the charge of traitor, counterrevolutionary, anti-emam and so forth against us.

Brothers Come, for the sake of God, out of friendship for the people, for those hundreds of thousands of families who have become vexed by the fact that the universities and higher institutes are closed today, and explain whether the act of closing the universities was a revolutionary act along the path of the revolution or a political factional act for private objectives. I, as a teacher, who for about 20 years in Tehran University has had active participation in all the occurrences which have taken place in that center, am ready to prove that the shutdown of universities like the University of Tehran will only turn out to the benefit of the counterrevolution, and that not only will it not solve problems in the future but the fact that these scientific institutions are closed will add to the burden of problems with every day. What steps has the Cultural Revolution Staff

taken so far to Islamize the universities? Except that you sent a questionnaire to the teaching staff, which was not expected of the revolutionary staff, moreover a staff selected by the emam of the nation, after this period after about 2 months had passed? Would it not have been better, instead of asking questions about matters which are all reflected in the teaching staff's file and instead of wasting a number of people's time in studying the response to the questionnaires, to have referred to the individuals' files, so that it could be known what the investigations on everyone was, what educational and other work they have performed so far, and what use is being made of these persons in current revolutionary conditions, then to have given a judgment on everyone, according to his type of specialization so that some action might be taken to advance the revolution? Would it not for example have been better had they asked me, whose specialization is nutrition, "now that the university is closed and your presence in the university cannot be benefited from now, go to Sistan and Baluchestan, to the factories, schools, mosques and so forth, and teach people what they should do to avoid food poisoning or how they should keep their water and food so it does not become rotten and polluted."

Would it not have been better, during this period, for you at least to determine the special characteristics of the Islamic university so that people could start planning for all those whose hearts beat for Islam and the revolution? To what extent do you know the people who are participating in the commissions? Let them not be smart people who have made 180 degree turns and who are the same as those up to yesterday who participated in sessions investigating the problems of the white revolution and today are planning in meetings for educational revolution and creating Islamic universities. Why instead of a dialogue of the deaf don't you raise these questions with the people? The fact that the universities and higher institutions are closed is not a small matter. It is linked to the lives of about a million families. Why don't you act in a revolutionary way? In your opinion is closing and destroying or building and opening more revolutionary? Come first determine the objective, then overturn the obstacles to reaching the goal, and build and pave the way to arrive at it.

What Class Suffers from the Fact That the Universities Are Closed?

I do not think that anyone would doubt that ours is still a society of classes. The downtrodden remain downtrodden and the haughty remain haughty. The regretful palaces and the regretful huts are still in place. The several-thousand-square-meter houses and the several-million-square-meter palaces are many and the shacks and damp rooms in the process of collapsing which are homes to families of many people are abundant. If you stand for a few minutes to get a bus along Mosaddegh Avenue or Dr Shari'ati Avenue, not a few, but dozens of luxury cars, costing thousands of tomans, will pass by you. While most people hope for 2 sirs of frozen meat, groups of people provide fresh meat, meat without gristle, for their dogs and cats. In an environment where the biggest entertainment and recreation for a large segment of the people of Tehran is to go to the parks, pass along Mosaddegh Avenue and go under the grees of Behesht-e Zahra by pickup or

truck, factory owners, big landowners and honorable merchants travel several times a year to California, Los Angeles, Paris, London and so forth to visit gentlemen and examine money and banking affairs in monstrous airplanes which prevent the water in their bellies from being shaken. It is natural, in a class society, that it is obvious what classes have suffered from the fact that the universities are closed: classes which have the ability to send their darling beloved children to well known universities in America and Europe to continue their studies, or people who are not even able to fill their children's stomachs? Don't think that the matter has ended yet, or that these things are unheard of in the Islamic Republic. A year and a half after the triumph of the revolution, cast a glance at notices in the newspapers and many matters will become clear to you. I will just refer to one example. On page 3 of KEYHAN, issue 11,067, of 13 August 1978, a short notice: "Spain, Austria, pension, language classes, university and other services, language preparation classes, telephone such and such." Now tell me, do those million families which are disturbed over the closing of the universities belong to the downtrodden or the haughty? To dependents of the 60,000 martyrs and the 100,000 wounded, or the princes, courtiers, capitalists and owners of gold and coercion? Downtrodden sister and brother, beware; do not let it happen today that they will be able to make the haughty dominate you with the slogan that sulphuric acid means there is no God, that they close the door to science and knowledge in your face by closing the universities so that you will once again pursue your father's work and they will follow their fathers'.

Distinguishing Features of the Islamic University through the Doctrinal Viewpoint

"The goal of government is to nurture people in movement toward the divine system (Valiollah ol-Masir). For the sake of the appearance and development of capabilities in order that the manifestation of the dimensions of the divine nature of man may be provided ("be formed in God's morality"), which can be possible only under the aegis of the active and extensive participation of all elements of society in the process of the transformation of the society," /About one line missing./ From the introduction to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we realize that from the doctrinal viewpoint everything is a means to one goal in an Islamic society, and that is the "divine nature" of man and the creation of people who are fit to "represent God" on earth. Thus what is at issue is the selection of the proper means and the approach to that. It is clear that one of these means is "to know--to know how one must proceed from "being" to "becoming." When we see that Islam relies on knowledge, science and knowing, to the point where it swears by the pen and, in the first message of the revelation, declares "he taught man what he did not know," we see that it raises this question in evaluating knowledge:

"Are people who know the equal of those who do not know?" They never have been. Islam's prophet considered the learned men of his nation to be his successors and stated, "pursue knowledge, even if that is in the remotest

part of the world." He gave such importance to understanding that he told "heathen slaves" in the hands of the Moslems "if you teach Moslems how to read and write, you will be free." It is because of this that, in the words of those who wrote the constitution, "the groundwork for the appearance and development of capabilities in order that the manifestation of the dimensions of the divine nature of man may be provided." Now, in order to continue this course, is it possible that one may ignore the role of the universities as a means? Not at all. So how can we create a university which will be Islamic and aimed at "the goal?" What are the distinguishing features of this university? What university can be a better model and form for us than the one which the leader of our creed, Emam Ja'far Sadeq, established?

What we have learned from the body of the writings and the sayings of the scholars of religion, clerics and learned men of Islam is that in order to make the universities Islamic one must first carry out three fundamental principles:

1. Purification and cleansing of the universities. They should be purged, in accordance with Emam Khomeyni's command, of the corrupt elements and servants and obedient followers of the previous regime, and the dependents and devotees of foreigners should have no access to them, so that the educational environment may be a center for the creation of model men who are divine in nature.

2. Freedom of thinking and expressing opinions, since man does not grow and cannot follow the road toward divine nature except through the intermisture of ideas. We learned this from the conduct of Emam Sadeq (on whom be God's peace), since his university was a center for the commingling of ideas.

3. In order to provide an Islamic nature and to have all members of society take part in all stages of decisionmaking, it is necessary that all the affairs of the universities take place through consultation, since in the opinion of those who wrote the constitution "the divine nature of man can be possible only under the aegis of the active and extensive participation of all the elements of society in the process of the transformation of society."

If these three fundamental principles (purification, free discussion and consultation) are carried out within our universities, that will be a big step toward their Islamization; otherwise we sill have just contented ourselves with changing the name of the imperial universities to Islamic universities. After acceptance of these three principles, planning for the sake of putting higher education at the service of the masses in a manner responding to the requirements of the revolutionary society will be easy.

Brother Members of the Council of the Cultural Revolution:

Some people are of the opinion that you, as an institution which must be "revolutionary" have not succeeded in your work in this period, which has lasted more than 7 months. Certainly you pursue discussions of this matter at your meetings. I do not know what conclusions you have reached, but, as I have said many times, in our opinion, until we make it known what economic, social, political and other characteristics our Islamic society will possess, we will not be successful in planning, including planning for the universities. You have the experience of a year and a half of revolution before you. Why have plans been so unsuccessful and the emam's cry has become so loud?

Let us learn from the past that means are necessary to reach the goal of "the divine nature of man." Until we realize what these means are and use them, we will not draw close to the goal, but will be remote from it.

Brothers: to attain the demands of the people, which they have been crying out for--that is, "the freedom and independence of the Islamic Republic--we are badly in need of devout, self-sacrificing scholars and specialists. What have you done to this end so far? do you think that sending out certain circulars and forming some commissions is enough? During the time you are making decisions, all the universities remain shut down for at least one term and you have no plans for absorbing people's powers. To whom benefit is the bewilderment of tens of thousands of students, professors and employees? Come, before it is late, and set the problems of the job truthfully before the emam and the nation, for, if you do not do so today, tomorrow, God forbid, may be late.

Peace be upon you.

11887
CSO: 4906

GOODS DISTRIBUTION CENTERS TO SPUR ECONOMY

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Aug 80 p 13

[Article: "The Role of Centers for Procurement and Distribution of Merchandise in Economic Reconstruction"]

[Text] Foreign trade under the former regime was based as much as possible imports, the daily expansion of a culture of brokers and middlemen, the replacement of domestic production with imports, and putting forth as much as possible the profit motive over the work ethic. Since foreign trade yielded ever increasing enormous profits, most people were awed by this, fell all over themselves in droves to go the way of capitalism, and sought to obtain trade licenses. Getting a trade license was a sure way to multiply one's wealth several times over in a short time. For the same reason there was no longer any incentive to establish production units, and every day the number of people going into foreign trade increased. Unfortunately we were also faced with an increase in foreign trade on the part of profiteers (increasing imports, of course, and not exports) because besides assuring a huge, legal profit (!), this was a way to make huge illegal profits by introducing fraudulent factors, in which the price of goods was inflated. As a result, the way was opened for smuggling and other operations.

With the ratification of the constitution and the insertion of Article 44 based on nationalizing foreign trade, a great change was set in motion in the history of our country's foreign trade, and the full implementation of this article can be a useful and lively step in the country's economic reconstruction.

The Ministry of Commerce, after several months of study and deliberation, has finally gotten the executive regulations of this plan approved by the Revolutionary Council, and has decided to put this article into force by establishing 16 merchandise procurement and distribution centers. About three months ago it set up three of these 16 centers, the metals center, the paper and wood center, and the textile and fabrics center, bringing the importation of such goods directly under its own control. Although there are still importers working in these fields, they are totally under

the control of these centers. According to the Ministry of Commerce, during this period the established centers have had noticeable success, and they have been able to bring about 30 percent of the volume of the country's imports under their own mantle. The Ministry of Commerce has expressed the hope of setting up all 16 of the aforesaid centers by the end of this year and to take control of all imports. We also hope that this article will be fully implemented before the end of this year, because, for the same reasons that the Ministry of Commerce has given, the claims of numerous difficulties and the lack of specialized knowledge do not establish the need for more time for the implementation of this article so that we allow a great many of these merchants to carry on their plundering for several more months. These centers must be conclusively established as soon as possible in order to put a stop to the abuses of numerous profiteers. Here we will summarize the effects of nationalizing foreign trade on the country's economy.

Control of Imports

Before now every private importer, without any form of control, ordered every kind of merchandise in whatever quantities he wished. How often the different merchants ordered so much of one good that prices went way down because of oversupply, to the point that it was no longer economical and they would even abandon them to customs. This problem caused the accumulation of merchandise in customs warehouses, and also the waste of a great amount of the national wealth. On the other hand, because of the lack of individual control, sometimes many different varieties of one type of good were imported from different countries, all of them satisfying only one need. For this reason the variety of imports has now exceeded 24,000 kinds. With the full establishment of the basis for nationalizing foreign trade, the centers for procurement and distribution of merchandise can at least economize both from the point of view of the quantity of orders and from the point of view of reducing the variety of imported merchandise and of ordering necessary goods and not sumptuous, deluxe goods to be bought with savings.

Protection of Domestic Products

With the full implementation of this article, by not importing items whose equivalents are produced inside the country, and by assuring higher prices for imports, these centers can protect domestic products and bring about factors that will encourage domestic producers. In this way traders also, with cutbacks on other profits, with no incentives to remain in this business, will undertake to set up production units and the amount of domestic production will increase. Then the dependence on imports, which now make up about 70 percent of consumer goods, will decrease.

Obstacles to Implementation

The nationalization of foreign trade endangers and will endanger the interests of many. The implementation of this article will be confronted on the one hand by the protests of many domestic merchants, whose enormous profits that they have put in their own pockets until now, will be stopped. On the other hand there are the foreign companies, brokers, and middlemen, who received commissions from both domestic producers and traders before the appearance of this article. According to reports from the managing directors of these established centers, these foreign companies' attacks on Iran have begun, especially since a number of them have been drawn to the brink of bankruptcy. They are trying to prevent producing companies from seling merchandise directly to Iran, in order to force Iran to import goods through these brokers in the old decadent way. The only way to fight these foreign brokers is to resist as much as possible in order to force them out of the picture. Domestic insiders who work in this field, however, also number about 23,000. They can either set up cooperative distribution and consumer companies, or they can set up production units. Considering the fact that setting up cooperatives will not be that profitable, it is better for them to go with industrial and production units than to both make more money and pay the price of the largely random production that faces the country and which they have either not been aware of until now or else have repressed, thinking they were fulfilling their moral and human responsibility by engaging in business.

9310
CSO: 4906

MOSCOW PAPER ADVERTISES TRANSPORT SERVICES TO IRAN

By FESCO Vessels, Trains

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 37, 21-28 Sep 80 p 15

[Advertisement]

[Text] FAR EAST-IRAN via CAUCASUS

A Reliable and Beneficial Container Landbridge
via USSR Territory

by TSCS--Trans-Siberian Container Service
and TCCS--Trans-Caucasian Container Service

Shipments from/to nine major ports in Japan, also Manila, Hong Kong, Bangkok to/from the port of Vostochny by modern container vessels of FESCO--Far-Eastern Shipping Company and further by express block-trains to Djulfa on the Soviet-Iranian border.

Daily Sailings from/to Japan

By Baltic Vessels, Trains

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 35, 7-14 Sep 80 p 4

[Advertisement]

[Text] TCCS

TRANS-CAUCASIAN
CONTAINER SERVICE

Shortest Container Route from Europe to Iran

Containers by fast ships from any major port in Europe to Leningrad-Riga-Tallinn-Klaipeda. Further by rail to DJULFA

WEEKLY SAILINGS

From each port are offered by Baltic Shipping Company
Latvian Shipping Company
Estonian Shipping Company

Information on Sailings and shipment is available from local agents or the Owners:

Baltic Shipping Company
5, Mezhevoy kanal
Leningrad 198035 USSR
Cable: Morflot Leningrad
Telex: 121501, 121514, 121542,
121563, 121561

Latvian Shipping Company
2, Boulevard Padomiu
Riga USSR
Cable: Morflot Riga
Telex: 161110, 161121, 161122,
161123

Estonian Shipping Company
3/5, Boulevard Estonia
Tallinn USSR
Cable: Morflot Tallinn
Telex: 173272

Any other enquiries to the TCCS General Operator

V/O "Sojuztransit"
32/34, Smolenskaya-Sennaya
Moscow USSR
Cable: Soltra Moscow
Telex: 7266 7291 7292

CSO: 1812

IRAQI AMBASSADOR AMASH NEW DEAN OF HELSINKI DIPLOMATIC CORPS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Vesa Haapala: "Amash To Become Dean of Diplomatic Corps Next Winter"]

[Text] The ascendency of the Iraqi Ambassador, General Saleh Mehdi Amash, to the position of senior foreign diplomat in Helsinki's diplomatic corps is causing concern and confusion in diplomatic circles.

The Israeli Embassy is experiencing particular uneasiness since as countries Israel and Iraq are officially in a state of war. In his diplomatic duties in Helsinki in the latter part of the 1970's General Amash has not been shy about presenting stands condemning Israel and Zionism. Frequently these two issues have been combined in the same stands.

The duties of the dean of the diplomatic corps will be transferred to General Amash in the early part of winter. At that time the present dean, Dutch Ambassador C. G. Verdonck-Huffnagel, will be leaving his post in Helsinki. He has unofficially announced that he will leave Helsinki at the end of next February.

The duties of the dean of the diplomatic corps include the management of the joint interests of the diplomatic community and the presenting of expectations with respect to the host country. At receptions and state visits the dean frequently represents all the diplomats accredited to the country. The duties of the dean also include the arrangement of receptions for departing as well as arriving ambassadors.

Embassy Secretary Gad Cohen of the Israeli Embassy states that they intend to proceed from the fact that no problems will appear in the future. Cohen considers that there might be a possible problem between General Amash and the Finnish Foreign Ministry.

"We hope that there will be no difficulties," says Gad Cohen.

Indeed the representatives of Chile and the Vatican have been accredited to Helsinki longer than General Amash, but since the Ambassador of Chile is in Stockholm and Papal Nuncio resides in Copenhagen, General Amash must accept the duties of the dean of the diplomatic corps next winter.

Outwardly, at least, good conditions exist for this since the palatial Iraqi Embassy completed on Kulosaari will be in full use at that time. The colossal, eastern style embassy, which was built with great speed on Vahaniityntie on Kulosaari, will receive its baptism by fire on the 16th of this month when a large group of invited guests will come to celebrate Iraqi national day.

Indeed this national day is actually on 14 July, but the French Bastille Day also falls on the same day. The French will celebrate their national day on the actual date. It is presumed that the Iraqis feared a loss of guests inasmuch as the celebrations would have come on the same day and many might have placed greater value on the French invitation.

The general who searched for Jews and Zionists hiding in Finnish corporations in the early spring now intends to establish roots in Finland. In addition to the climate, the general is also attracted to a piece of land in Kirkkonummi.

Recently horses were brought there to be raised. The came from the same place the general does, Iraq.

General Salem Mehdi Amash

10576
CSO: 8117

NATION'S MANY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS LAUDED

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 17 Jul 80 pp 8, 9

/Article: "Iraq on the Road to Comprehensive Development"/

[Excerpt] Women's Takeoff

The Iraqi revolution has devoted conspicuous attention to women, who were neglected and lived on the sidelines before the revolution occurred. This concern arose from women's weight and importance in building a new society and dozens of laws have been codified on their behalf so that they may assume their full role in the process of development and construction. Women, by virtue of the application of this law, have become teachers, oil engineers, policewomen, operators of gas pumps, officers and pilots.

Among the most important things women have achieved is the Personal Status Law, which has given all Iraqi women reaching legal age the right to request a divorce and to reject forced marriage. They have also received the right to be electoral candidates and be elected to the National Assembly, as actually occurred about 3 weeks ago when for the first time Iraqi women took part in the first elections held in Iraq for about a quarter century. These resulted in the victory of 16 women--the highest figure to be found among Arab parliaments.

Working women in Iraq have enjoyed the achievement of numerous gains and accomplishments. Legislation embraces everything which uplifts the status of women in general and provides the wherewithal for their liberation, their resurgence and their exercise of roles in society which are as worthy and competent as those of their brother men.

The Labor Law for the year 1970 is to be considered a true mirror of revolution's intellectual orientation toward women's issues. It underlines the need to incorporate women in labor and give them the scope to engage in work while providing all legal guarantees and caring for their special circumstances and their role in society as mothers and workers.

This law allotted a special chapter to regulating the jobs of working women. This contains legal sections which stipulate that one may not employ women in industry on night jobs except for administrative work or work related to special technical or social activities, with permission from the competent bodies, in places where health and recreation facilities are available to them.

The Labor Law prohibits the employment of women in harsh, difficult circumstances and makes it obligatory to give working women a rest period of no less than 11 consecutive hours per day in addition to a vacation of 1 month from the date they give birth, with confirmation by a medical certificate from medical bodies. It prohibits their employment in night or overtime work, or work which is harsh and detrimental to their health and the health of their fetuses during periods of pregnancy. It also sets work hours for pregnant women at 7 hours per day.

Upbringing of Youth

A mass organization, the Iraq General Federation of Youth, is in charge of preparing and bringing up young people in Iraq. This consists of three organizations: the first, the Vanguard Organization, is concerned with small children ranging from 9 to 14 years of age; there is the Youth Organization which deals with the 15- to 19-year-old group; and there is the Young Person's Organization dealing with youths who are 20 years old and above.

In Iraq there are 87 youth centers and 11 youth homes dealing with matters of art and literature, 78 sporting clubs, and five educational care centers which are all concerned with various youth activities. The Ministry of Youth supervises these.

Technology and Planning

In constructing a new economy, Iraq relies on the programmed planning system. It prepares annual 5-year plans to absorb financial revenues, which increased after it nationalized oil in 1972. Allocations to the 5-year plan for the years 1965-69 came to 631 million dinars, and the 1970-75 national development plan for 1970-75 to 3,008,000,000 dinars. Total allocation for the years 1976-79 were 9,903,600,000 dinars.

The new 5-year plan for 1981-85 consists of balanced development of the various economic sectors. It devotes special attention to rural development and is based on the premise of coordination and economic integration among Arab countries.

From this premise, that of constructing a strong national economy, officials in Iraq consider that planning assumes central importance in building the economy and all its branches and in developing it in accordance

with current and future national and domestic requirements. It also considers that the process of socialist construction is inevitable and necessary.

National Income

What has been achieved in this context may be attributed to national income, which came to 9,792,000,000 dinars last year, as compared with 850 million in 1969 or an annual growth rate of 27.7 percent. Per capita income rose from 92.3 to 763.8 million dinars, or an annual rate of growth of 23.5 percent.

Wages paid to employees and workers increased by great rates over their pre-revolution level. Out of concern for the application of socialism, these increases were concentrated in a manner covering the main classes of society, such as workers, low-level employees and people with limited incomes, and the minimum wage rose by 122 percent.

Investments

The figure on investments allocated to the annual plan in the current year comes to 5.24 billion dinars, or an increase of 176 percent over total investments allocated to all plans set out before the 17 July 1968 revolution.

Concomitant with the program which officials in Iraq are following, the government has offered Arab investors the requisite facilities, they number about 400 investors in various sectors, and their total investments come to about $7 million.

Continuing in the development sphere, we can point out that work has recently been increasing in the General Building Authority, which is carrying out 721 development projects at a total cost of about 1.3 billion dinars. The costs of projects contained in the plan for the current year comes to about 768.49 million dinars, while annual allocations came to 334.5 million, an increase of 200 percent over last year's allocations.

Of these projects, 343 have attained a high rate of completion; these consist of various facilities spread over all areas of the country.

Among the most prominent projects to be carried out in the current year are the technological institutes which will prepare intermediate and technical staffs in the Provinces of Maysan, Irbil, al-Ta'mim, Nineveh, Babil and Basrah, at a total cost of 62,374,000 dinars, and teachers' training institutes in the Provinces of Baghdad, Nineveh and Maysan at a cost of 32.19 million dinars.

Work is on the verge of completion on all the projects for industrial schools, a number of which were recently delivered throughout all governorates at a cost of 45 million dinars.

The General Building Organization will start preparing studies and designs for the construction of soccer fields in the governorates of Babil, al-Qadisiyah and Nineveh.

Work is also continuing on the construction of a number of socialist sector building projects, most prominent of which are the planning agency complex, the Council of Ministers, the General Motion Picture and Stage Organization, the site of the Economic Commission for West Asia with a special housing complex, buildings and machinery for AL-THAWRAH newspaper, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Baghdad University.

Development of Telephone Services

The National Development Plan for the Years 1976-80 has given great attention to telephone projects in rural areas, in order to provide modern services and eliminate differences between urban and rural areas.

Iraq's Ministry of Transport and Communications plan is aimed at connecting Iraq's districts with a reliable automatic system consisting of telephone and cable services as part of a project containing exchanges with capacities ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 lines.

The project also includes the construction of 97 microwave stations spread about over all areas of the country. This will be characterized by the use of mobile air conditioned vehicles until completion of the communications complexes which will accommodate installed exchanges with capacities based on actual need.

These vehicles, with their equipment, will be moved to subdistrict seats to cover most rural areas in the country with their services. The project will be outfitted with central supervisory and control equipment to keep close supervision on activity in the vehicles.

The project will help stop migration from rural to urban areas by providing all the requirements for living in rural areas which exist in the towns, such as health, telephone, electric, and clean water services and other important services; in addition it will help regulate the marketing process by accelerating communications among cooperatives and crop gathering centers of various types.

Road and Bridge Projects

In the context of roads and bridges, the General Construction Contracting Company at the present time is carrying out a number of road, bridge and

pier projects at a cost of 260 million dinars distributed among the provinces. These include the al-Qa'im-'Akashat-al--Ramliyah road, the al-Qa'im-Akashat railway and stations and birdges belonging to that, the airfield tunnel, the barrier for the town of al-Sa'diyah, the Kirkuk-Fathah bridge, the road connected to it, and 10 strategic piers at Umm Qasr.

The Umm Qasr pier project will cover an area of 900,000 square meters on the west bank of Umm Qasr. Its total cost will come to 95 million dinars and it will consist of 10 commercial piers and a special track on which 26 large cargo unloading cranes will operate.

In another area, the General Agency for Constructing Southern Roads built 285 kilometers of roads and three pontoons last month at a cost of 10 million dinars. These are distributed among the Provinces of Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, al-Muthanna and al-Qadisiyah. The agency is now continuing the construction of 961 kilometers of roads in these provinces at a cost of 49.34 million dinars.

Social Affairs

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs' Plan for the years 1985-86 consists of effecting a major qualitative shift in the context of the social services the ministry's agency provides, in light of the requisite volume of change and development and the demands of objective reality, as well as construction materials whose effects are not isolated from field conceptions.

As regards disabled persons, the relevant body supervising these people has decided to establish a special town in every province for them. The area of each town will be 65,000 square meters. Special designs have been made for them at a cost of 93 million dinars preparatory to startup of construction early next year.

It should be added that every town will include a nursery, kindergarten, primary school for deaf and dumb and retarded children, and shops for practical training in sewing, carpentry, ironwork, ceramics, drawing and weaving.

It will also contain a boarding area for children afflicted with numerous disabilities, a center for disability diagnosis 2,000 square meters in area conforming to the most modern developments, a large common hall for activities in various departments, and all other services relating to food, movies, sports and daily activities.

Five million dinars have been allocated to the board, which is headed by the minister of labor and social affairs, Mr Bakr Mahmud Rasul, to provide all necessary equipment and facilities for the disabled.

The sum of 450,000 dinars has been allotted to renovating the al-Amal institute for the deaf and dumb and increasing the serivces it provides; in addition, the board has received 30 buses, will soon receive another 20, and then will get another 100 to provide transportation for the disabled who are covered by the new Employment Law.

The board recently opened new institutes for the retarded in the town of al-Thawrah, a ceramic shop in al-Waziriyah, and an institute for the mentally retarded in the al-Harithiyah area, as well as transferring some social development centers to centers to serve the retarded.

In the course of the past 6 months the board opened 26 projects to serve the retarded and is continuing its work of preparing the curricula which they will operate in the coming school year. Among these projects are 10 institutes for the retarded in Baghdad, three in Basrah, two each in the Provinces of al-Najaf, Karba'a', and Irbil, and the expansion of spaces in existing institutes.

Special Child's Care

Among the types of care which officials are providing for all citizens, there is special care for children, the generations of tomorrow. As of last year,85 mother and child care centers had been established in the country, including 16 in Baghdad, to perform health and guidance care for the pregnant in order to eliminate deviations and moral disturbances. Thus there is a concentration on child care and the provision of a suitable climate for balanced growth. In the light of experiences in actual practice the health boards have recommended the establishment of 25 new centers and the performance of a comprehensive study to cover Iraq's needs according to geographic and population distribution.

The government has given great care and attention to nurseries and kindergartens and the specifications and conditions on the basis of which these types of educational and service organizations are constructed are recorded. The number of kindergartens in Iraq total 43, ranging from national government organizations to mass organizations and benevolent societies. The Iraq General Federation of Women is prominent in this vital educational and service sphere, and it has established a prominent prsence in directing experience in it as regards the construction of children's kindergartens. Sixteen schools are being opened with a capacity of 200 children each.

On behalf of children, also, a decree has been issued on compulsory free education, meals in schools, institutes and schools devoted to the affairs of disabled children, and coverage of free time by providing a healthy cultural and recreational atmosphere and providing sports, art and games to develop talents, children's playgrounds, publication of a children's

paper and children's museums, and stage, movie and television activities devoted to children's psychological and pedagogical affairs.

The Social Care Law

Officials have been directing these vital affairs for about 3 weeks with the issuance of the Social Care Law, in which a stipend is allotted to every family whose monthly income is below the minimum wage for unskilled workers, if it consists of five or more persons below 70 percent of this wage if it consists of four persons, /below/ 70 percent if it consists of three persons, /below/ 66 percent if it consists of two persons, or /below/ 33 percent if it consists of one person.

Every widow, every divorced woman who has a minor child living with her, every minor orphan and every person totally disabled by sickness or old age will be entitled to the family care stipend in accordance with the law.

The law allots a monthly stipend of 13 dinars to heads of households, 9 dinars 100 fils to wives, and 5 dinars 200 fils to children.

In its first part, the law describes the general objective it has in mind. Amont these are:

Article One. Social solidarity is the primary basis of society and its intent is that every citizen should perform his obligations toward society in full and that society should guarantee the citizen all his rights.

Article Two. The government will strive to provide social care for all citizens while they are alive and for their families after their death.

Article Three. Work is a right whose provision the government guarantees for every citizen and a duty for everyone who is able to perform it. It is required by the need to participate in the construction, protection, development and prosperity of society. The government has the goal of providing social insurance for all citizens in cases of disability or old age.

Article Four. Government support for families with low or non-existent incomes is a tentative obligation which will decrease the more the country progresses on the way to socialist construction. The need for this support will lessen when a society of progress and welfare is achieved, providing work for everyone who is able to work and providing social insurance for all members of the population.

Article Five. The basic objective of family insurance is to maintain human dignity, eliminate negative effects on the family and children in the present and future, and put the family in a position where it can help to create a new society with awareness and sincerity.

Article Six. Children are the future of the nation. Therefore, the government looks after the stage of childhood by various means, among them establishment of government homes.

Article Seven. The government is trying to reduce the phenomenon of disability in society, to look after the physically and mentally disabled by strengthening them, qualifying them and encouraging them to work in accordance with their abilities preparatory to assimilating them into society, and to look after those who are totally unable to work from all material, health, social and psychological standpoints.

Article Eight. The social care of the physically and mentally disabled is aimed at realizing the duty of the government and the society toward citizens who are partially able to work or wholly unable to do so, by qualifying them and providing social, medical, psychological, educational, vocational, and cultural services to enable them to overcome the effects which have arisen from their disability.

In its third part, the law talks about children and child care, as follows:

Article 29. First, government houses have the objective of looking after children who suffer from states of family fragmentation or the loss of one or both parents, providing a sound atmosphere for them compensate for the family warmth they have lost, and warding off anything which might make them feel that they have no one to care for them.

Second, the government will provide all housing, clothing and food requirements and pocket expenses for children, young people and youths in accordance with the instructions issued by the chief of the General Social Care Organization.

Article 30. the Department of Social Services of the General Social Care Organization will establish and manage government homes in various parts of the country and will provide all accessories and an adequate number of employees and workers for them.

In the fourth part, the new law discusses the care of disabled persons and declares:

Article 45. Every disabled person has the right to accreditation and care, and the government will perform these services free of charge in accordance with the following principles:

First, accrediting disabled persons and returning them to the activities and professions they engaged in before their disability or qualifying them for other activities and professions which are in keeping with the abilities they still possess and require modern scientific, technical and educational vocational, health, social and intellectual equipment, so that they may play their part in building a socialist society.

Second, qualifying persons with severe disabilities who are partially able to work and orienting them toward protected workshops, productive cooperative societies or any other work places which are compatible with their actual abilities.

Third, care for people who are totally unable to work (the severely disabled or the aged) by establishing social, medical and psychological care centers in which all services are integrated in a manner guaranteeing that a calm dignified life is provided.

Article 46. Every disabled person will have the right to use vocational qualification services by belonging to a vocational qualification unit conforming to the nature of his disability.

The causes justifying the promulgation of this new law declare that, with advancement along the road to socialist construction, the citizen's bonds with society and the government will become firmer, his relations with others will become based on firm, objective foundations, new relations will take the place of tribal, feudal and capitalist ones, raising the status of the individual and the family, giving the trade union, vocational and cooperative organizations in the rural areas and the towns the key role in rearranging social relations, assimilating the individual into the new society gradually and creating a common life in which socialist notions and values will constantly grow and flourish.

While the regulation of material and moral production impose specific tasks upon individuals and groups who are capable of working, the society, as represented by the government, is in turn compelled to provide adequate care, primarily for families with low or nonexistent incomes, children, and the mentally, physically and psychologically disabled and to help them keep abreast of and join the caravan by qualifying them and encouraging them to join in the productive process and exploit the powers they possess.

This law has come about in order to cover classes which are in the most intense need for care, indeed whose inclusion under this care will give the caravan further socialist import and will elevate its status. With progress in the building of socialism, no individuals or groups lacking the social care they deserve will remain in the future.

Health Care

Officials in Iraq devote great attention to health affairs. The most modern hospitals have been established and spread about, along with various clinics and dispensaries, in various areas of the country to provide comprehensive free care to all citizens in accordance with the most modern pharmaceuticals medicine has developed and specialized human staffs.

The last 10 years have witnessed great attention to health care for citizens, especially in rural and poor ordinary areas. The number of

hospitals in 1976 totalled 194, comprising 23,324 beds, and the number of other health institutions, aside from hospitals, came to 2,047, that is, an increase of 19 percent over the figure for 1968. In addition, officials prepared the necessary staffs of doctors, dentists and practitioners of health vocations, and their numbers rose at rates of 58, 61 and 164 percent respectively in 1976 in comparison with the figures prior to the revolution. Thus the ratio of doctors to the population now is one to 2,200 as compared with one to 4,200 in 1968. The ratio of practioners of health vocations totals one per eight hundred inhabitants now as compared with one to 1,700 before the revolution. The necessary requirements have been provided to offer the best services to citizens, and the revolution has given special attention to mother and child care, especially in the rural and ordinary areas of the country.

Iraq has striven to provide medical and treatment services to citizens free of charge or at token fees with the goal of reducing the burden on the poor classes, especially in villages and rural areas.

An Integrated Medical Complex

In addition to the massive medical city in the capital, and other modern institutions in Iraq, the coming year will witness the start of construction of the medical complex buildings in the city of Mosul, covering an area of 250,000 square meters.

The health projects which the General Building Organization is carrying out are now receiving exceptional attention from the organization's technical staffs so that they may be completed by the specified date.

The organization is now building five public hospitals with a capacity of 400 beds each, distributed among the Provinces of Baghdad, Salah-al-Din, Dhi Qar, Irbil, and al-Najaf at a cost of 57.5 dinars.

It is hoped that these hospitals, on which work was started last October, will be completed by the start of 1982.

This month startup on the construction of six other hospitals, also with a capacity of 400 beds, apportioned to the Provinces of Baghdad, al-Anbar, al-Muthanna, al-Qadisiyah, al-Ta'mim and Wasit, will be announced.

Improvement in Education

The educational stage and institutions have passed through a major process of improvement on the qualitative and quantitative levels. Among the most prominent of these achievements has been the decree making education free at all levels and applying compulsory education to provide all citizens with opportunities for education. Higher and vocational education have received the care and attention which will place them at the service of constructing the new man and strong comprehensive development.

Investments allotted to the education sector have increased from 78 million dinars in the 1970-75 plan to about 726 million in the 1976-80 plan--that is, by 831 percent.

Students in all educational stages in Iraq in the 1979-80 year totalled 3,752,290, of which 70,418 were children in kindergartens, 2,608,933 were pupils in the primary stage, 897,700 were students in the secondary stage, 54,026 were students in vocational education, and 22,761 were in homes and institutes train male and female teachers. University students totalled about 100,000, distributed among six universities in various areas of Iraq. The number of students in higher studies came to about 2,200. Preparations are being made to construct the al-Rashid University in Baghdad and the Islamic University in al-Najaf.

As regards al-Rashid University, the startup of work on advanced designs will begin soon. Invitations have been sent to a number of specialized international consulting firms to offer preliminary design ideas to choose one of these international firms to participate with the National Center to carry out advanced designs which respond to scientific and traditional developments for this university and to introduce the best construction systems and service layouts to it, as well as making the Arab and Islamic nature of the building complex and its distribution stand out.

This university will be distinguished from other Iraqi universities in that it will accept 15,000 male and female students and may be expanded and enlarged to accommodate 20,000, including higher studies.

38,000 in Universities and Institutes

In the coming academic year, 1980-81, 38,160 male and female students will enter the universities, the technical institutes organization and the higher institutes of health.

In the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research plan for the coming academic year, which was recently approved by the Council of Ministers, consideration has been given to the indices of the Ministry of Education up to academic year 1983-84 and the Ministry of Planning on the national development plan requirements for qualified staffs up to 1985.

In other university areas, the Higher Committee for Attention to Arabic Language Affairs recently approved the final formats for admission of students into Arabic language departments in Iraqi universities, starting with the coming academic year.

The committee determined that linguistic ability, talent and desire would be the bases for preference among students applying to these departments, in order to guarantee that a strong base will be provided for training Arabic language instructors and language leaders capable of seriously participating in improving language performance among students.

The committee also approved the opening of special language courses in government organizations to raise the capability of people employed in them, especially as regards composition of official letters and the avoidance of mistakes in their places of work.

In Iraq's celebrations of the 17 July revolution these days, the inauguration of the Technological Institute and the boarding areas attached to it is taking place in the Province of Nineveh; this cost 11,236,000 dinars.

The project comprises 26 main buildings, including administration buildings, an auditorium, and classroom buildings, in addition to rooms for professors, department heads, laboratories, a modern library, a movie room, a stage and many other installations.

Eradication of Illiteracy

In the sphere of elimination of backwardness and the upsurge of national development, Iraq has decided to eliminate and eradicate illiteracy. On 1 December 1978, the organization of a broad compulsory anti-illiteracy campaign was begun. The government consecrated all its attention to making it succeed. This campaign is aimed at abolishing illiteracy among 2,212,630 Iraqi citizens, accounting for 19.3 percent of the total population. Peasants and workers make up a large percent of them.

The campaign is 36 months long. Students join it in two shifts, each of which is of two sessions, in which the students receive lessons in reading, arithmetic, and general culture, including lessons which will help them implant the skills which they have acquired. At present there are 26,726 centers in which all the necessary ingredients for making the plan a success are present. Almost all those who have been enrolled in the plan have graduated and will enter ordinary schools at the fourth grade primary level. This cultural experiment has been studied by researchers at Baghdad University and it has become a prominent one, by the acknowledgment of Unesco, which gave Iraq a badge of appreciation in this field last year.

Allocations allotted to the plan came to 66,951,000 dinars, along with annual allocations of 1,695,000 dinars, or from 26 to 260 dinars per student.

The first of the comprehensive compulsory anti-illiteracy campaign stages has ended, represented by the base and complementary stages, and the second and final stage, the ordinary school or cultural education stage, for which Iraq is distintuished, will begin.

In the ordinary school plan provision has been made for a 22-month period in which instruction will be in three stages: the fourth grade stage, followed by the complementary stage, 7 months long, then the fifth grade stage, also 7 months long, and the sixth grade stage 8 months long, within a special curriculum for each of these stages.

The ordinary schools have the objective of achieving five main points:

1. Establishing basic reading, writing and computation skills in a manner guaranteeing that they are adopted as a means to develop personality and vocation.

2. Strengthening the self-confidence of the citizen and his confidence in his abilities, implanting national, domestic and socialist notions in work and life.

3. Enabling citizens to grow inwardly in a manner enabling them to continue to learn, develop their skills, abilities and tendencies, and use this to build society.

4. Forming new values, customs and practices among citizens in a manner harmonious with the goals of the revolution.

5. Achieving a total marriage between knowledge, skills and the requirements of the vocation.

The number of people enrolled in the ordinary schools, which began officially on 1 March 1980,was estimated by the end of March at about 1.7 million male and female students, including people included under followup programs, and there are about 76,000 male and female teachers attending the centers and ordinary schools in all areas of the country.

A Dwelling for Every Citizen

In the context of the other numerous services which the government provides for its citizens, planning is being made to have every Iraqi have a clean dwelling. Among the new actions in this sphere, citizens in Baghdad and other provinces of Iraq will receive 8,000 housing units which are now being constructed by the General Housing Organization, along with public service projects for these residential sections, by the end of this year.

Construction of these housing units is taking place within integrated service districts which include paving, water, sewers, electricity, parks, open areas, shops, health centers, schools of various stages, telephones, and so forth; this is taking place as part of the provision of suitable housing for citizens in various areas of the country.

Mr Muhammad Fadl Husayn, Iraqi minister of housing and construction, states that the exceptional concern for the housing sector is being realized through the adoption and authorization of scientific programmed planning which has the objective of providing suitable housing for every citizen, so that he may take effective part in implanting society, and offering him and his family happiness and confidence. This goal is the cornerstone of housing policy.

He adds, "The amount of work we are anticipating is represented by the construction of approximately 3.38 million new housing units of various types, in addition to improving and maintaining about 255,000 housing units existing now, in the next 20 years, while preserving the existing housing stock, considering that a national resource which must be preserved and developed."

The total housing units to be constructed this year, as listed in the General Housing Organization plan, come to 34,756 housing units with a total cost of 450 million dinars, including services.

Among these units, distributed among all the provinces, there are 546 housing units being built by prefabricated methods. The services which will accompany the construction of the housing units are inner and outer road systems, large waterworks, electricity, schools of different types, central markets, kindergartens, health centers, mosques, green areas, and children's playgrounds.

Recently 22,497 housing plots were set out in the province of Babil, preparatory to the distribution of deeds for them to citizens in stages during the current year.

11887
CSO: 4802

NATION'S MASSIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS REVIEWED

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 17 Jul 80 p 10

/Article: "Big Industrial Projects Are Turning Iraq into an Advanced Country"/

/Text/ In this industrial era, which is raising the developing countries to the ranks of the advanced ones, Iraq is trying to establish an industrial base which it will be able to rely on in building a strong national economy, where production and exports will be diversified for the sake of strengthening economic independence, responding to the needs of development, and providing the maximum possible manufactured goods for production and consumption purposes in all sectors.

Thus Iraq entered the sphere of strategic heavy industries, and the current development plan (1976-80) is aimed at developing transformation industries supplied with technology, and reducing dependence on crude oil from about 88 percent in 1976 to 79.8 percent in 1980.

Total allocations to the industrial sector in the investment program for the year 1977 came to about 966 million dinars and the value of industrial output in 1978 came to a total of 851.63 million dinars, 234.6 million dinars of which were for the private sector.

Numerous strategic industrial projects were carried out in the last two years, including the chemical fertilizer (urea) project with a capacity of 1 million tons per year;

The petrochemical complex, with a capacity of 150,000 tons of plastics per year;

The iron and steel complex, with a capacity of 1.2 million tons of sponge iron and 400,000 tons of steel products per year;

And, in addition, numerous projects in the sphere of the oil, textile, and other transformational industries.

Massive Projects Transform Iraq into an Advanced Country

The coming 5-year plan (1981-85) represents a qualitative transformation in Iraqi industry, as it will primarily be based on a policy of industrialization and the avoidance of assembly in the industrial process.

Mr Tahir Tawfiq, minister of industry and mines, states that this plan includes a number of giant strategic projects in addition to expansions in a number of existing projects, as imposed by the country's pressing needs and the dimensions of the current national development plan in general.

Implementation of the coming 5-year plan projects will be apportioned within a time ceiling to be specified in accordance with their importance and the objective circumstances which Iraq and the Arab nation are going through and in harmonious balance with the basic needs of the Iraqi people. In addition, the orientation within the industrial situation, in the context of this plan, will attempt to create some heavy industries such as automobile and tractor manufacture, implant the technology of this industry, and train personnel who will absorb and develop this technology.

In addition, transformational industries will witness great development and expansion in the production of chemical, phosphate, and compound nitrogenous fertilizers which will help develop the agricultural sector. The petrochemical (plastics) industries and industries related to them will occupy an important aspect of development during the coming 5-year plan and the establishment of projects related to machine manufacturing industries, which will contribute to the process of technology transfer and implantation.

In the sphere of electric power generation, Iraqi rural electrification and the provision of electrical requirements for purposes of industrial and household consumption throughout the country is progressing toward completion.

Development of Old Industries

The minister points out that the ministry has determined to develop some old industries and upgrade their type of output to a level which will realize /the country's/ ambitions, in view of the accumulation of a good amount of expertise and knowledge regarding their output, marketing and durability, such as the textile and foodstuffs industries.

This, in general, concerns the projects for the coming years. Their status in the national development plan proceeds in principle from the development ideology in the country, which is focused on the establishment of a firm industrial base, creation of a developed, multifaceted economy, and the reduction of dependence on oil; as a consequence, the industrial projects will possess importance in the national development plan.

As regards the industrial status of the nation of Iraq, relative to the Arab countries and the developing countries, Mr Tahir Tawfiq stated that this matter is determined in terms of the criteria of comparison. From the standpoint of the volume of industrial investments, manpower employment, and value added, Iraq is to be considered advanced, and on the international level Iraq will shorten the time gap in the coming plan and will be transformed from a developing country to an advanced one as a result of the international growth rates which the coming plan will exclusively enjoy, in view of the giant strategic projects it contains.

The Coming Plan Is an Extension of the Past One

Concerning industrial achievements in the current 5-year plan, which is on the verge of being completed, the minister said that this plan was a historic extension of and complement to the plan that preceded it, but is distinguished by qualitative changes from the standpoint of content and execution. Its reliance has basically been on the general developmental trend, which proceeds from the economic and social changes created by the increase in revenues available for development following the act of the nationalization of Iraqi oil and the increases which have occurred in oil prices through the current five-year plan. With a comparative glance at previous plans, it is clear that there has been growth in investments and in the value of production.

We can define the rate of development in the value of production between 1976-80 and 1980 (planned, not actual) as follows: textile industries, 0.016, food industries, 0.0210, construction industries, 0.0276, chemical industries, 0.047, extraction industries, 0.0117, electric industries, 0.0428, total rate of development, 0.0201.

The figures in general seem to us to be acceptable, since progress has been realized in the basic industries, those which are considered the core and basic focus of industrial development, such as electric power generation, machinery industries, and extraction and construction industries.

The bases and ingredients the ministry has relied on for the industrialization process in the current 5-year plan have concentrated on all aspects of the national economy through scientific planning programmed through the execution of plan projects in a manner which will ensure their success and the construction of an industrial base in the country within the framework of a versatile economy.

In addition, attention is being focused on development of the industrial sector and the elimination of all obstacles facing it, in order to bring the quality of production up to the level of the ambitions contained in the current plan, in accordance with new formulas, with the goal of increasing the productivity of labor and investment.

New Industries

Among the important strategic industries which are being carried out now, there is the 'Akashat project, which consists of two main sections, first the phosphate mine project and road leading to it, where the percentage completion up to the end of last year came to 78 percent, and second the project of the chemical complex in al-Qa'im, where the percentage of completion at the end of that period came to 46 percent. The Ministry of Industry is also constructing two integrated residential towns to house people belonging to the project at the site of the mine in 'Akashat and the site of the complex in al-Qa'im; the rate of completion is 5 percent.

The petrochemical complex project is important strategic; the completion rate in that totalled 91 percent by the end of last February. Operation has started on the service units to produce industrial water, nitrogen gas and so forth. Operation started on the main unit last month and it is hoped that that will be completed in final form and put into commercial operation at the end of this year. As regards the paper mill in Maysan, the project has been completed and is in the preliminary stages involving test operation.

There is the project on the iron and steel complex, which is considered the firm base of heavy industry in Iraq. This includes:

The semi-integrated iron project; test operation has started successfully on all sections of this text. That is in the preliminary production stage, and its annual design capacity totals 400,000 tons of round reinforcement rods, (al-Rasitah) iron, angles and water wheels.

The sponge iron project, which includes the small unit with a capacity of 440,000 tons per year; this will be the primary material for the semi-integrated iron project, and test startup began at the end of last March.

Regarding the major unit, whose design capacity totals 750,000 tons of sponge iron per year, most of the work is on the verge of completion and it is hoped that its test operation will begin at the end of this year after some technical problems are overcome in coordination with the contracting company.

Progress in Oil

Oil production gradually increased from 1,465,000,000 barrels (75 million tons) per year in the year of nationalization (1972) to 3.45 billion barrels (175 million tons) last year , 1979. Proved reserves increased several times since nationalization as a consequence of the exploration and development activities pursued by national agencies relying on Iraqi staffs.

Control over oil production is now subject to considerations of national development requirements, first, and the requirements of fraternal Arab

countries, friendly countries and those in the developing world in particular.

Iraq is now striving to make radical changes in its economic structure, to transform it from a one-sided economy depending on oil as a basic source of financing to an economy with diverse revenues and a firm industrial and agricultural base, by following a policy of linking oil production and revenues to development needs on the one hand and creating new sources which are by nature long-lasting.

At the start of last month, Iraq celebrated the anniversary of the nationalization of oil and transfer of ownership of Iraq Petroleum Company to the state, making Iraq the first third world country to dominate its oil resources in full, giving other oil countries scope to emulate its experiences in the realm of oil production and marketing beneficially.

After some months of deprivation, during which Iraqi management proved great skill in oil production and marketing, Iraq began to reap the fruits of its great victory, since the oil sector became inforporated into the overall domestic economy, greatly helping development plans which turned Iraq into a broad workshop, in addition to the massive financial aid which it offered Arab countries and third world countries.

Iraq, through the Iraq Foreign Development Fund, which provides facilities, loans and aid to developing countries and through bilateral agreements, has offered more than $1.5 billion in 1 year, in addition to effective contributions to numerous joint development funds such as the Special OPEC Fund and others.

Iraq has also committed itself to implementing its special proposal to aid developing countries unilaterally during the past 7 months of the past year, offering countries contracting to buy oil from it $254 million in discounts off from official surcharge adjustments introduced into prices of Iraqi oil during this period. This means that the increase in Iraqi oil prices has not added to the burden of the developing countries, because it is continuing to make strides in its programs to aid these countries.

New Projects

The General Agency for Oil Construction in Iraq has begun to carry out a group of oil projects whose costs come to 20 million dinars.

The new projects include five massive oil tanks in the areas of al-Mushahidah, Hamam al-'Alil, Kirkuk, al-Karkh and al-Rusafah, development of the al-Mishrif oilfield at South Rumaila, a central garage in al-Mada'in, and the laying of a broad oil pipeline system in Basra and al-Bayji.

Next year work will begin on construction of an important strategic petrochemical project in Nineveh Province.

Next September Petrochemical Complex Number One in the Province of Basra will offer its new petrochemical product output for the first time. The first sections in the complex have started primary operation and these were followed 3 months later by the productive units, preparatory to full operation.

The complex has been planned in accordance with the most modern international designs to produce 150,000 tons of plastic products per year, broken down into 60,000 tons of ABS, 30,000 tons of high density polyethylene, 60,000 tons of low density polyethylene, and 42,000 tons of caustic soda.

The complex's new products will meet Iraq's requirements for materials involved in the construction of plastic pipe, electric cables and household equipment and appliances.

Development of Oilfields

It was recently decided to form a Supreme Technical Committee under the chairmanship of Mr Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, minister of oil, to take charge of adopting the measures necessary to study, design and implement projects to develop the al-Halfayah, Majnun, Nahran 'Umar, West al-Qurnah, and East Baghdad oilfields of the National Oil Company in the quickest, most appropriate possible ways.

The decree stipulates that all the fields the committee develops or supervises under the provisions of the Major Projects Implementation Law No 157 for the Year 1973 are to be developed and will enjoy all the privileges and exemptions listed in Article Six of the law. The committee may exempt some projects it does not consider essential from application of this law.

The committee includes, as members, the undersecretary of oil for organization affairs, the president of the National Oil Company, the chairman of the General Southern Oil Organization, the chairman of the General Northern Oil Organization, and one or more persons possessing expertise or specialized background in financing, law and engineering.

The decree also stipulates the formation of a projects department within the organizations of the National Oil Company headquarters which will take charge of performing general supervision over the various necessary works and activities for the implementation of development projects, coordinating with the executive organizations and departments, assigning the Planning Council powers stipulated in the instructions and powers bearing on implementation of the annual plan for 1980 and the powers of the board of directors of the Iraq National Oil Company, and assigning any organization or department belonging to the Ministry of Oil to implement any activity in projects to develop fields.

In addition, Iraq National Oil Company recently signed a contract with an Italian company to develop an important new oilfield in the country.

The contract is aimed at developing the field in integrated fashion to exploit its oil and gas reserves simultaneously in short time frames.

The two parties will cooperate intensively in carrying out reservoir and engineering studies and determining rates of field crude oil and gas production and the size and volume of surface installations preparatory to inviting international engineering firms to supply the equipment and carry out installation activities.

Development of the field lies within a carefully studied plan, and a group of matters have been considered within it, such as the proximity of fields currently producing, their processing facilities, pipelines, tanks, pump stations and loading docks, in order to make use of them and merge crude oil and gas production from the new field into the production of operating fields in accordance with principles which are being relied on for the first time in the country.

The field development process will rely on the technique of secondary recovery from the anticlines by injecting water into the formations to remove the crude oil and increase its flow into the wells, starting with the initial production stages, in order to extend the life of the oil trap.

Agriculture Is Permanent Oil

In addition to industry and oil, agriculture receives great attention in Iraq. Since the July revolution, the volume of agricultural investments, especially after the oil nationalization act of 1972, has increased: the agricultural sector's share in1977 alone totalled 389,877,000 dinars while the sum of 366 million dinars was allotted to the sector during the years of the 5-year plan (1970-1974).

Agriculture in Iraq is dominated by the mode of cooperative production, collective farms, and state farms, in addition to the private sector. The number of peasant cooperative societies came to 1,987 last year and the number of collective farms to 79 in 1978.

Expansion has occurred in the use of mechanization in the agricultural production process. The standard of living of inhabitants of rural areas has risen noticeably, which has led to a reduction in the difference between them and those in the towns.

In the field of irrigation, modern technology in the transmission and use of water and preservation of water quality has expanded and the application of sprinkler and drip irrigation has been applied in many government agricultural projects. There is a tendency to apply the automatic operation of irrigation projects generally, and in the 5-year plan for 1981-85 work

will start on reclamation of 2,054,000 donums of agricultural land and construction of irrigation and drainage systems for other projects. Massive dams will be built, such as the Mosul, Hadithah, and Hamrin dams, the latter of which will be inaugurated this month.

Recently sources in the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform announced that the reclaimed areas the ministry has completed and on which it is expected to complete construction activities at the end of the current year come to about 900,000 donums.

The source stated that of these lands an area of 540,000 donums will be delivered; they will be distributed among a number of agricultural projects so they may be exploited in agricultural production activities in the coming production plan.

They mentioned that the remaining area of this group of land, totalling 360,000 donums, is now in the stage of leaching, planting and other supplementary activities.

University Research To Evaluate Agricultural Projects

The Ministry of Agriculture recently formed a committee to supervise and coordinate activity with university teams so they would continue their research activity bearing on the subdivision of agricultural projects.

The university has requested all agricultural organizations, installations and committees to address themselves to the committee on all problems and obstacles requiring study, with the objective of coordinating with the university teams to remedy them and establish the necessary criteria for them.

The ministry will give compensation for the accomplishments these teams make in the context of their study of remedying the work obstacles and development of productive processes in agricultural projects.

The Plan To Develop Fruit Production In the Next 5 Years

The plan includes the establishment of orchards over 96,000 donums, 75 percent of which will be peasant cooperative society and private sector lands; the rest of the area will be distributed to the lands of agricultural agencies state farms, the General Orchard Committee, the General Forest Committee and the Kirkuk Irrigation Project.

By virtue of the new plan, the irrigated orchard area in 1985 will rise to 780,000 donums from 688,000, and the area of unirrigated orchards that year to 50,000 donums from 46,000.

The plan has stressed the production of 24.9 million deciduous fruit tree seedlings, 2.6 million olive seedlings, 7 million citrus seedlings,

200,000 trees citrus origin, and 15 million trees deciduous fruit origin.

In another area, 300 greenhouses are to be built in a number of agricultural projects, schools and institutes in the province to grow vegetables.

The number of technical institutes in Iraq in the coming academic year will rise to 24, now that the Technical Institute Organization opened five new agricultural and technical institutes this year.

$990 Million for Irrigation Projects

In the context of irrigation, the ministry is preparing detailed studies and necessary designs and surveys for the construction of 22 small storage and dam projects on the Tigris River and tributaries and watercourses in the autonomous region.

The government has allocated $990 million to the construction of irrigation projects and land reclamation projects this year.

The plan this year included the construction of the Mosul Dam in northern Iraq, with a storage capacity of up to 12.8 million cubic meters of water per year, and completion of the Bukhmah dam with a capacity of 8.3 million cubic meters of water per year.

11687
CSO: 4802

POLL EVALUATES PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MINISTERS

TA011250 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Oct 80 p 19

[Fourth in a series entitled "Election Forecast" by pollster Hanokh Smith: "The Ministers Received a Lower 'Rating' Than the Coalition; Hammer Leads With 57 Percent, Hurvitz Dropped But is Still Popular"]

[Text] The president of the state, Yitzhaq Navon, is above everyday politics in Israel, but he is also above everyone else in terms of his personal popularity. Our poll, conducted between August and September, indicated that 93 percent of those polled believe he is either good or very good as president, and 80 percent think he is very good. This is a unique achievement in our political life.

The prime minister is the ruling personality in the Israeli government, but the auxiliary team of ministers also plays a part in shaping the public's view of the government's overall functioning.

The "Smith Research Center" polls asked the public to periodically evaluate the performance of certain ministers. One must, however, be careful in interpreting these ratings--which are very limited--particularly on the professional plain. The public does not normally have close contact with the ministers, nor is it in a position which would enable it to objectively assess that rating. The public sees the ministers mainly through the eyes of the media or through a much lower level of contact with the government ministers. This, also, has to do with what happens to the ministers and the public in reality in view of cabinet resolutions. The public's rating of the ministers is thus a function of their overall rating as part of the government's performance and that is why one should not attach too much significance to these evaluations. A minister who does his job properly and quietly might--perhaps because he does not make the headlines--receive a rating lower than a minister who is always subject to public scrutiny and who does not adequately perform his job.

The best way to evaluate ministers could perhaps be to examine to what extent their reputation is higher or lower than the number of votes the government coalition received in the poll in question. First let us review the areas of defense and foreign policy, which have traditionally been the fields deeply involving the prime minister.

No doubt the prime minister has lost allies by the resignation of Moshe Dayan and 'Ezer Weizman. It appears that Yitzhaq Shamir has not yet gained wide public support. The following is the percentage marked in four polls:

The Reputation of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Minister

[Figures in Percentages]

	Dayan as Foreign Minister	Shamir as Foreign Minister	Weizman as Defense Minister
May 1979	67	--	79
Sep 1979	55	--	76
Feb-Mar 1980	--	--	64
Aug-Sep 1980	--	20	--

Both Dayan and Weizman received good ratings by a large share of the opposition and the undecideds alike. Prior to their resignation, both were involved in an argument or some sort of dispute that cost them some loss of public support even before they resigned. However, the findings indicate that Shamir has not won over the public and that some portion of the loss of confidence in the government regarding its handling of foreign affairs and its security policy should be attributed to the resignation of these two popular ministers.

Whereas the Begin government lost public support when Dayan and Weizman resigned, it gained--at least temporarily--from Yiga'el Hurvitz' joining it.

The role of finance minister is usually the most unpopular in Israel. When Pinhas Sapir was finance minister, he was always the least popular among the front-line ministers. Even during the days of Golda Me'ir only 32 to 42 percent evaluated him as a good finance minister. The fate of his predecessors was much worse. Yehoshu'a Rabinowitz, Rabin's finance minister, was assessed in 1977 as being a good finance minister by only 12 to 15 percent, whereas Simha Ehrlich received even less than that in 1979. The finance minister has always occupied the lowest rung on the ladder of cabinet ministers' rating.

Yiga'el Hurvitz changed all this. His energetic approach first gained remarkable public agreement. The February-March poll was conducted almost 5 months after he took office. He may have been over the peak of his support by then, but he was still very popular. To the question of "Do you believe Yiga'el Hurvitz' economic plan could curb inflation?" about 18 percent replied that he would clearly succeed and 32 percent thought that he would at least have partial success. All in all, 50 percent of the population thought that he would be at least somewhat successful. His personal rating was, considering that he is finance minister, still very high: 44 percent thought he was doing a good job.

Now, 6 months later, the enthusiasm is gone. Replying to the same question now, only 10 percent replied in the affirmative and another 25 percent thought that he will have some success. Compared with the rate of 50 percent of the population believing that he will at least have some success as per the February-March poll, only a little more than one-third of the public currently believes he will succeed even partially.

His personal rating, too, went down, although not as much. It declined to 36 percent, which is still a high rating for a finance minister. The poll's findings even show that his personal popularity exceeds the success of his policy. At the same time, the two are interconnected. The loss of confidence in the economic policy certainly strengthened the process of the decline of the "Likud's" popularity in the public opinion polls and the 4-percent decline--from 18 to 14--in the percentage of those who thought the government's economic policy was successful.

Yiga'el Hurvitz' diminished popularity between the February-March and the August-September polls was coupled with a steep decline in the popularity of housing, construction and absorption minister David Levi, who enjoyed sympathy from the ranks of people who did not support the coalition as well. The February-March support indicated that 47 percent of the people interviewed thought he was doing a good job. In the last poll, that figure declined by 11 percent, reaching 36 percent.

All the other Likud and DMC [as published] ministers whose status was polled received a relatively low rating. Here are some of the results:

The Prestige of Other Cabinet Ministers

The Minister	The Date of the Poll	Percentage of Those Who Believe He Is A Good Minister
Likud:		
Ehrlich--Finance	May 1979	10
Pat--Commerce, Tourism and Industry	Feb-Mar 1980	15
Moda'i--Energy and Infrastructure	Aug-Sep 1980	22
Sharon--Agriculture	Feb-Mar 1980	26
DMC:		
Yadin--Deputy Prime Minister	Sep 1979	27
Katz--Labor and Welfare	Mar 1979	24
NRP:		
Burg--Interior	Sep 1979	27
Hanner--Education and Culture	Aug-Sep 1980	57

In general, both the Likud and the DMC ministers received a much lower rating than the percentage of people who would vote for a coalition party. Of special interest is Yiga'el Yadin. Whereas 26 percent of all those polled in the September 1979 poll thought he was doing his job well, only 3 percent of those who voted for the DMC in 1977 held that view. Yisra'el Katz' situation was slightly better.

Again, the religious ministers fared better. In September 1979, Yosef Burg received 38 percent whereas, in the last poll, 57 percent expressed their view that Zvulun Hammer was doing a good job as education minister. Thus, according to the last poll, he was the minister who received the highest rating vis-a-vis his performance.

The results of the above poll might hint that the Israeli public has recently been particularly harsh toward the political leaders. However, Hammer's high rating could contradict this. Moreover, even now it is possible to attain such high ratings as Golda Me'ir did prior to the Yom Kippur war.

When we look at the ruling ministerial team, Prime Minister Begin stands out from among the Likud ministers as the one who arouses relative satisfaction with respect to the fulfillment of his job. The disappearance of Dayan and Weizman from the defense and foreign affairs fields was not countered by the emergence of anyone popular. The greatest reinforcement in the last year was Yiga'el Hurvitz, who first received a large measure of public support but, according to the latest poll, seems to receive waning public backing. The other relatively popular minister from among those listed, David Levi, suffered a steep decline in public support over the last few months. None of the Likud or DMC ministers seem to attract wide support.

One can, of course, argue that these polls merely exemplify the assessment of ministers at a certain time whereas more extensive polls could provide different results. This is undoubtedly true, but such an exercise might overrate the significance of the personal factor. The above examples indeed give a valid picture of how the public reacts to prominent ministers.

In the last article I wrote that the percentages of people who thought that the government was generally successful or largely successful went down from 25 to 17 percent in 12 months whereas the part of those who would not vote for a coalition government decreased, over the same period, from 35 to 30 percent. Most of the ministers assessed vis-a-vis the performance of their jobs received ratings lower than the coalition as a whole. This certainly does not mean that they are the cause of the decrease, but it indicates that they are not likely to contribute in the way of overturning the trends as the election time approaches. Few ministers of public support could help the prime minister in the difficult task of obtaining massive support again at the 1981 election.

CSO: 4805

SHARON PREFERRED AS DEFENSE MINISTER IN ISRAELI POLL

TA011232 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Oct 80 p 10

[Pori public opinion poll: "Sharon--the Preferred Candidate for the Defense Minister's Post"]

[Text] Ari'el Sharon is the preferred candidate for defense minister, much more than all other candidates. This is the finding of the nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute and commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

On the question, "In your opinion, who should be defense minister," Ari'el Sharon received 30.2 percent of the vote. A distant second is 'Ezer Weizman with 19.4 percent. The prime minister's candidates for this post, Professor Arens and Foreign Minister Shamir, received a very small number of votes. Arens received 3.5 percent and Shamir only 0.8 percent.

Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori, who demands the defense portfolio, received only 1.7 percent. Moshe Dayan is still enjoying some popularity and 4.5 percent want him as defense minister.

Other personalities chosen by those polled were Yitzhaq Rabin (3.1 percent), Shim'on Peres (1.4 percent) and Hayim Bar-lev (1.1 percent). Chief of staff Refa'el Eytan, Yiga'el Yadin, Hayim Herzog, Mordekhay Gur and Matityahu Peled received less than 1 percent each.

Prime Minister Begin, who holds the defense portfolio, is viewed as suitable for this job by only 1.7 percent.

An analysis of the findings according to Likud and Alignment voters indicates that 47.6 percent of the Likud voters support Sharon for defense minister, in contrast with only 12 percent who support Weizman; while 26.8 percent of the Alignment voters back Weizman, as compared with 24.7 percent who back Sharon.

An analysis of the findings according to social strata indicates that support for Sharon is especially strong among young people who were born in Israel and people with less education or of Asian and African origin; whereas support for Weizman is particularly strong among women, middle aged people, veterans and people with higher education or people of U.S. and European origin.

CSO: 4805

COMMANDER COMMENTS ON ARMY SIZE

TA011229 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Oct 80 pp 11, 14

[Interview granted by Israeli commander of the southern command, Maj Gen Dan Shomron with military correspondent Ze'ev Schiff; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Question: Do you not think that we can reduce the size of the regular army?

Answer: I am in favor of reducing the size of the career army but against reducing the fighting power of the regular army. I will explain what I mean. One must not cut down the regular army when we are faced with a situation where the opposite side has such large regular armies. The regular army plays a central role in any kind of a surprise war. Any other solution may paralyze a large economic potential due to the need for reserve forces on a permanent basis. In addition, the security policy is mainly intended to deter--to prevent war. The smaller the regular force, the more the danger that this deterrance will be impaired. Nevertheless, since IDF is mainly a reserve army we have many regular army commands--commands without forces with stockpiles--so that a very large part commands stockpiles and lacks power.

Question: Will a cut in the number of commands lead to dismissals in the career army?

Answer: In my opinion, yes, of course. The size of the career army grows yearly. I accept what Minister Sharon says on the issue of cutting back on the number of career army personnel.

Question: Do you favor the view that standards of manpower will not be set in the IDF but will be dictated to the army as in the United States?

Answer: I am seriously inclined to think so. I will accept this if this is carried out with negotiations, explanations and bargaining. A country that allots such a large budget for security may demand to know how this budget is spent.

Question: From your remarks one can understand that the general headquarters has, over time outgrown the desirable proportions. Is this true?

Answer: Yes, and unnecessarily. I was told that it was not only the general headquarters but the army as well that has grown. This is true but one had better take a look at the increase in the number of officers and their ranks. When the units grow larger most of the officers should be on the lieutenant and captain levels since this is the major section. It seems however, that since 1973 the number of captains has become seven times as great while the number of brigadier generals has increased by about 100 percent. I am not at all referring to the addition of personnel over and above the manpower standards. The standards themselves manifest terrible irregularities and they are unrealistic. In my opinion there is no connection between the rise in the size of the army and that of the general headquarters just as one should not enlarge the brigade or the battalion command when another company joins the brigade. One should then add a company commander.

Question: In other words, you are for a reduction in the number of the career army officers.

Answer: Not only the officers. The career army has many master sergeants as well as many officials and drivers. If you ask me about the technical level, here too cuts can be introduced as a great many of the emergency stockpile units are being turned over to the ground forces stockpiling system.

CSO: 4805

DEBATE ON JORDANIAN OPTION IGNORES PLO ROLE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 p 14

[Article by Yehudah Litani: "On the Road of All the Terrible Stations; Anyone Who Thinks Settlements in the West Bank Can Be Removed by Words, Threats, or Even by Military Force, Ignores the Mood in Those Settlements; Those Who Are Endlessly Repeating the Magic Words 'Jordanian Option' Must Accept the New Reality Which Means Cooperation With the PLO"]

[Text] In the debate which took place on Wednesday at the Van Leer Institute on the subject "Israeli Policy in the Territories--Past and Future," Yehoshua Porat of the Hebrew University said that, in his opinion, a correct understanding of the situation should have impelled Israel to avoid succumbing to the temptation of conquering the West Bank. According to Porat, the conquest of the West Bank has halted the Jordanization process, a positive process from Israel's standpoint, in that it took out the sting of the Palestinian problem through a natural process. If we had been aware of this important process which was taking place among the Palestinians on both sides of the Jordan, in that the refugee camps in Amman and in the West Bank's cities were becoming an integral part of the cities, and that Palestinians were becoming progressively integrated in Jordan, we would have not been tempted to conquer the West Bank. He said that we had known about it, and that the British ambassador to Jordan spoke of it publicly until the war broke out.

So much for the past. As for the future, all the participants in the debate agreed, each in his own way, that Israel's most desirable option is the Jordanian.

Prof Amnon Cohen of the Hebrew University said in the debate that Israel should not "play into the hands" of Jordan. Jordan must not be shown that it is the only option. It should be made to see that there are other options. Menahem, also of the Hebrew University, said that Israel must reward the more pragmatic leaders in the territories, those who are willing to cooperate with Israel on the Jordanian option and territorial concessions, and give nothing to or even impose sanctions on those leaders who refuse to recognize Israel's existence. He spoke for direct

involvement of Israel in the territories by way of supporting pragmatic leaders, thus helping them disassociate themselves from the PLO.

Prof Amnon Cohen spoke against this approach and said that "artificial leaders cannot be cultivated in the long run." Tzvi Alpeleg of Tel Aviv University argued in the debate against Israel's seesaw policy in the territories--now in favor of Jordan and now against it, now assisting the PLO and now punishing its supporters. He said that he accepted the Jordanian option. Professor Porat argued that Israel had worked consistently against the Jordanian option and against the pro-Jordanians in the territories since 1967, and quoted retired Maj Gen Rifa'el Vardi, former operations coordinator in the territories and commander of the West Bank.

The organizers of the debate did not include in the panel anyone who advocates other options on both sides of the Jordanian option--the Palestinian or PLO option and the Israeli option which favors annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. The panelists expressed opinions before an audience which is well versed in the subject as if the year were 1970 rather than 1980, 10 years later. During those 10 years many facts have changed. There are no longer few settlements in the Jordan Valley and in the Etzion Bloc, but rather settlements of varying sizes in different parts of the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, in the Gaza Strip. Although the number of Israeli settlers in the territories is not impressive (11-12 thousand in the West Band), the new reality in the area is a stumbling block to any serious attempt to negotiate with Jordan, with the Palestinians, or--the most likely possibility--with both.

Permanent Construction

With the idea that this is the last year of the Likud government, Minister of Agriculture Ariq Sharon is working diligently to increase the number of settlements, to expand the permanent construction, to add hundreds of dunhams to settlements on the West Bank. All of which, in his words, is designed to foil any plan of returning any part of the land of Israel to any outsider and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.

This month hundreds of dunams (400) were expropriated from residents of the villages of Dir Al Hatib near Alon Moreh to pave a bypass road to the settlement. The road is already being built. The first settlement established in Samaria, Kadumin (alias Kadum, or Alon Moreh; to avoid confusion it should be pointed that the settlers of Alon Moreh lived first in Kadum, moved to Alon Moreh on the lands of the village of Rujayb, and after they were evacuated were forced to relocate to Mount Kabir. The settlement there is now called Alon Moreh, and is the only Alon Moreh), is now adding a new, permanent construction section, on an area of 100 dunams which were recently given to the settlement (by the committee for examining the status of lands in the settlements, headed by Minister Sharon).

The Shave Shomron settlement is also adding a new permanent section. In Alon Moreh on Mount Kabir, land is being cleared for industial plants. In the Shiloh settlement where the settlers first came as an "archeological expedition," the settlers are getting ready to build permanent structures instead of the "do it yourself" type. Only to mention a few examples.

On the other side of the fence, in recent years the prestige of the leaders who support the PLO has gone up in the territories, and it can be said that it has skyrocketed. Anyone who saw the royal treatment which was accorded Bassam Shak'a, the wounded mayor of Nablus, when he came to East Jerusalem (to visit the relatives of the Nafha jail prisoners who are striking at the Red Cross in the eastern part of the city), could understand the status of this leadership. Even Shaykh Ali Jabri was not welcomed in this manner in his own town, Hebron, at the zenith of his power. The more Israel curtails the activities of the PLO in the territories, the higher its prestige will go up. Last week, restraint orders were issued against seven members of the "National Steering Committee." [Committee for National Direction] Their pictures were flashed across all East Jerusalem's newspapers and their prestige went up dramatically. What more can Israel do which it has not done already? According to the mayors, the military government monitors all their incoming and outgoing telephone calls, and in recent months the mayors in the West Bank have not been able to leave their towns without explicit permission from the military government.

At the same time, the prestige of the pro-Jordanian leaders is going down constantly. Not only have some of them grown old without finding replacements (Shaykh Jabri has passed away; former Nablus Mayor Haj Ma'zuz al Misri and his relative Hikmat al Misri, former chairman of the Jordanian parliament are over 70; Gaza Mayor Rashid al-Shawwa, is 70; younger men are the two Jerusalem Anwars--Anwar Nusayba and Anwar Al Hatib, both 65. The youngest pro-Jordanian leader is Elias Freij, who is 60), but also their position has been weakened in face of the growing public sympathy for the members of the "National Steering Committee." The real power of Jordan in the West Bank and Gaza is not reflected in the status of the leaders who support it in the territories. The power of Jordan is much greater, and has a great potential.

The "Jordanian option" as it is seen now, is bound by the close ties which have been formed in recent years between Jordan and the mainstream of the PLO. Anyone who speaks today about the Jordanian option must [illegible] at this stage of the game King Hussein does not want to rid him[illegible] his ties to Al Fatah, his former enemies. In the territories, too, [illegible] supporters of the PLO and of Jordan say that any negotiations between Israel and Jordan will involve--indirectly--the PLO, or at least Al Fatah.

Thus, the debate which took place this week at the Van Leer Institute (in which were present the former ministers Israel Galili and Mordekhai Bentov, senior officers past and present, professors and many students), focused on the Jordanian optionn without Al Fatah and the PLO on the one hand, and the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza on the other.

The maze we have found ourselves caught in, in the territories, has reached the point that we no longer seem to have control over it, and holding up this option or the other which was a good 10 or 5 years ago is of no use now, especially after 3 years of Likud rule which has stressed the difference between itself and the Alignment by establishing more and more settlements.

Anyone who believes or hopes that it will be possible to evacuate the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza by using words, threats, or even the army, ignores the mood in those settlements. Its residents feel that every new house, every physical item in the area is permanent, and cannot be removed. Anyone who knows the feelings of the settlers understands that at least some of them would rather fight than leave. They know that the threat of civil war will make those who want to give up parts of this land shy away from doing so.

A Tough Partner

Those who keep repeating the magic words "Jordanian option" must take into account the new reality and understand that a Jordanian option means the inclusion of Al Fatah. It is an option which will demand many concessions from Israel, and which will focus on the question of East Jerusalem. Even if Hussein agrees to rid himself of Al Fatah (under the present circumstances this would be most difficult), he will be a tough partner in the negotiations, according to the king's men in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

In his poem "Half of the People in the World," Yehuda Amihay says:

> ...and to go out on the roads
> Made only for return
> All the terrible stations--
> The sand, stick, fire, water, butcher,
> The kid, and the angel of death?...

I recalled those lines this week as I considered the future difficulties of the Alignment--if it wins the next elections--in initiating talks with Jordan, viz, debates during the election campaign with the Likud, the Tehiyah, and the MAFDAL; internal disagreements on the substance of the negotiations with Jordan and on withdrawal from the territories; disagreements with the settlers; disagreement with the MAFDAL, its coalition partner; American pressures; divisions between Jordan and the PLO; ferment among PLO supporters in the territories; and finally, differences which are bound to surface between Jordan and Israel. Indeed, a torturous road.

9565
CSO: 4805

ISRAEL SEEN FAILING TO UNDERSTAND ARAB REALITY

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 8 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Kassim Zaid: "Needed: Change of Concept; Israel's Arabs' Red Line" (Part Three)]

[Text] "The Arab intelligentsia is bankrupt--it is undergoing a grave psychological and ideological crisis. The old guard has failed. The traditional leadership is also bankrupt, including the political leadership. The establishment leaders have failed worst of all." These are the words of Dr Dami Mar'i, director of the Institute for the Advancement of Arab Education in Haifa University.

His is one of the various opinions voiced by different leaders who disagree politically--which will be quoted later on--though it seems that there is a meeting of the minds among the various segments of the Arab population in Israel.

Dr Sami Mar'i is full of complaints and he states them sharply. He sees the condition of Israel's Arabs today, especially after the passing of the anti-democratic laws which are most detrimental to Arabs, as extremely bleak: "Israel's Arabs are at a crossroads. There is ferment in Arab society. Various forces are in conflict, various currents which are the result of self-growth and political maturation." In his opinion, "Israel's Arabs, as an ethnic group, are split into groups which have severely suffered from internal and external struggle."

The State Pulls Out the Rug

Dr Mar'i does not see the logic in the state's position in regard to Israel's Arabs: "It actually pulls the rug from under them. We hear many statements, of which the most aggressive are Rabbi Kahane's. But there are other, contradictory statements, and contradictory plans. I feel that the majority does not recognize the Arabs of Israel. They are considered hitchhikers on the state wagon."

In his opinion, "The majority--the Jewish majority, that is--is more bankrupt than the minority. This can be seen in the attitude of the

majority to Israel's Arabs. The Alignment is the first among those who have failed, since it is the only body which has tried to deal seriously with the problems of Israel's Arabs, and therefore it has failed more than the others. As a result, the trust of Arab intellectuals in the Alignment has reached an all-time low. The present administration competes with the Alignment on this issue in a fascist manner."

Who has not failed?

According to Dr Mar'i, the citizen who belongs to the silent majority has also failed. "Because he sees how the crime is being committed and remains silent. Thus, he is an accomplice. His responsibility is greater than that of the oppressor. The silent majority sees the Arab students being persecuted and even executed, and does nothing about it. In short, the majority should break its silence and show courage by standing up to the rising wave of extremism. It is political blindness which stands in its way."

A Maturing, Unifying Public

Dr Mar'i believes that RAKAH has been wiser than the rest of the parties in Israel. "It was aware of the others' bankruptcy--which gave rise to the idea of the Democratic Front for Peace, which has strengthened RAKAH's position. Israel's Arabs are a growing ethnic group which shows a high degree of solidarity. Its apptitudes are improving. Its self-confidence is growing. If the policy of observation posts, of neglect, injustice, and physical threat continues, the Arabs will start to believe the government is showing them the way in which they must follow."

Why didn't this happen in the past?

"Because the government is not aware of and does not wish to recognize the degree of maturation and self-awareness of Israel's Arabs. Even among the academicians, there are those who refuse to believe that all teachers in Arab schools are Arabs. They do not believe that there is a surplus of Arab physicians. The quality of the Arab is improving constantly, not because of the government's policy, but because of the ancient Arab civilization."

"Arabists and Political Stupidity"

In Dr Mar'i opinion, "the retaining of the Arabists (i.e., the heads of the various departments of Arab affairs) is political stupidity, precisely from the Jewish standpoint. From the Arab standpoint it is an incredibly underhanded policy. "Israel's Arabs as a nation--according to him--"are a power which creates itself. There are dominant forces among Israel's Arabs who can occupy positions on the international level. There are talents which the state must call upon to mould the image of Arab society.

"I am not willing to respect any government which maintains that Imanuel Koplowitz (director of the Arab Education Department in the

ministry of education), for instance, is a genius, while at the same time considers us backward. I, for example, am asked to do planning in the Jewish educational system, while I am denied the right to do the same thing in the Arab system.

"The ministry of education has created an advisory council for Arab education, headed by Prof Menahem Milson, who did not attend any sessions. I met Milson and I asked him why he did not participate in the sessions. He told me, 'this is not my area of expertise and I know nothing about it.' He even authorized me to express his beliefs at the meeting in his name.

"The Ministry of Education appointed Nisim Dana, director of the Druse Department in the ministry of religion, in place of Professor Milson. When we, the members of the Arab council, asked for an Arab to lead the council, the director general of the ministry of education refused. Professor Milson has said that it is stupid to appoint a Jew as the head of the council for Arab education."

Not Only a Matter of Good Will

"Building good Arab-Jewish relations should not be predicated on good will only, as has been the case until now. If the relations are not based on equality--it will only be empty words. Where decisions are made there should be equal opportunity. There should be objective economic relations based on mutual interest.

"We are not trusted. We develop and improve our capabilities. But the more we do it, the more we are told to stay in our place.

"The Israelis cannot accept the fact that we are here to stay, since our presence foils the plan of a pure Jewish state. It does not square with their plan. Worse yet, our presence here creates tensions in the plan of the Jewish state. The Israelis are not even willing to deal with the problem."

An Existential Fear

According to Dr Mar'i, "this situation creates among us an existential fear. Why? Because we have no faith in the future. We are not allowed to plan and take care of our interest by ourselves. This is a real danger to our existence and to coexistence. I have tried all along to get Jewish lecturers to do something jointly with us for Jewish-Arab relations, but I have been turned down. 'Forget it!' Why do the distinguished lecturers act this way? Because they do not wish to go against the growing fascist trend."

In Dr Mar'i's opinion, "there is a difference between what is and what should be. Everyone is dreaming of what should be, but reality is different and much more painful than we can imagine."

Is there one body which works toward Jewish-Arab understanding?

"No, and yes. Shim'on Peres, for example, argues that he opposes the government's policy toward Israel's Arabs. If this is the case, why doesn't he convene the center of the Labor party and issue an official proclamation opposing this policy? If the Alignment opposes ideologically the government's policy why doesn't it make noise? We know that the Arab departments are headed by Alignment people, and that they are faithfully carrying out the Likud's policy."

"Extremism Is Slanderous"

Are Israel's Arabs truly extremists?

"This is slanderous. Israel's Arabs are excessively moderate. Even if all half million of Israel's Arabs demonstrate on Dizengoff Street against the crying injustice, in my opinion they will remain moderate. Israel's Arabs have not yet reacted as they should in light of their difficult situation.

"How can you imagine, for example, that half of the students in Um al-Fahm study in rented rooms in subhuman conditions? Even if the residents of this large village blocked the main road they would remain moderate. Since, after all, all they are asking for is parity with their Jewish fellow-citizens. Is this demand, which shows their good Israeli citizenship, considered extremism?"

Dr Mar'i does not hesitate to turn to such a sensitive topic as security. "What are Israel's Arabs doing against the security of the state which has been used as a sacred cow against the Arabs? We did not hear that the residents of Um al-Fahm attacked the bus in droves, or undermined the security of the state. The number of Jews opposing the state far exceeds the number of Arabs. What is the purpose of this panic which is being created among the population? What is this fear, if in one village or another there are some Sons of the Village members? Is this the end of the world?"

As a result of this blindness "they think that an Arab who demands his rights is a member of the PLO. The terms are totally confused. If we want to be Israelis in every way, are we extremists? Where is the logic? How incredible--the very thought of a discussion to open an Arab university in Nazareth is causing undue excitement. Member of Knesset Orah Namir demanded that Minister of Education Zevulun Hammer put a stop to the experiment. Even if you killed me, I wouldn't be able to understand why different Jewish groups can open universities because of the differences between secular and religious Jews, and we, as an ethnic group, are not allowed to. All we want to do is take advantage of our educational and cultural rights."

"The Solution--Participation in Decisionmaking"

We asked Dr Mar'i: What is the solution to this difficult dilemma?

"The only solution is the active participation of Arabs in the decision-making process, not only in matters which concern them, but also those which conern the entire country. A senior Arab minister should be appointed. This is the only way to insure the brainwashing of the extremists.

"The solution must come through a fundamental and drastic change in the Zionist approach to the Arabs in Israel. What kind of a solution is it, when Ariq Sharon continues with his observation posts policy. Such policy must be nipped in the bud. A conceptual change must take place in Zionist ideology, in order to reach a stage where it becomes clear that there is no contravention of Zionism in a Zionist state absorbing non-Jews."

Dr Mar'i reached the "red line" when he said: "If the current situation continues, I invite public opinion in Israel to prevent me from becoming a fascist. Can anyone offer advice on how this can be done?

"Just as the Middle East cannot be conceived without the state of Israel, so the state of Israel cannot be conceived without Arabs. The Israelis must recognize the imperative of cooperation with the Arabs, and extend us their arm and ask for our cooperation. We will then be able to extend our arm."

Regarding the idea of creating an "arab lobby," Dr Mar'i says: "Theoretically, it is a healthy idea. But the creation of such a lobby will not do much for Israel's Arabs, since such a lobby will not have power to put pressure on Israel to solve the problems of its Arabs. The solution is establishing an independent Arab party, which will recognize first and foremost the existence of the state of Israel and the existence of the Palestinian people."

9565
CSO: 4805

WEST BANK RESIDENTS VIEW JORDANIAN OPTION

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Aug 80 p 8

[Article by Dani Tsidkoni: "Jordanian Option Viewed by West Bank Residents"]

[Text] As in the motion picture Rashumoon, the opinions of the experts on territories in Israel are divided on what the residents of the territories want. These experts may be journalists, military government officials, or politicians, who believe--like the journalists--that the honest truth of what the residents of the territories want is what they were told in tete-a-tetes with residents who are important or not so important people. Not once was I taken by surprise when someone gave someone a version of his "true" political opinion different from the one he had previously expressed, in keeping with the rule of "truth and honesty."

This is why I have recently refrained from publishing a report I received from a senior official of the military government, according to which he had gotten the impression in his talks with Arab leaders in the territories, that if they were given the power to decide they would prefer the "Jordanian option" to that of the PLO. By this they do not mean the Peres proposal, but rather Israeli withdrawal from all the territories back to the 1967 borders, and a political solution in conjunction with Jordan. The senior official's impression is undoubtedly sincere. The question which is up in the air is, is what he was told true? In any case it is plausible, as can be seen in the fact that mayors and delegations from Gaza and the West Bank attended the funeral of the Jordanian prime minister. Consoling the mourners, as it is well known, is not the only reason for attending funerals.

Since I choose to believe that I am able to have honest conversations with residents of the territories, for, among other things, it is good for my ego, I tend to believe that others are also capable of--even after taking all critical and intellectual precautions--falling into this trap, which causes Israelis to argue among themselves about the wishes of the territories' residents. Sadly, as a result of Arab terror there are two channels of communication between the residents and Israel.

The official one maintains that any public statement follows the PLO party line. The unofficial one is where we hear about the leaning toward the Jordanian option in the West Bank and to some extent in Gaza, and toward the Egyptian option in the Gaza Strip. The upshot of all this is that it may be preferable for Israel to remain in the territories rather than establish a state headed by the PLO.

A Confusing Situation

My impression is that both the nationalistic aligning with and the fear of the PLO of a great many people in the territories are sincere. This refers to people to whom the PLO, as the standard-bearer of oppressed Palestinian national pride in the territories, is the focus of success and the rallying point. This, despite the fact that they are afraid that the PLO, as a band of terrorists, may very well plunge the Palestinian nation into a terrible bloodbath. I believe that whoever tells me this--and it has been told to me more than once--speaks honestly. But the yearnings and aspirations of the Palestinians, as well as their fears, do not form a basis in the present reality for bringing an end to the bloody conflict between the two nations. It is a pity that Mina Tzemah or the Pori Institute do not have an office in the territories--if indeed polls can be taken there--since public opinion polls in the West Bank and Gaza could help determine our political activity, and perhaps even create new concepts regarding our policies in the world's public opinion.

What is clear is that until we can employ democratic methods which will enable us to obtain an accurate picture of the residents' opinions, we will have to find out about their wishes from the open statements of their leaders, whose enthusiasm for the PLO can go up and down, but whose fear of the PLO is a constant. We can also base ourselves on conversations which cannot be publicized or which can only be reported "without giving the source" or "not to be quoted," in which the leaders of the territories will express their opinion before Israeli government and opposition leaders, officials of the military government, and Israeli and foreign journalists.

Prefer Strong Government

This, then, is the present state of affairs, confusing as it may be. The "Jordanian option" which has been reported lately is for the moment more of the Labor party's making than the residents'. It is possible that if Labor wins the elections, it will be able to impose this option on the residents more successfully than Begin is able to implement his autonomy plan. There is a real possibility that an Israeli "Jordanian option" may enjoy more support in the territories than the Likud's "people's autonomy" plan. It should be mentioned that the only one who has been able to deal successfully with the PLO is King Hussein. The silent majority in the territories prefers, in any case, a strong government. It will not fight the PLO, but it will certainly be willing to have Hussein fight it on its behalf.

What is clear is that the treatment of the residents cannot continue as before. If the autonomy plan fails Israel will have to find new and bold ways to solve the problem of the territories. The territories have presented a problem even before the Gush Emunim, simply because their residents are Arabs and we are Jews.

The "Jordanian option" is one of the possibilities, but to say that it is popular among the Arabs is inaccurate, just as it is inaccurate to say that they reject it.

9565
CSO: 4805

BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY IN TERRITORIES ANALYZED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 pp 15, 20

[Article by Dani Rubinstein: "Danger Lurks From Within; Deterioration of State Authority in Israel and Territories Should Not Be Underestimated"]

[Text] In Miha'el Bar Zohar's book on Isar Har'el and the Security Service (The Chief, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, Jerusalem, 1971), I found the following passage: "The first clash in the War of Independence took place between the nucleus of the nascent state and the undergrounds which refused to disband. In the second stage, the undergrounds which cropped up again within the state and attempted to destroy its government were eradicated. The adversaries of the state in the third stage were not only undergrounds. This time the struggle took place in the open, publicly, under the guise of a battle for justice and law.... The danger to the state stemmed from the seemingly new character of the struggle. Now, too, the main adversary of those who opposed the government was the Security Service. However, it was not prepared for a sophisticated public battle. The service was trained for a struggle against classic undergrounds and was not ready to deal with public storms. In order to stand up to the new methods employed by the adversary, it needed new tools, and it had to resort to action which aroused a great deal of criticism."

This passage is the opening paragraph of a chapter titled "Danger Lurks From Within," in which the Hastner Trial and the battle of the Security Service against the "Volunteers' File" and Attorney Elyakim Hatzni, the Olam Hazeh weekly, Shmu'el Tamir, Dr Israel Scheib (Eldad), and others is described, those who were then known as the adversaries of the government. In Isar Har'el's opinion those people had undermined the state's authority 25 years ago and therefore the Security Service was turned on them.

All of this happened many years ago, and Israel then is not Israel today. The political system has undergone shocks and crises. I assume that the Security Service has changed and has grown in size (back then there was a quarter of a million Arabs under Israeli rule, while today the number is quickly approaching two million). What has not changed is the target of the Security Service, which, according to Har'el are those who are a

"danger to the government," who wish to "bring down the Israeli Government," and who "undermine the authority of the state."

When such activity is clandestine, certainly when it is violent, the entire Israeli security system is turned on it, full force. Things are clear and unequivocal when it is a terrorist activity by one of the arms of the PLO, or when it is a case of espionage or assistance to the enemy. Things become fuzzy when it is overt political activity, controversial and demonstrative. Who can decide what the difference is between dangerous "undermining" and open political struggle? On the periphery, the line between the two is hazy and the intervention of the security services is difficult to determine. On the periphery, we find the extreme left-wing as the offshoot of Matzpen whose members were accused of espionage; nationalist Arab groups, like the Sons of the Village; and the Organization of Progressive Students. There are also groups of Jewish zealots who resport to violent and clandestine (?) action against Christian missions, and there is Rabbi Kahane's group.

As can be learned from reading the newspapers, the security authorities in the state follow a policy of strong measures when the activists of those marginal groups shift from words, proclamations and preaching to violent action and clandestine activities. But the haziness and the confusion grow when the undermining of authority reaches broader internal circles. From time to time someone suggests to outlaw RAKAH (the communist party), so that it may go underground and its members could be put under arrest. As far as I know the security system opposes it. It should be stressed that RAKAH's leaders keep insisting that they are Israeli patriots, more so than others, and that their activities are cautious and within the law. On the other side there are such groups as Gush Emunim who, because of their excessive patriotism, can be included in Har'el's definition of "those who" undermine the authority of the state," even when most of their activities are overt and public.

I am writing these lines against the backdrop of what correspondent David Halevi wrote in the Washington Star and the strong denial of the head of the Security Service of everything in the article. Official spokesmen refused in recent months to play up the possibility that it was Arabs who attacked the mayors in the West Bank, and this possibility is being carefully checked out. When the load of explosives left by the terrorists detonated recently in the 'Neve Ya'akov section of Jerusalem, it was announced immediately that it was the same kind of explosives which had been found in the mayor's cars, which indicates that it was the work of Arabs. Or, as was reported in the organ of the Jewish settlers in the territories: "The PLO people murder one another, which is old hat" (Nekudah, June 27, 1980). It seems to me that the possibility that it was done by Israelis is the most dangerous one for Israel, and is the one which should be investigated among those who had rejoiced when they heard about the attacks which took place on the thirtieth day of the murderous attack on the settlers of the of the Kiriat Arbah section of Hebron.

For a long time the activities of the settlers and of Gush Emunim on the West Bank have been an overt political demonstration. The establishment of makeshift settlements, secret settlement expeditions, secret invasion of the Hadassah building, innumerable clashes at the Cave of Mahpelah, breaking the rules of the military government, all of this has taken place as part of an aggressive political struggle, which the governments of Israel had to yield to. As Rabbi Levinger has said: "we show the mumbling government the right way." Back then, the settlers wanted to show the military government the right way to deal with the Arabs.

In 1967 the residents of Kiria. Arbah restored order during the disturbances in Hebron. Once they caught Shaykh Rajab al-Tamimi (who had since been expelled) and at the point of a gun forced him to remove a barrier which Arab youths had set up on the road. Later, they stopped Arabs and "taught them a lesson" with the help of a dog and with beatings. The police had to interfere when the settlers broke into Arab homes and caused damage, or when the suspicion arose that someone from Kiriat Arbah shot and killed an Arab boy and an Arab girl who demonstrated in Halhul (he was put on trial and was freed).

After the Begin government established the settlements in Ramallah and Nablus areas the clashes increased (it is correct to say that this government too had to yield to Gush Emunim after the scuffles of the 1977 patrol). The many instances of settlers engaging in acts of retaliation, shooting, searching, detaining suspects, etc, are known, and each person can draw his own conclusions. The settlers did not cease arguing that the military government and the security service abandoned them and forced them to resort to self-defense. Once they even put two Arab workers of the electric company in jail in Ofrah, after they came to collect debts from the settlement. In other incidents, the settlers refused to hand over their weapons to the representatives of the military government who ordered them to do so. In Ofrah and Kiriat Arbah the settlers even went so far as to establish their own security committees.

The next stage was unusual and interesting. Instead of combatting the vigilantism of the armed settlers, the latter were put under the law through a restraint order. Each reserve soldier among them was taken out of his regular army unit and placed in the "area defense" of the settlements which was established on the West Bank. The concept of area defense is an old one in the IDF. After the unsuccessful experience of the settlements in the Golan Heights in the Yom Kippur War it was decided by the defense system to improve it. In the past, the area defense of border settlements operated against enemies from across the border. The innovation in the Gush Emunim settlements is that now the area defense is used for internal security, to guard against the surrounding Arab settlements (as was the case in the War of Independence).

Consciously or unconsciously a situation was created in the West Bank similar to the pre-state days, in which settlers, civilian soldiers, fight Arab marauders, whether they are children throwing stones or terrorists using firearms (in those days there were called "gangs"). The area

defense units in the Gush Emunim settlements are politically homogenous military units, which are integrated in the security activities of the border guard and the IDF in various sections.

The problem begins when the suspicion arises that members of the area defense units of Gush Emunim do not act exactly (an understatement) according to routine military orders and directives. Unfortunately, we do not know who attacked the mayors in the West Bank; we do not know who put explosives a few days ago at the marketplace in Hebron, who placed a bomb around the same time at the home of the head of the village of Surayf, and we do not know who had put a bomb a few days ago at the offices of the AL FAJR newspaper in East Jerusalem. When I asked official spokesmen, I was told that it could have been Jews or Arabs, or even secret agents of outside bodies active in the area. After all, the Gush Emunim people participate in the security of Ramallah and Nablus as part of the IDF, and only in one instance a suspicion arose as to their failing to do their duty.

It happened after unknown persons broke the windows of scores of Arab vehicles in Ramallah and Al Birah, during a few hours one night, destroyed stores and property. A border guard barrier discovered in the middle of the operation a vehicle from the Bet El Yeshiva on its way to Ramallah, carrying stones and a hammer.

The passengers of course belonged to the area defense of Ramallah and had the unit's army radio. The IDF checked to see whether they were on duty and who was on active reserve duty. It was not possible to find out what the purpose of their trip to Ramallah was. A police spokesman said that they were arrested but refused to cooperate with the investigators. Be it as it may, it is hard to put someone on trial because of intentions, and the case was closed.

To judge from this suspicion and from the fact that explosives were found in the attic of the Kotel Yeshiva in the old city (here two soldiers were accused of keeping explosives without permission, using military vehicles without permission, and passing for officers--since no evidence was found of any intentions to engage in terrorist activities), it seems that we are dealing here with a dangerous political subversion trend. It is most important to find out who is carrying out these acts of terrorism in the territories, especially when it could be Jews. Finding a legal angle is peripheral compared to discovering a militant and aggressive political trend which becomes subversion. The Security Service is making an effort to find out who had put the explosives in the mayor's cars, but Israeli governments, especially the present one, neglect the underpinnings of the undermining of the state's authority which started with Gush Emunim and which is growing both in Israel and in the territories.

9565
CSO: 4805

BANK GOVERNOR OFFERS RECESSION CURE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by Arye Lavi, HA'ARETZ writer on economic affairs: "Negotiated Package To Make Shorter Restraints Possible"]

[Text] Negotiation of a package for freezing prices, wages and taxes will make it possible to shorten the period of restraints, the Governor of the Bank of Israel Mr Arnon Gafni said yesterday in an interview with HA'ARETZ.

If a negotiated package is not signed, and the prospects for achieving agreement are few because of the political situation in the country, restraints will be continued for a longer period; it will be necessary to cut the budget and credits even further. Mr Gafni stated that his position on this issue is known to the finance minister, but that he does not know whether he will support the idea of a freeze.

The governor believes that now is the right time for the economy for a negotiated package which will put an end to the inflationary spiral. In his view, it is desirable for the sides to reach agreement even if there can be no full agreement.

As to the allegation of the president of the Manufacturers Association Mr Avraham Shavit, that there is no place for a freeze agreement after the payment of wage increases of 70 percent, Mr Gafni said that the cost-of-living accord was signed by Mr Shavit and had he not been able to pay, he surely would not have signed such an agreement. Cost-of-living increments which have been paid are for the increases which have taken place already and now agreement should be reached which will prevent additional increases.

In the governor's opinion there have not been any realistic wage increases this year and all of the increases merely compensated for the cost-of-living advances which have taken place up to now. An orderly freeze of prices, taxes and wages would also bring about a reduction in the number of unemployed and make possible a renewal of economic growth.

The chairman of the Chambers of Commerce Association, Mr Avner Ben Yakar, yesterday expressed support for the governor's proposal. That is, on condition that the agreement include as well a freeze on the foreign exchange rates. He said that he had suggested the idea of a freeze to the governor, in a letter which he had sent to him more than a week ago.

8090
CSO: 4805

FINANCES LIMIT POLICE ACTIVITY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 p 13

[Editorial: "The Police Force--Not Projects Alone"]

[Text] Twelve billion Israel Pounds--that is the amount required, according to the national headquarters of the police, to rehabilitate and reorganize the Israel Police Force in the next five years. The force has a complement shortage of 5,000, its weapons are inadequate and obsolete, its motorized fleet suffers constant accidents as a result of a shortage of parts and poor maintenance. The Inspector General, Commander Herzl Shapir, told the press about the diminished physical fitness of the police officers and of his intentions to advance the retirement age of police personnel.

These are all important factors which explain the failure of the Israel police in its war against rising crime that is sweeping the country in an unprecedented manner--and we have already evaluated the crime situation in the country as severe.

Reporters who spoke with the finance minister following his visit to the national headquarters got the impression that Mr Hurvitz understood the need for infusing additional funds into the police force in light of its severe situation, despite the overall goal of cutting the budgets of governmental ministries.

It may thus be assumed that the multi-year plan of the police, Plan "New Wine," will be accepted by the government when it is brought up for approval in another 2 weeks. The new Inspector General, Commander Shapir, will be able to interpret that as a personal victory. Since taking up his duties on 1 January 1980, he has dealt primarily with the working out of the plan. The public has, without a doubt, gained thereby. It is possible that the citizen complaining about a break-in of his apartment will now have to wait less time for the investigators to arrive at his home, and that we shall see in the cities' streets more mobile police and more police officers--and perhaps even stronger police officers able to prevail over the hoodlums.

Yet it is difficult to escape the feeling that in Plan "New Wine"--or at least in what has been made public about it--and in the funds that will be invested in it, there is not enough to guarantee automatic success to the police department in its war against crime. The plan is designed, principally, to improve the operational capability of the police department. This is without a doubt an important goal, yet when crime is as organized and sophisticated as it is today physically fit officers and superior operational organization are not sufficient. No less important --and perhaps even more important--is the capability of the police department to investigate and solve sophisticated crimes with no less sophisticated means. What is required is: to enlarge the weight of the investigative arm within the police department, with a constant utilization of the police intelligence and operational activity to implement the findings of the investigation, as the last link in the chain.

These were the recommendations of the Shimron Commission, and it appears that they have remained within the realm of desire. The poisonous plague cannot be eliminated by night raids on settlements, and the gang wars these days cannot be overcome by night sweeps alone. Such operations will not bring about a solution for a single one of the 27 (of 51) murders which have been committed during the first half of this year and remain unsolved, the majority of which have been described as "the settling of accounts of the underworld." Operational capability, be it even the best, will aid but meagerly in the elimination of the branch of "contractors" for arson and bombings in the criminal world which has existed for years, and about which only recently it was reported in a secret report of the police department intelligence division.

It is to be assumed that the Inspector General, after he has been freed from his extended preoccupation with preparations for Plan "New Wine," will give his attention also to this aspect of the police department's organization.

8090
CSO: 4805

HOUSING SHORTAGE SAID CAUSE OF RESENTMENT AMONG YOUNG

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Aug 80 p 8

[Article by David Moshiev: "The Housing Shortage--A Time Bomb"]

[Text] The ongoing demonstrations by young married couples, and the incursions of apartments and buildings are indicative of the severity of the housing shortage in Israel. The precipitous rise in the price of apartments in the country above and beyond the cost-of-living increases which appear on the scale of the high price of construction--only aggravate the problem. Many people who formerly were able to acquire apartments on the free market are unable now to do this, because they were not born to millionaire parents or because they did not win millions in the lottery or in the sports pools.

The housing shortage exists not only in the urban sector, but in the depressed neighborhoods on the outskirts of the cities as well. There is a particularly acute housing shortage in the worker settlements, and especially in specific smallholders' cooperative settlements [moshavim]. There are many hundreds of people of moshav origin who reside in abandoned cattle sheds near the homes of their parents for lack of other housing. The problem in these moshavim is severe. The birth rate in them is high, above the national Israeli average; the returning sons are unable to build a "family nest" for they lack the housing and the government does not help.

The pathetic situation in which the country is immersed in the area of housing was caused by the Likud government which promised "to do well by the nation." Alignment governments (at all times and during all periods) were concerned about keeping government construction at a high level and maintaining a substantial inventory of apartments in the market, something which influenced the prices of apartments. In addition to that, bonuses were granted and savings plans were offered to all the citizenry so that they might achieve housing.

The Likud government upon its rise to rule, did away within a very short time with the inventory of apartments which were on hand in Israel and

which had been constructed during the term of the Alignment, through fear of losses, thereby enriching the speculator elements, which were able to pay cash for the apartments offered them on relatively good terms. But this is not its only sin. In parallel to this activity, the Likud government most drastically limited government housing starts. Thus, the inventory of apartments in Israel is particularly meager. When we add to that the galloping inflation--with the compliments of the government--and the high price of apartments, we find that an apartment has become a commodity far removed from the capability of the average citizen in the market.

Only the most massive and expanded construction of housing units in various parts of the country, granting of convenient and reasonable terms to those lacking housing who are eligible for it, but who are unable to bear the payments of millions of pounds for acquisition of an apartment--can help in the solution of the crisis of the housing shortage in the country.

The Labor party should, even now, prepare a comprehensive and detailed plan for solution of the problem, which will answer all of the needs in the cities and in the villages. There will be the need for the implementation of such a plan immediately after the Israeli voter, on the day of elections, gives a mandate to the Alignment to make up the next Israeli government.

The Likud government failed seriously in the matter of housing in Israel, and demonstrated its total helplessness in this area. There is no salvation for Israel in this government, and the citizenry of the state will be unable to acquire apartments as long as it continues "to do well by the people."

8090
CSO: 4805

ABSORPTION DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEW TOWNS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 7 Aug 80 p 12

[Article by Shim'on Weiss: "To Stem the Exodus From the Development Towns"]

[Text] An insufficient number of the heads of local jurisdictions in the Galilee assembled recently in the community center in Safad, to confer and find solutions to the wave of emigrants which is now plaguing the development towns in the Galilee, and to the almost total freeze in the number of people being absorbed in the Galilee. Less than 10 heads of local councils assembled in Safad to listen, among other things to the gloomy forecast for next year, as it was presented by the manager of the Center for Direction to Development Towns, Zohar Gindel. "The period of the long summer vacation is the time for moving to new settlements by most of the citizenry and the Center for Direction, which year after year was flooded with hundreds of applicants and interested people, today stands before an empty trough. Although in the year 1978/79 an increase in the number of those coming to the Galilee was reported--I fear for the coming year. The situation is undoubtedly serious. There is a halt in the movement of settlers in the Galilee, and to the development towns generally. My forecase is that with the existing and foreseeable figures in the employment and housing market, there will be a drastic drop in the number of applicants and there will be almost no absorption of new settlers in the development towns."

According to Gindel, this kind of situation did not exist for many years in the Center for Direction to the Development Towns which is quartered in Tel Aviv but whose branches reach into all the development towns in the country. Citing the figures on the number abandoning the development towns in the north was sufficient to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation, and the gloomy future. According to data from the Central Statistics Office 14,080 residents left the Galilee in the year 1978/79 and informed sources point to an even larger number. Many of those abandoning the towns remain "residents of the development towns in theory," so as not to lose the privileges that they are afforded as such inhabitants.

A New Plan

The Center for Direction to the Development Towns recently completed a plan which will ease, possibly, the distress and find answers to a portion of the problems. "We must make cooperative efforts in 2 areas," says Gindel. "The one, strengthening the absorption system and preparing the settlers who have arrived in the development towns and the second--organization and action to prevent exodus." The proposal which was developed by the Center for Direction and which was brought to the meeting at Safad, discusses appointment of an absorption coordinator in each city and the setting up of local absorption committees, in which the community workers will participate in the relief bureaus. Gindel details the functions of the absorption coordinators and the committees: "Assembling data regarding the principal reasons why a family abandons, pinpointing the immediate factors requiring care for and aid to the new families, dealing with the problems of the children in the educational institutions, planning and help for the new families to take root in the community activity in the settlement, planning special activity for new families in the stages of their absorption, and creating personal contacts and ongoing follow up." The absorption coordinator, on the other hand, will be the one with overall responsibility and will match the implementation of the goals placed upon all the absorption factors in the settlement. According to the proposal, the mayor or the municipal council will head the absorption committees, and the Center for Director to the Development towns will direct the work of the committees from a professional standpoint.

The mayors and the council heads who participated in the conference in Safad accepted with appreciation the mobilization by the Center for Direction to deal with the difficult situation which had been created, but according to the expressed opinions of the participants, it is doubtful whether they see in the absorption committees and in the coordinators the most important thing. Menahem Ariav of Nazareth Ilit alleged that the government favors only a small number of settlements in the Galilee to which it grants the incentives and the funds, resulting in damage to all the others and to a distortion of the balance. As an example, Ariav cited Carmiel which, since its establishment in the mid-sixties, enjoyed intensified industrialization and various concessions the result of which, it would appear, were not long in coming.

By contrast, Aharon Nahamias, mayor of the Municipality of Safad, was optimistic. According to him, despite the present data being discouraging there is at least one positive aspect and that is that in comparison to the first 5 years of the decade of the seventies there occurred in the second five years a steady increase--albeit moderate--in the number of people absorbed in the Galilee as compared with those abandoning it. With respect to the future, Nahamias does not hide his trepidation. "We hear of unemployment and housing shortages even in places considered strong and immunized such as Carmiel, and all this in addition to an almost total drop in the bonuses and the various loans which reach those arriving at the

development towns. At one time there was free school tuition for the children of the development towns. Today--all must pay. Today everyone recoils from linked mortgages, so what's left? We must press and apply wherever necessary with a demand that the system of incentives in the development towns continue high relative to the rest of the country--and in that way only will they come to us."

Bennie Shalita, head of the local council at the moshava Menahemia, commented during the conference that if the settlements in the Galilee were included in the statistical categories of the development towns the numbers and the graphs would appear differently, far more positive. People in the Galilee are the evidence that 8 settlements in the Galilee are blooming today. Shalita argues that day after day tens of applications to be absorbed in the moshava which is in the Jordan Valley reach his desk and he is unable to respond to them positively since all the housing units are occupied "and all of this is taking place without publicity, without fanfare and without a Center for Direction--only with true quality of life and serenity." According to him, the root of the evil is in the governmental officialdom which prefers to equalize in every way the development towns remote from the middle of the country and from the large cities and thereby to cause itself fewer headaches. It is impossible for there to be equality of incentives between a dense Tel Aviv and the sparsely populated development towns and that everything be seen only through figures, merely because this is more convenient for the clerks in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. This is mockery to the poverty-stricken. Today, it is not enough to draw settlers by a mere call to come to 'quiet and to quality of life.' People want to know prices, too, and it is not possible for the municipality of Tel Aviv and me to be the same. We must cry out against this incredible equality."

In-Depth Survey

According to Amos Lutan, adapter of government activities in Galilee and himself a Safad resident, the solution lies not only in the setting up of absorption committees, with all the importance of those. "People are abandoning the Galilee today even after many years of living there and exaggerated bonuses. There must be an in-depth examination of the reasons for the abandonment, not merely a look at the dry figures. We're talking about level of life, about education, about society--these are the dominant factors that shape good absorption and by extension--the good life. Take Carmiel: it had been planned from the start with a proper base for absorption and today it is decisively altering the balance of abandonment of the Galilee, and making it more positive, at least from a statistical standpoint. All the other villages were hastily constructed so as to find refuge for immigrants who came during the fifties and needed a place, even a temporary one, to establish themselves. Aid during those years was for a short time, if at all. And afterwards all the immigrants were left to their own devices."

In Lutan's opinion it is easier today to stem the exodus than to build a complete absorption system, and that is why we must examine what is to be done in the cities themselves to improve the atmosphere and what is granted to the residents within the various limits. His suggestion to the head of the jurisdictions is to freeze the construction and housing budgets and transfer them to improving the quality of life in order to do right by the settlers who linked their fate with settlement in the Galilee. In this connection Lutan proposes to conduct a sweeping and fundamental survey of the factors for abandonment of the Galilee and to conduct a widely representative symposium in which all delegates of the factors related to the Galilee will take part. "This will at least increase the awareness among the public and the higher levels of the state of the issue of the Galilee," he says.

All were in agreement on at least one fact--that Carmiel is a good example of absorption. Despite the distresses of the present and the early signs of unemployment which exist in this city too, in recent years it has absorbed more than any other development town in the country. When Avi Orenstein, director of the absorption department in Carmiel, described the work which his department is doing and the results, his colleagues were only able to envy him and the residents of his city. Everything had been accomplished there in an official and approved manner; the absorption department in Carmiel has allocated to it a greater share of the budgets and the personnel. Most of them, incidentally, do their work as volunteers. The follow-up is already begun at the former place of residence of the new family and intensifies with the family's arrival at Carmiel and during its early period there. Four years after its arrival, the new family is still "under follow-up," which continues until everyone is convinced that absorption of the family has been concluded in the best possible light. It is not surprising therefore to hear Orenstein state: "Our fear is that we shall be unable to fulfill our mission, because week after week we receive over 200 applications to come and live in Carmiel."

Time will tell if, in the other development towns as well, the fear of a minority of arrivals will convert to a fear of the large number of arrivals.

8090
CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

SPOKESMAN DENIES ISRAELI AID--The spokesman of the Kurdish Democratic Party today denied that Israel had supplied the Kurdish rebels with weapons when they were fighting against the Baghdad authorities. A few days ago Prime Minister Menahem Begin disclosed that Israel had helped the Kurdish rebellion in various ways. Today a Kurdish spokesman, in a conversation with our London correspondent, said that no such aid had ever been given and he accused Mr Begin of an attempt to disrupt the good relations between the Kurdish Party and Baghdad. [Excerpt] [TA011326 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 1 Oct 80]

AIRFIELD QUALITY, FUNCTIONALISM--[Declaration by Defense Minister M. Tzipori: "The Airfields in the Negev Will be Operational and of the Required Quality"] The airfields being constructed in the Negev are to be completed by the month of April 1982 in the required quality and will be operational, it was reported yesterday at a meeting which the Assistant Defense Minister, Mr Mordekhai Tzipori, while talking in his office to the commander of the American Corps of Engineers, Lt Gen John Morris, in charge of construction of the airfields as representative of the American administration. Participating in the meeting were the Director General of the Defense Ministry, Mr Yosef Ma'ayan, Air Force Commander Major General David Ivri, Chief of the Negev Airfields Administration appointed by the IDF, Brigadier General Moshe Bar Tov, the appointee of the American administration for management of the Negev airfields, General Paul Hartung, as well as senior officers. Commander of the American Corps of Engineers accompanied by the Director General of the Defense Ministry toured the airfield sites: Mitrad and Rimon in the Negev, observing close-up the tempo of progress in the construction of the fields. [Text] [Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 7 Aug 80 p 4] 8090

CSO: 4805

IRAQI ACTION AGAINST IRAN 'RIGHTED A WRONG'

LD241219 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 22 Sep 80 p 1

[Article by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "The Ability to Rectify Wrong Situations"]

[Excerpts] Iraq has done what Iran did, with the difference that Iraq has righted a wrong by force, whereas Iran obtained by force what was unjustly sought.

When the shah was strong and conceited he demanded what he wanted and in so doing he relied on his worldwide influence and good international relations. He also exploited Iraq's weakness when its foreign relations were strained and nobody wanted to cooperate with it because it was unstable, while Iran was stable and had close relations with the United States and good relations with Russia. The Soviet looked at him from a standpoint of "better to have an understanding enemy than an ignorant one." Japan and Europe supported the shah because they saw in him the future man of the region. The shah used his influence against Iraq--influence strong enough to force certain Arab countries to bring pressure on Iraq to be flexible even at the expense of its interests and national sovereignty. In fact, Iraq was told then: "Accept so as to win Iran over." This is what happened 5 years ago, but now Iraq has rectified the situation at a time when Baghdad is enjoying the same advantages which the previous Iranian regime enjoyed in the past. Baghdad now has good international relations with the Soviets and with the free world countries, which find in the Baghdad government a regime with which understanding can be reached.

Iraq has benefited from a favorable international situation in which Iran's relations with the two superpowers are strained, its relations with the free world are bitter, and its relations within the area are tense because of political mismanagement resulting from an abnormal revolution and a change in the regime that went beyond all calculations.

It is up to Iran now to show flexibility, something which it has not really lost, just as Iraq was flexible over something for which it paid with its national rights and which the time had come to recover.

CSO: 4802

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LEBANESE FRONT EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 12 Jul 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Ibrahim Salamah: "From Kabul to Bikfayya"]

[Text] The Idea of the Lebanese Front Contacting Moscow Originated in al-Kaslik [locale designates major Maronite monastery near Juniyah]

Amin Al-Jumayyil: Our Relations with the Soviets Are Not Strong, Because They Are Our Adversaries' Allies

The Soviet Embassy's Staff in Beirut Met with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, with Amin and Bashir al-Jumayyil, and with Dany Sham'un, First in Secret, Then in Public

Throughout the past 30 days, Lebanese-Soviet relations have developed in a surprising way. This was expected by few people concerned with international policy in the Middle East. Two Lebanese delegations arrived in Moscow, one after another, within a period of 20 days. The first was composed of Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, and secretary general of the Lebanese National Movement. He was accompanied by Samir Franjiyah, nephew of former President Sulayman Franjiyah, and one of the prominent Maronite dignataries in northern Lebanon.

The second delegation represented the central committee of the Lebanese Communist Party, and was composed of Georges Hawi, the party's secretary general, along with a group of comrade members of the Lebanese Communist Party's political bureau. Two prominent members of the Soviet Communist Party's political bureau, Andrei Kirlinko, who is currently the number three man in the pyramid of Soviet power, and Boris Bonamaryov, who is the official responsible for Third World Liberation movements and who currently holds the post of secretary of the Soviet Communist Party's central committee, met with the two Lebanese delegations.

This was in Moscow. In Beirut, it was recently announced that the Soviet ambassador to Beirut, Soldatov, had three lengthy meetings with three of the most prominent leaders of the Lebanese Front, former President Camille Sham'un, Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, member of parliament for al-Matan, and his brother Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, leader of the "Lebanese Front."

Observers have dwelt extensively on analyzing the Soviet initiative in Lebanon. Some say that it is the beginning of Moscow's new policy in most Middle East areas, through which Moscow will attempt to return to the political scene in the Middle East, by means of renewing or reviving its old alliance (of Czarist days) with racial and sectarian minorities in the countries of the Arab East.

Others have not lent importance to the matter, viewing the Soviet initiative as certainly intended to counter the American and European initiatives in the Middle East.

However, the basic question remains: What motived the Lebanese Front leaders to get in touch with Moscow's representatives?

The answer to this question calls for caution, because both parties (Moscow and the Lebanese Front) are maintaining secrecy about the dialogue which has been held, and, so far, there has not been the slightest indication of any basic change in the two sides' positions.

From Paris, AL-MUSTAQBAL contacted Shyakh Amin al-Jumayyil, seeking an explanation. This information comes direct from the member of parliament for northern al-Matan and a prominent leader in the Lebanese Phalange Party: "Our relations with the Soviets are long-standing, beginning with the time of Sarfar Azimov, Moscow's ambassador to Beirut (before the war). At that time, the Soviet ambassador visited Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, head of the Phalangists, and extended an invitation to him to visit the Soviet Union as a member of a high-level Lebanese delegation, including such prominent members as former Premier 'Abdullah al-Yafi and Imam Musa al-Sadr. When Azimov was transferred from his post in Beirut, the invitation was not renewed. We contacted him and remonstrated. The outgoing ambassador thereupon gave a party in Shaykh Pierre's honor. The discussion with my father was kept under wraps at that time."

Shaykh Amin continued: "In that period, I met with Azimov, who invited me to visit the Soviet Union. I accepted the invitation, accompanied by two friends, Michel Edde and Fariq al-Taybi. The visit lasted 20 days. That visit could be considered the beginning of serious relations between us and Moscow."

[Question] What happend after that?

[Answer] Since Mr Soldatov's selection to represent the Soviet Union in Lebanon, it was clear that he was in favor of the Palestinian Resistance and its Lebanese allies who are known as the National Movement. Therefore, no meeting between us and the Soviet representative took place throughout the

2-year war. The first meeting occurred during the autumn of 1979, at the home of former Minister Farid Rufayil in the Hazamiyah district. Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and Pierre Far'un, in his capacity as agent for Soviet commercial shipping lines, attended on the Lebanese side, apart from the host, former Minister Rufayil. On the Soviet side, there was Ambassador Soldatov, accompanied by the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Beirut, Alexander Mosayef.

After this meeting, there were repeated meetings between us and Soviet representatives.

I met more than once in Beirut with the embassy's first secretary. In one of the meetings, we were joined by Dany Sham'un, President Camille Sham'un's eldest son. The meeting was held in the town of Faqra, in the mountains of Lebanon. Then I met again secretly with Soviet Ambassador Soldatov. After that, the Soviet ambassador met with Shaykh Bashir some months ago at Pierre Far'un's house in al-Ashrafiyah. Then there were the recent public meetings between Soldatov and President Sham'un and Shaykh Bashir.

[Question] In your estimation, what were the results of these meetings?

[Answer] So far, just good feelings, because the Soviets are linked with the National Movement as well as the Palestinian Resistance. We asked them on more than one occasion to free themselves from the "joint communique" signed on their part with Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], which unequivocally stipulates the Palestinians' right to fight using Lebanese territory as a starting point. Their answer was: "We do not interfere in Lebanese internal affairs."

In the opinion of [myself] Shaykh Amin, the Soviets began to get close to the front after they heard and read our critical remarks about America's policy on Lebanon in particiular, and on the Palestinian issue in general. So far, there is nothing serious between us and them. [end of answer]

This was a summary of the views of Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, a prominent official in the Phalange Party. Non-Phalangist Lebanese political circles look at the matter from another angle. Here is a summary of their views:

The Lebanese crisis has lasted longer than the most pessimistic persons expected. The reason for the situation remaining as it is is mutual international and Arab understanding, which Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil described, in his speech at the Yacht Club on 22 June, by saying: "Our desire is to take over all of Lebanon, along with every Lebanese fighting for Lebanon. The day we decide to take over the government in the eastern sector, we will give the Palestinian a present, so that he can take over the government in the western sector. This will be Lebanon's partition, and the Americans will be happy."

A new development in the chain of events of the Lebanese war is what could be described as a crisis of confidence between yesterday's allies. After Dany Sham'un's statement in L'ORIENT-LE JOUR, in which he expressed his

"disappointment with respect to the United States and Israel," Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil stated clearly, in comment on the crisis: "We felt as if we were being turned out of our own house. Our friends sold us out and conspired against us. Lebanon is not abandoned territory, nor is it an American or Soviet province." (Yacht Club speech--AL-NAHAR, dated 29 June 1980)

The state of Lebanon (the legitimate one) shares the view of the Lebanese Front leaders regarding the attitude of the West toward the Lebanese crisis. The Lebanese Government's relations with the French authorities are worse than lukewarm and are almost semi-severed. Three events confirm this crisis of lack of confidence.

The first is French President Giscard d'Estaing's refusal to visit Lebanon during his recent tour of most of the Arab capitals.

The second is Lebanese President Sarkis' receiving Mr George Marchet, the French communist leader. He is one of the leaders of the French opposition, that is, Giscard's opponents.

The third is Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus' statement, in which he declared: "Britain's position regarding the Lebanese crisis is more clear and better understood than the French Government's position."

There is an international diplomatic and media blockade of the Lebanese crisis. President Sham'un talked about this crisis when he stated, criticizing the regime's moves in international policy: "Minister Butrus and President Sarkis must be learning international policy from Abu 'Ammar." The interpretation of the former president's words is that the Lebanese Government must maintain ties or men bridges with all friendly and neutral international parties, in the hope of reaching a satisfactory solution which would restore peace and soveriegnty to Lebanon.

Following Sham'un's statement, the question arises: To what extent is it possible to develop the Lebanese-Soviet flirtation?

If the objective of this flirtation is to annoy Washington, as Shaykh Amin believes, then this tactic is fragile. But, if it turns into something of a strategy, then it means that Moscow's leaders are no longer betting on just one horse on the Lebanese racecourse as they did in the past, and that their new kind of struggle with Washington might force them to assist and flirt with the strong and active minorities in the Arab East.

The idea of contacting Moscow is not new on the Lebanese scene. At the height of the 2-year war, on the exact day Washington sent its representative, Dean Brown, to Beirut, some priests of al-Kaslik broached the idea of extending a hand [of reconciliation] to Moscow. The author of the idea was Abbot Qazi, who at one time headed the college of Lebanese monastic orders.

An eyewitness recounts the details of the conversation between Mr Brown and Abbot Qazi along the following lines: Abbot Qazi said: "Mr Dean, let us put the war aside. Is it in America's best interests to abandon the Christians

of Lebanon, despite cultural and humanitarian aspects?" Mr Dean replied, "Excuse me, but I must make America's position very clear to you. In short (and he said this in English) Lebanon's Christians can go to hell. We are not fighting for Christians in the East, and you must understand that, for the last time."

Immediately after that meeting, the al-Kaslik group began to study ways of getting in touch with Moscow, on the basis of a theological, philosophical theory that the theory of dialectics, which is the backbone of the Soviet system, is the product of the industrial, Christian society. This theory cannot be widely disseminated in the Islamic, Arab World. Therefore, a time will come when Moscow will clash with the majority of Middle Eastern people. Moscow will not find anyone better able to understand it than the Chrisitians of Lebanon, and some other minorities. It was Abbot Qazi's belief that "there is nothing wrong with solidifying good relations with Moscow, if Moscow aids us, in deed and not words, in rescuing Lebanon from its ordeal."

It is obvious that the analysis of al-Kaslik, especially Abbot Qazi's, was not just a summer night's dream. Moscow was expelled from Egypt in an unseemly manner. Then, her relations with Somalia became strained, and it had to move its guns from the Somali port of Berbera to the Ethiopian port of Massawa. Finally, Moscow has been engaged for several months now in a difficult war in Afghanistan, opposed by the masses with strikes, insurrection and all kinds of weapons.

From Kabul to Bikfayya?

Why not?

There is no room for sentiment in politics, because common interests are eternal inducements for such reversals as these. Although, as some many think, the Phalange is a right-wing party and former Presdient Sham'un is no socialist, Moscow has in the past cooperated with and supported right-wing regimes and non-communist parties, led by the Arab Ba'th Party itself, which was created basically to stop the communist spread in countries of the Arab East.

A strategy or a tactic? That question has become somewhat secondary. With the passage of time, especially in the Arab World, tactics might turn into strategies. Let us wait and see, as the English say. Perhaps the Lebanese war, which began unexpectedly, will end in an unexpected way.

7005
CSO: 4802

SOVIET RECONCILIATORY ROLE IN LEBANON ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 12 Jul 80 p 14

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Soviet Wood to Cook Lebanese Reconciliation Recipe! Moscow's Positive Neutrality Enters Phase of Practical Initiatives!"]

[Text] Moscow has let it be known that it is ready to offer its good offices for the achievement of Lebanese-Lebanese and Lebanese-Palestinian accord, on the basis of Soviet conviction that the situation in Lebanon must not remain unchanged, and that steps must be taken to correct it.

Informed political sources in the Lebanese capital couple this readiness to mediate with Moscow's current belief that the Lebanese situation, as it now stands, has begun to develop into a factor serving Camp David plans concerning the region.

The Soviet ambassador to Beirut, Mr Soldatov, was charged with conveying his country's readiness to Lebanese Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus during the meeting the two had a few days ago.

Informed Soviet sources in the Lebanese capital declined to clarify whether this Soviet readiness reflected a mere gesture of good will, or constituted a Soviet initiative on behalf of accord in Lebanon. At the same time, the Lebanese foreign minister chose to speak openly and in detail about his meeting with the Soviet ambassador regarding this matter. However, with regard to whether Ambassador Soldatov agreed with him on initiatives which would begin within a specific timeframe, Mr Butrus, in a private meeting, was content to say that the Soviet ambassador discussed the Lebanese situation with him in all its internal, Arab and international dimensions, and expressed his country's readiness to assist in achieving reconciliation.

Ever since the beginning of the crisis, or Lebanon's ordeal, the Soviet Union's public positions have remained limited to public expressions of support for Lebanon's unity and independence. This is the first time that Soviet statements have been made on readiness to participate in solving specific aspects of the Lebanese crisis, namely, Lebanese-Lebanese and Lebanese-Palestinian reconciliation in Lebanon.

One must refer at this point to the fact that this Soviet readiness was preceded by several meetings and dialogues between the Soviet ambassador to Beirut and the Lebanese Front, represented by both former President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, head of the war council of the Lebanese Phalange Party. As has become known, these dialogues dealt with the Maronite position in general, the Syrian role in Lebanon, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and what guarantees Moscow could give regarding the Syrian role and the future of the Palestinian presence.

Those who are knowledgeable about the Soviet contacts with the Lebanese Maronite front are aware that the dialogue which took place was conducted in a positive atmosphere. They emphasize that the readiness conveyed by Ambassador Soldatov to Minister Butrus was a result of the dialogue which Soldatov had with Camille Sham'un and Bashir al-Jumayyil. This dialogue represented moves started by Moscow to create the necessary atmosphere for a new political initiative. This time, it would be comprehensive in nature, not confined as before to the Palestinians and their leftist allies in the Lebanese National Movement.

The Soviets have not so far begun to translate their new readiness into practical steps and initiatives. The conviction which continues to be held by senior Lebanese officials, especially President Ilyas Sarkis, is that any practical Soviet assistance to Lebanon has to start with the Palestinians.

The simple explanation for this Lebanese belief is that Moscow, as a superpower, has by itself sufficient influence on the Palestinians to convince them of the need to carry out whatever would help Lebanon to regain its unity and accord among its people.

Some Lebanese officials believe that if this positive Soviet readiness is motivated by a desire to combat Camp David plans and pull the Lebanese situation out of the zone of pressure being applied by the Camp David parties, the results of this Soviet readiness would surely appear now and manifest themselves in facilitating the success of the efforts of Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis to form a government of national reconciliation.

Efforts to form this reconciliatory government are apparently still at an impasse, and are awaiting the results of the continuous efforts of the Syrian Government to resolve the difficult problem of former President Sulayman Franjiyah. He still rejects the formation of and his participation in a cabinet of political activists, as long as it requires effective Phalange Party participation in it.

The outgoing prime minister, Dr Salim al-Huss, who has played an indirect advisory role in creating this conviction [in Soviet ability to influence the Palestinians], is the winner in this situation, especially following a meeting held between him and President Ilyas Sarkis. Right after the meeting, al-Huss told some of his political friends that the president had lost hope with respect to forming a government of political activists, and that he is now in the process of investigating alternatives.

A day or two bef[illegible] President Sarkis met with al-Huss, the presidential palace had not completely switched to this new frame of mind. But a close friend who has just visited the palace confirmed the feeling that President Sarkis has begun preparing to turn his attention away from a government of activists.

This politician friend asked the president to clarify this point, and put the following question to him: "In the event a government of reconciliation and political activists cannot be formed, to what extent would you say there is a possibility of forming a government like the one that has resigned, or at least re-establishing the outgoing government?"

President Sarkis replied, "We do not wish to talk just yet about alternatives to a government of activists. If we did so, we would weaken the idea of such a government and the climate in which it grew. And we would thereby turn the spotlight on matters of form at the expense of substance."

The President went on to say: "Therefore, I would not want to even talk about a different type of government, even though I have very little hope left of being able to form a government of activists. We must continue to devote our total attention to a government of national reconciliation, and all initiatives and contacts must be based on this idea."

The political friend returned from his visit to the palace completely convinced that the president is serious about pursuing the task of forming a government of reconciliation, and that he would not cease his efforts in this regard, even if it took the entire month of July. The President feels that if he became ultimately convinced that all doors are shut in the face of a government of activists, there would be no problem in forming a new government, like the one that resigned, with an hour or a very few days at the outside.

The issue, with regard to President Sarkis, is not a simple matter of winning or losing in this effort. "he initiative to form a government of reconciliation began with and continues to stem from a deep-rooted conviction that a government of activists would provide the right solution [for the crisis]. At the same time, such a government represents a last opportunity for President Sarkis before the end of his term, of which only 2 years remain. It also represents a last opportunity for a united Lebanon whose single entity is still threatened with disintegration and extinction. Consequently, failure to form a government of reconciliation would mean a very great deal. Success would also mean a very great deal, because it would mean the beginning of the end [of the crisis] as President Sarkis says.

7005
CSO: 4802

CORRUPTION OF MEMBERS OF PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES DISCLOSED

Tripoli AL-ZAHAF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 30 Jun 80 pp 20-21

[Article: "Serious Facts Discovered by the People's Committees"]

[Text] Beware of the Danger of Foreign Companies.
Busts: A Study Presented by the People's Committees.
Arab Slaves or Jewish Capitalists?

As a result of the serious facts uncovered by the People's Committees on the basis of conclusive evidence, it has become evident to the revolutionary people that some of those who live among them pretend to be pure and honest, but in reality are filled with deadly poison. These elements want to ruin the people who took it upon themselves to protect the gains and capabilities brought about by the revolution of the conqueror.

The bad practices of the exploitative society, of those who have sick souls and petrified consciences, are enough evidence of betrayal by these people of their nation. The nation always paid a heavy price of blood and wealth for thei. sake in the hope that they would rise to relieve the nation of its heavy burdens. But through their ugly practices, of which the People's Committees are presenting samples, they wanted to harm their nation and to drag it into unwanted aimless imperialistic schemes.

The People's Committees are busting corrupt people wherever they are found. Without any desire to seek fame or praise, these committees are trying to make the corrupt drop their imperialistic masks behind which they always try to hide. They pretend that they want to help the developing countries through companies which hide poison in their fangs.

The People's Committees seek to warn the helpless nations and to request that they right wrongs and take measures to reform past imperialist corruption and thwart continued imperialist efforts to corrupt. These nations should learn from their mistakes to become immune to the deceptive practices of imperialism, its conspiracies and its hatred for the peoples who seek freedom.

Competition Between Money and Conscience

The secretary general of the People's Committee for al-Mukhtar (al-Amin?) sold his conscience for 420 [sic] DM to a German company in 1978-79, and deposited this amount in his private account in Zurich.

During a period of 2 years, 1976-1977, he received from the Yugoslavian Milyunoritsch company the sum of 14,000 dinars, and an additional sum of 20,000 dinars in the month of August 1979. He deposited all this money in his private account in Zurich. He also received a commission of £10,000 from a British company, and he deposited this amount in his account in London. He has accounts in America, in Germany and in Switzerland. In America he has $6,000; in England, he has $9,000 and £700; and in Switzerland he has 210,000 DM. In addition, he has received a total of 29,000 dinars in cash bribes and gifts.

This was all taken at the expense of the masses which put him in his position.

He spent 1.185 million DM in bars and nightclubs. He used foreigners who work in Libya to smuggle his money, such as an engineer in the Misrata Road Construction Company, and a contractor who owns a consulting firm in Tripoli and has a branch in Germany.

He purchased foreign currency equivalent to 1.782 million dinars. His bank account in Libya is only 300 dinars, but he owns the following:

A Mercedes 450 SAL costing 20,000 dinars,

A BMW 520 costing 7,000 dinars,

(Land Carriers?) costing 30,000 dinars,

A camper costing 3,700 dinars,

A Fiat 131 costing 700 dinars,

A house under construction in which he has so far invested 50,000 dinars,

A total of 7,000 dinars in cash in his house.

Withdrawals from his bank account totalled 339,736 dinars.

He employs 13 foreign male and female employees of various professions.

He used these employees to smuggle his money outside the country.

A False Statement for 4,000 Dinars

The president of the transportation union in Ghiryan and vice president of the union in Tripoli was able to take illegal cash bribes from certain contractors.

He received a bribe of 4,000 dinars in return for delaying the takeover of a quarry that belonged to someone else, and for issuing a false statement on the radio to the effect that the takeover had actually occurred. This was done without the knowledge of the responsible committee.

He also received 500 dinars for the purpose of purchasing furniture for the union. Instead, he kept the money.

He also received a Peugeot 504 from a road construction company and 7,000 dinars from a contractor.

He received a bribe of more than 4,000 dinars from the Five Continents Company.

In addition, he received a bribe of 3,000 dinars from al-Amal company. Another 3,000 dinars were given to him by a contractor in exchange for a letter allowing the contractor to bring workers from abroad.

Prefers the Zionists Over the Arabs

This man is an accountant in the general administration of the postal service. He is in charge of all accounts related to projects and contracts. Being the only employee responsible for these accounts, it became very easy for him to do anything he wished. He has been in this job for 8 years and has received bribes in the form of money from foreign companies in return for certain favors during the execution of their projects. He studies the bids of these companies and then draws up the financing of the proposed projects. He received a bribe of 14,300 dinars from the French (Toussson?) Company through the company of Bleu-Duron-Asmar. He also received a bribe of 1,500 dinars from the representative of that same company.

From the Japanese company, Linsbun, he took a bribe of 12,770 dinars through Aytu-Sada-Hamanka-Kujima company.

From an American communications company, he received, through the company's representative, Cordyred, the sum of 25,000 dinars. In addition to all these bribes, he received commissions and luxurious trips at the expense of foreign companies. In fact, these corrupt actions were committed at the expense of the Libyan treasury. The conscience of these people were bought at the expense of the Libyan people who trusted them, in return for this trust, the people received ingratitude.

As for the bank accounts of this postal service man in Arab and non-Arab banks, he has 14,200 dinars in the International Bank of London; 2,700 dinars in the Arab Bank in Amman; 1,400 dinars in al-Zarqa' Bank in Jordan; and 50 dinars in the main office of the National Commercial Bank in Libya.

Favors to Foreign Companies and Bribes from the Peoples' Money

A surveyor working as a supervisor in the department of highways received bribes totaling 28,920 dinars from foreign companies in exchange for certain favors.

He received a bribe of 8,870 dinars from a representative of a French company, and a bribe of 4,000 dinars from a representative of another French company called Coursac.

From the Japanese company, Nisbun, he received 6,550 dinars in addition to other cash bribes he received from individuals.

Bribes and Cars in Return for Favors

The commercial director of the National Company of Trade and Machinery received a total of 16,000 dinars in bribes from foreign companies.

He was expecting a bribe of $203,000 and a BMW car from a certain individual.

He received from the Belgian company, Holmz, 30,000 dinars directly; 30,600 dinars through a person in Switzerland; and 7,850 dinars through a person in Italy.

The sums of 15,000 dinars from a person called Sahandal, 118,000 dinars from the Conitho Caro company, and 15,000 from another person were on their way to him.

Favors from Libyan Banks and Foreign Accounts

Banking favors to a businessman and previously a contractor at the al-Wafa' Contracting and Trading Company totaled 760,000 dinars from al-Wahda Bank, 200,000 dinars from the National Commercial Bank and an additional 160,000 dinars from the same bank.

As for his foreign accounts, he has 25,000 dinars at the Deutche Bank in Germany. Also, he was able to smuggle 200,000 dinars to Alexandria in order to enrich the treasury of the defeated Sadat.

As for bribes, they were all in gold and silver with an estimated value of 2,800 dinars. This is in addition to the numerous properties he owns.

The estimated cost of buildings he owns is 210,000 dinars. In addition to that, he has 15,000 dinars worth of land, 900,000 dinars worth of machinery and agricultural equipment.

The Love of Money Twisted His Mind

The total value of bank transfers to foreign countries, for the secretary of the Mediterranean Hotel Company, reached 305,000 dinars. The transfers amounted to 280,000 dinars to the Agricultural Bank in Rome; 12,000 dinars to a bank in Lausanne, Switzerland; and an additional 3,500 dinars to this same account. From the owner of Juwandi Company, he received 4,000 dinars, in addition to other bribes. He took all this by virtue of the position he was trusted with by the people. The proverb says: "Beware of those to whom you have done good."

Computer Would Fail to Add Up the Wealth of One Person

The wealth of a contractor in Benghazi could be invested in productive projects which would be beneficial to the people. The glitter of money dazzles these individuals who rob the people and deposit their loot in foreign banks to be used for imperialist purposes.

Another example of such persons is a contractor who owns buildings on al-Fatih Street. The buildings which contain 40 apartments and 16 stores are valued at 450,000 dinars.

He owns a store for spare parts which has an estimated value of 160,000 dinars.

He has purchased a 100 donum farm for 100,000 dinars. On this farm he has what is worth 200,000 dinars in buildings.

He owns an asphalt making factory valued at 60,000 dinars and road machinery valued at 100,000 dinars.

He has other investments in some factories, such as the tile factory in which he has invested 17,000 dinars.

In addition, he owns a quarry valued at 50,000 dinars, a herd of 600 sheep, and gold valued at 10,000 dinars.

What this immoral person owns now is estimated at two million dinars.

Bribes, Smuggling and Punishment

The secretary of the National Committee for Trade and Equipment used his position to accumulate wealth at the expense of the people.

He received bribes totaling 162,100 dinars from foreign companies operating inside and outside the country. This was in return for importing construction materials for sale in Libya at exorbitant prices. He used his position to facilitate transactions for a businessman who smuggled 65,000 dinars to his son who fled to live in an enemy country.

Has a Monthly Salary of 550 Dinars and Receives Bribes!

In a very short time, a member of a certain peoples' committee was able to receive a 24,000 dinar bribe, 13,000 dinars in commissions and a trailer.

8988
CSO: 4802

MILITARY SECURITY IN GULF NATIONS SURVEYED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Aug-Sep 80 pp 53-72

[Article by Philippe Rondot]

[Text] The holding of the American hostages in Iran and the failure of the attempt made at liberating them, the occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca in Saudi Arabia, exacerbation of the tension on the border between Iraq and Iran and the reinforcement of the American and Soviet fleets in the Indian Ocean, on the doorstep of the Straits of Hormuz, even while the Red Army tries to "normalize" Afghanistan, have only increased the chances of conflict in this zone of ultra-sensitivity for the industrialized world.

In a recent edition, August-September 1979, Admiral Henri Labrousse and Philippe Rondot focused their attention on the Gulf, already the subject of growing fears in the West since its Persian coast had become the theater for a revolution which it was feared would spread. Bringing his observations up to date on a region he has traversed from Dhofar to Shatt al-Arab, Philippe Rondot, deputy mission chief at the Center for Advanced Studies on modern Africa and Asia, today sketches, in broad strokes, the outline of this potential theater of operations.

An editorial in the newspaper TIMES OF INDIA published in 1899 ended with this somber prediction: "It is around the Persian Gulf that the political storms of the future are preparing [to be born], and it is there that the real battle for political domination will be fought." At the time, the British had just imposed their protectorate on Oman (1891) and Kuwait (1899), and had secured against [the danger of] pirates free circulation of commercial vessels. They were thinking only of their Indian empire. In 1980, the Emirates, independent now, are profusely wealthy from their oil; Great Britain withdrew, in 1971, to the west of Suez; the Iran of the

Pahlavis, which had turned itself into the protector of the Gulf with the consent and assistance of the United States, has become an Islamic republic; the Soviet Union, with its army now in Afghanistan, could tomorrow sweep down on the Straits of Hormuz; the Americans, disabled, are trying to redeploy their military strength. The conclusion of the editorial in the TIMES OF INDIA could be that of the pages which follow.

Doubtless many of the fears that many feel at this time for preservation of peace in the Gulf are not new, since the oil crisis born out of the last Israeli-Arab war of October 1973 clearly demonstrated the West's energy dependence. They were considerably aggravated for several months, especially after the President of the United States, in his State of the Union message before Congress, in Washington, on 23 January, clearly stated that "any attempt by an external power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be considered as an attack against the vital interests of the United States and it would be resisted by all means including the use of armed force." (1)

The Gulf has thus become a potential theater of operations about which it would be good to understand the important political and military facts, in their national aspects and in their regional and international contexts, before examining the appropriate means of providing for its security.

A Tangle of Sensitive Points

A long (800 km) arm of the sea with a surface of about 250,000 km^2, the Gulf, whose steep Iranian shoreline contrasts with a flat and often marshy Arab shoreline, offers an exceptional concentration of sensitive points: social (populations), economic (oil installations), and strategic (communications); all these can be targets for political or military action. Their overlap among the states, most of whom at their young age must remain fragile, adds to their vulnerability.

Despite the fears expressed, the riverine Arab countries have not so far suffered the effects of the Shiite revolution on the opposite bank. President Saddam Husayn has made use of all arguments, including that of [the use of] force (2), to forestall an uprising of Iraqi Shi'ites (5.5 percent [of the Iraqi population]), who moreover differ rather significantly from their better organized and more politicized Iranian co-religionists. The threat, however, remains: in Kuwait (35 percent Shi'ite), in Bahrain especially (60 percent), in Saudi Arabia (about 5 percent), in the United Arab Emirates [UAE] (Dubai first of all), the vigilance shown by the authorities, accompanied on occasion by relatively severe repression, has contained an Islamic-populist effervescence which was expressed by various mob activities and inflamed speeches. This apparent calm should not generate any illusions: because of the role played by Islam, the impact of the Iranian revolution has been serious enough to affect not only Shi'ites, but also some Sunnites. The existence of a Shi'ite majority [sic] in Iraq, traditionally restive, concentrated mainly in the south part

of the country and still imperfectly integrated into political life, like the presence of numerous Shi'ites (35 percent) among the oil workers in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia (the Qatif region), are potential centers of agitation (3).

The resurgence of nationalist feelings in the ethnic minorities constitutes another factor of instability. The Kurds of Iraq, who for long years successfully opposed the central government, are not all equally content with the implementation of the autonomy that was granted them in March 1974. Those in Iran, their weapons in their hands, show their discontent at not having obtained from the new leaders any more consideration for their rights than in the time of the shah's reign. They may be joined, in these autonomist demands, by the Azerbaijani Turks, the Turcomans, the Baluchis, the Pashtuns, and the Arabs of Khuzistan. A handful of irreducible Dhofari rebels is still resisting the army of Sultan Qabus of Oman. The exploitation of these regional particularisms which are still flourishing--the Kurds and Arabs by Iraq against Iran, the Baluchis by the Soviets against Pakistan, the Dhofaris by South Yemen against Oman--is no longer, in some cases, a mere hypothesis.

Another nationalism can be exploited with even more serious results: that of the Palestinians. There are 300,000 in Kuwait in a populace wherein the nationals (less than 45 percent) are already in the minority. There as elsewhere, their competence and dynamism have often placed them in positions of responsibility. Since Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, threatened to send his commandos to block the Straits of Hormuz or blow up the oil wells (4), one is aware even more keenly of the influence wielded by this Palestinian community present everywhere in the Gulf, except in Oman, and which up to now has remained relatively peaceful.

Moreover, it is partly due to the influence of the Palestinians that the local leftist forces have obtained the establishment of some form of democracy. Kuwait first, then Bahrain in this way for several years benefited from their only parliamentary experience. If it was put to an end, in August 1975 in Bahrain and in August 1976 in Kuwait, in order to curb progressive pressures, the re-establishment of this practice is not excluded by the leaders. In Iraq, the Baas party in power has agreed to parliamentary elections, the first in 22 years (5). In Saudi Arabia, King Khalid decided in March 1980, that a consultative council of some 60 appointed members should exercise legislative powers (6).

Preoccupied by the awakening of these socio-political forces, the government is not always certain to present a united front. In Iran, the multiplicity of centers of power enfeebles the authority of the government. In Iraq, tensions within Baas maintain a dangerous climate of suspicion. In Saudi Arabia and in the Emirates, intra-dynastic rivalries, which show up in the apportionment of official conferments and in successions, require a continual effort at balancing of powers, often at the cost of efficiency.

To these concerns for internal order is added the persistence of border conflicts or territorial claims involving Iran (Iraq-Iran, Bahrain-Iran, UAE-Iran) and also the Arab states among themselves (Iraq-Kuwait, Qatar-Bahrain, Saudi Arabia-Oman-UAE, Saudi Arabia-Yemen). Reconciliations, even when translated into treaties, have a character all the more ephemeral because external threats are often brandished as a means of re-solidifying national cohesion.

This cohesion also suffers from the presence of a multitude of immigrant workers (55 percent in Kuwait, 60 percent in Qatar, 75 percent in the UAE, 20 percent in Saudi Arabia) who could play a swing role for forces thirsting for power (7). The fact that a large number are employed in the oil industry aggravates the vulnerability of these installations, which by their concentration are already quite vulnerable (8).

Finally, one last sensitive point, and not the least: the celebrated Straits of Hormuz through which pass, as we know, 80 super-tankers per day. Its two navigable channels, in a rough area strewn with islets and rocks, in shallow water (45 to 65 m), within artillery range of the two banks (35 km wide) can be controlled, indeed blockaded, with little difficulty. Soviet bombers starting from Afghanistan are in direct range of this vital artery.

Local Disparate Military Potential

The national armies of the Gulf were fashioned in accordance with the ambitions or concerns of the riverine states. These latter being diverse, even opposed, for reasons that are at once geographical, demographic, or political, no balance of forces exists. One constant, however, emerges: all the countries, except perhaps Oman, have the financial means necessary to create an effective instrument of defense (9).

In order to make his country the dominant power in the region, the shah of Iran wanted to make his army the finest in the East. His objectives--the augmentation of mobility, almost total mechanization, sophistication in armaments, the creation of special rapid intervention forces--were attained, with the help of the United States (10), even though he lost his throne, without even being able to use this formidable battle force to serve him (if it would) as an ultimate recourse. Even more than the land army, largely deployed in the south starting in the Seventies, the air force, whose strength in manpower grew eightfold between 1965 and 1976, benefited from this effort. As to the navy, whose development was equally impressive, based on new facilities built at Kharg, Bouchir, and Bandar-Abbas, it had a sphere of action extending far beyond the Gulf, to the configuration of which it was perfectly adapted (a flotilla of hovercraft), for extending beyond Hormuz into the Indian Ocean.

In passing from the traditional military authority to the poorly defined guardianship of the Islamic republic, the Iranian army lost much of its operational efficiency. Suspiciously viewed at first by the new regime

which feared the emergence within it of a counter-revolutionary current, weakened by desertions (60 percent), next committed in the bloody repression of Kurdish separatism, it presently shows signs of malaise serious enough that the government is thinking of totally reorganizing it (11). Only the navy, perhaps, has been able partly to escape this disintegration. In any case, the air-naval maneuvers of May 1980 in the Straits of Hormuz, supervised by President Bani Sadr, would tend to prove (and to make known) that republican Iran remains determined to maintain in the Gulf some of the ambitions of the fallen empire.

Saudi Arabia, seeing as early as 1970 the impressive arsenal of the shah and desirous of setting bounds to his hegemonic designs, undertook in its turn to strengthen its military capacity. It tried to compensate for weakness in manpower levels (44,500 men) by effectiveness and sophistication of equipment, which explains the very high level of military expenditure ($1,000 per inhabitant in 1976-1977). Parallel with the army, a national guard of more than 20,000 men recruited from the tribes of the Nedj, commanded by Prince Abdallah (12) is specially entrusted with the protection of the dynasty and the surveillance of oil installations. But this defense apparatus is not yet effectively cohesive.

The conditions in which occurred the occupation of Mecca by "renegades," in November 1979, and the difficulties in subjugating them, showed not only weaknesses in the general security apparatus of the kingdom, but also the inadequacies of the forces and of some of the staffs. The reorganization of commands, improvements in training, the establishment of obligatory military service, the decision to build up the army to 300,000 men and the national guard to 75,000 men by 1985, the construction of several multi-functional military bases spread out all over the kingdom (13), and the creation of a navy (with the help of France) are the next steps Saudi Arabia wants to take in the climb to power it is presently pursuing.

The small Emirates of the Gulf have more modest plans. Bahrain and Qatar have only a few battalions, rather well equipped to be sure, charged with maintaining internal order and coastal surveillance. Their air forces, practically nonexistent, could eventually be equipped with Mirage 2000's (14). Kuwait was the first Emirate to provide itself with a small modern army, well supplied with armor, airplanes (18 Mirage F-1's) and means of anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense. These precautions are explained by the fact that its powerful neighbor to the north, Iraq, has not completely backed off from its territorial claims, and that tension persists on the borders separating the two states.

The Federation of United Arab Emirates disposes of fairly considerable forces if one compares them to the population and the dimensions of the country. It is true that, despite the existence of a federal army, several emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and Ra's al-Khaimah) also maintain local armies, one of which, that of Abu Dhabi, is clearly bigger than that of the federal state. The decision, made in November 1976 by the supreme council, to unify the military forces, like that of May 1975 to authorize

the federal force aims to dispose of air, land, and naval armaments, is thus not formally implemented. The presence of a majority of mercenaries (Omanis in particular) and the traditional rivalry between Shaikh Rachid of Dubai and Zayed, emir of Abu Dhabi and president of the federation, add to the confusion, paralyzing a defense system which is having freeing itself from tribal constraints.

The army of the Sultanate of Oman is distinguished from the other armies of the Arabian peninsula by the fact that it is the only one to have fought a rebellion, namely that of Dhofar. Staffed by British officers, composed partly of mercenaries (Baluchis), supported starting in 1973 by an Iranian expeditionary corps, it succeeded in putting down the revolt at the end of 1975. Since then, Sultan Qabus has continued the modernization (acquisition of 12 Jaguars) and has been trying to "Omanize" his troops. On permanent state of alert against the ever-present possibility of a resumption of the Dhofari rebellion, the Omani army is thus maintaining itself at a high operational level. Foreign assistance, since the Iranian withdrawal, is nevertheless still indispensable.

The Iraqi army is the strongest Arab army in the Gulf, although at least until recently its missions did not particularly extend to this zone. Strongly politicized, by tradition (15), it has been trained and equipped, with the help of the Soviets, to contribute to the Arab war effort in the Near East conflict. While this army has effectively participated in [that effort] (in 1973, 13,000 men and 250 tanks were dispatched to the Syrian front), it has above all been used to fight against Barzani's Kurds, from 1969 to 1975. The crushing of the Kurdish movement is not so much due to the effectiveness of its campaigns as to the fact that the shah of Iran, in accordance with the terms of the Iranian-Iraqi agreement of March 1975, brutally ended the support he was giving to Mustapha Barzani.

Endowed with an imposing armor-park, having a high-quality air force (especially the Mirage F-1's), the Iraqi military is not yet capable of ranging enough warships (16) to claim to figure honorably in the Gulf. This insufficiency of naval forces also explains why up to now Baghdad has not risked aggravating the dispute with its Iranian neighbor. It explains also why Saddam Husayn too has decided to get himself a naval force, in the creation of which France should be involved. Alongside the regular army there is a popular force of more than 75,000 men, endowed with its own materiel and forming the pretorian guard of the Baas regime.

Foreign Military Presence

The foreign military presence in the region must be distinguished according to whether it is deployed within or outside the Gulf, that is, in the Indian Ocean and the riverine countries (Oman, South Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, and India), and also according to whether it is of a permanent or temporary nature, and finally according to the diverse forms it assumes: bases, port calls, advisers, arms supply.

Even within the Gulf, this presence remains limited: all the riverine countries are against the ostentatious deployment of foreign forces. In Bahrain the United States has only port facilities in the military part of the port of Jufair formerly run by Great Britain: piers, some military huts, light maintenance personnel for three warships, whose flagship is the "LaSalle." On 27 June 1977, Bahrain and the United States decided to terminate an agreement giving the American fleet the right to utilize the installations (17).

It certainly seems that this was only a false retreat, for the American presence, indeed discreet, remains. The isle of Bahrain in fact offers the advantage of being in the heart of the Gulf and of being a principal node for aerial communications in the region.

What the Soviet navy has in the Iraqi port of Oum Qasr is scarcely better: there too it is just port facilities, with supply depots and repair shops. The United States and the Soviet Union are set upon keeping these facilities because they justify their units taking shore liberty frequently there and because they offer the possibility of reinforcing an armed naval presence at any moment.

With respect to Moscow, this privilege assumes greater significance, since it results from the implementation of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship and cooperation of April 1972, which apparently seems not to have suffered as a result of the fairly tangible cooling of relations between the two countries since 1977 (18). More than 800 Soviet advisers are helping the Iraqi army, for which the Eastern countries remain the principal source of supply. If Kuwait, which along with Iraq is the only Arab country in the Gulf to maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, has embarked with this country on a modest program of military cooperation (purchase of missiles) since 1976, at least it refuses to expand this [cooperation] to the presence of advisers (19).

The apparent ambiguity of American-Saudi relations, which suffers (20) from misunderstandings or from differing views on the modalities of peace between Arabs and Israelis, is not translated into a slowdown in military cooperation, even if one discerns, among Saudi leaders, considerable irritation with American vacillation in Iranian affairs and with White House reluctance to authorize the delivery of more sophisticated armaments. It is notwithstanding the case that least 60 percent of Saudi military contracts are signed with the United States, which underwrites the biggest share of arms supplies (with the exception of French tanks), technical assistance, personnel training, conception, realization of logistical infrastructure, and maintains in the country several hundred advisers or technicians, civilian and military.

The disorganization of the apparatus of state prevailing in Iran does not permit us to be sure whether the Soviet Union can hope to turn the eviction of the Americans to its advantage and launch [a program of] military cooperation (21). It is also not certain that the present leaders would

be disposed to do so, those who support the Afghan revolt against the Red Army. The time will come however when Tehran will have to think seriously about re-filling its inventory of materiel, which already suffers from the absence of upkeep and spare parts.

The foreign military presence within the Gulf, where on the Arab bank the United States seems to hold the advantage, has less reason to be circumspect once outside the Straits of Hormuz. Opposite its outlets, in the Sea of Oman, American and Soviet fleets are building up and watching each other. The Soviet Union now has some 30 warships cruising (10 combat, 16 support), supplemented during maneuvers by several nuclear attack submarines or the aircraft carrier "Minsk." Several hundred marines are on these ships which include electronic warfare craft and logistical support vessels. The United States for its part is doing no less, and can bring to bear as much naval transport from the West (25). The necessity for the Soviet Union to become an oil importer, starting in 1985 probably, is another explanation of its effort to penetrate the Gulf. Moscow denies it, of course. The Soviet Union "does not covet the wealth of others," Leonid Brezhnev says, in January 1980, but it could not notice without reacting to the appearance "on its southern border of a source of serious threats to its security," he adds. In other words, if the region belongs to a "sphere of vital interest," it is rather that of the Soviet Union than that of the United States.

The disappearance as a regional power of the Iran allied with the Americans, chosen and equipped by them to stand guard in their place over their interests in the region, has provoked a fresh review of their local strategy. The present doctrine seems to start from the principle that there must be no more reliance on "proxy-powers," but rather to guarantee the threatened order by itself, through a combination of its own military and economic power (26). Washington would also like to rely on its Egyptian and Israeli allies who dispose of the two most powerful armies in the Near East and are agreed to supply to the [American] co-signatory of the Camp David accords the logistical facilities (use of air bases) [needed] to complete its dispositions to the west of the Gulf. In fact, what men like Zbigniev Brzezinski and Harold Brown in Washington would like is the constitution of a veritable regional military alliance which would include not only Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, but also Israel.

The still uncertain future of the Iranian revolution, and the still less foreseeable future of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, have certainly sensitized the Arab regimes in the Gulf to their defense problems, but not to the point that they would rush to get under an American "umbrella," whose flimsiness moreover has been shown by recent events. To entrust its security to the West would require assurance that the latter will have the means and above all the political will to intervene. It would also require a definition of the conditions and limitations of intervention in such a way that there would be no doubt (or ambiguity) about intentions. It would, finally, imply the ability to squeeze out a consensus on this subject. The capabilities of the West being in doubt, American intentions remaining unclear, and unanimity being far from being achieved, the Arab

countries of the Gulf have, without exception, beginning naturally with Iraq, clearly expressed their intention not to leave the responsibility for maintaining internal order in the Gulf to any but their own forces.

This option, which Saudi Arabia reconfirms again in January 1980, by affirming that it does not want to accord any military facilities to the United States or to tolerate the presence on its territory of foreign troops or equipment (radar-aircraft notably), implies that the riverine states are redefining their defense policy. Thus one sees that the share of the budget reserved for the armed forces has grown perceptibly in 1979-1980, and that purchases of armaments, along with technical assistance, mostly from Western firms, have grown larger (27). The United States, but also France, Great Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany are thus making, indirectly, their contribution to the defense of the Gulf. But this effort in equipment remains futile without the human resources [needed] to use the materiel acquired. This is doubtless not the case with Iraq, but it is already to some extent with Saudi Arabia and most certainly with various Emirates, those that must resort to a large number of foreigners for their forces.

However, the most serious aspect of the question is not in recruitment, even if it is an immediate problem, but rather in the difficulty of integrating into a system of collective security these different forces, some of which lack any truly national character. The problem is not new, since already in the time of the shah it was posed but couldn't be solved (failure of the Muscat conference of October 1976), because of Iranian pretensions (to remain the kingpin) and Iraqi fears (concerning the preservation of freedom of navigation). The Khomeyni revolution then came to give the Saudi leaders the opportunity to renew the discussions, leaving Iran aside. After having dropped the abiding suspiciousness with which it viewed the Iraqi Baas regime, by proceeding to sign, on 20 September 1979, a treaty of mutual defense with Iraq, Saudi Arabia on 16 October convokes a conference at Taef. This comes to grief on the choice of alliances to set up: American for the Sultan of Oman, to whom the United States had just promised $100 million for the protection of Hormuz, inter-Arab for the other participants, among which group, however, Iraq is not found. On 8 Feburary 1980, this country will propose a charter condemning all foreign military presence in the Arab world and calling for the formation of an inter-Arab force capable of coming to the rescue of any member state of the Arab League whose security should be threatened.

Despite the failure of Taef and despite ideological conflicts, several accords now exist between these different Arab states at the level of police and intelligence organizations, but Iraq, Kuwait, and even more so North Yemen remain still opposed to the establishment of a regional defense pact as well as to the Omani initiatives aimed at "internationalizing" protection of the Straits of Hormuz. Riyadh is thus still searching for an Arab defense formula which, in spirit, would cover not only protection of the Gulf but would also neutralize the threat from South Yemen, felt even more keenly in the wake of the Mecca affair.

Iran, for its part, is concerned both by the pressure of Iraq on its borders and by the consequences for the economy of a solid American blockade. The tour of the Arab Gulf made by Sadeq Ghotbzadeh in May 1980, in the course of which he mentioned the possibility of calling for large-scale cooperation with the socialist bloc and hinted at the role Shi'ite minorities could play, illustrates the pressures to which the riverine Arab countries are subjected. If their leaders, who today are demanding strategic independence, delay in coming to agreement on a plan for collective defense, it is because they fear that to make it credible they would have to fall into dependence on a third power, in this instance the United States (28). If that should be the case, they would have to take into account the opposition from their own people, who may be more sensitized than they seem by the "anti-imperialist" professions of faith emanating from Tehran or elsewhere.

It is indeed important for the West to demonstrate its solidarity with the Arab countries of the Gulf. It is no less important for this to be accomplished with discernment, taking into consideration these constraints of every kind, quickly summarized, that prevail in this zone of tensions.



Key:

1. Legend
2. Scale: 1 to 2,000,000
3. Flow of maritime traffic
4. Depths are expressed in meters

1 Tableau : les potentiels militaires des pays du Golfe

	2 Arabie Saoudite	3 Bahrein	4 Fédération des Émirats Arabes Unis	5 Irak	6 Iran (prérévolutionnaire)	7 Koweit	8 Oman	9 Qatar
10 Superficie (km²)	2 225 000	598	77 400	438 446	1 648 000	17 820	300 000	10 360
11 Population	7 984 000	355 000	905 000	12 730 000	39 330 000	1 200 000	870 000	210 000
12 Service militaire	conscription	volontaire	conscrits	2 ans 41	1 an 42	18 mois 43	volontaire 44	volontaire 45
	38 b/c 1980	39	40					
13 Forces armées	44 500	2 300	25 150 (1)	222 000	415 000	11 000	19 200 (2)	4 700
14 P.N.B. (1977) en dollars	64.2 M (4) (1978)	1.7 M	12.0 M	15.5 M (1978)	75.1 M	11.9 M	2.55 M (1978)	1 M
15 Dépenses militaires (1979) en dollars	14.18 M	98 m (5)	750 m	2.02 M (1978)	9.94 M	336 m	688 m	61 m (1978)
16 **Armée de terre :**								
17 Hommes	35 000	-	23 500	190 000	285 000	9 000	16 200	4 000
18 Chars	623	-	60	1 800	1 870	400	-	18
19 Blindés légers	1 886	102	371	2 900	2 000	200	36	70
20 Artillerie sol-sol	260	-	20	1 600	710	318	36	12
21 Artillerie A.A.	175	-	80	1 500	1 900	140	-	15
22 **Armée de l'Air :**								
23 Hommes	8 000	-	750	28 000	100 000	1 900 (2)	2 100 (2)	300
24 Chasse	180	-	39	354	447	55	24	11
25 Transport	33	-	13	39	+ 90 (3)	4	28	-
26 Hélicoptères	37	12	38	228	+ 350	36	21	6
27 **Marine :**								
28 Hommes	1 500	-	900	4 000	30 000	200	900	400
29 Patrouilleurs	4	-	9	29		25	9	9
30 Vedettes	4	3	10	10		3	-	11
31 Dragueurs	6	-	-	5	46 Voir Tableau annexe	-	-	-
32 Débarquement	6	-	-	3		-	-	-
33 Sous-marins	-	-	-	-		-	-	-
34 Divers	17	10	16	8		5	7	-

35 (1) Seule a été prise en considération l'armée fédérale — 47 (4) M : milliards
36 (2) Nationaux seulement — (5) m : millions
37 (3) Dont des ravitailleurs en vol — 48

Key: (Table)

1. Table: Military Potential of the Gulf Countries
2. Saudi Arabia
3. Bahrain
4. Federation of United Arab Emirates
5. Iraq
6. Iran (pre-revolutionary)
7. Kuwait
8. Oman
9. Qatar
10. Surface area (km^2)
11. Population
12. Military service
13. Armed forces
14. GNP (1977) in dollars
15. Military Expenditures (1979) in dollars
16. Land Forces
17. Men
18. Tanks
19. Light Armored [vehicles]
20. Ground to Ground Artillery
21. Anti-aircraft Artillery
22. Air Force
23. Men
24. Fighters
25. Transport
26. Helicopters
27. Navy
28. Men
29. Patrol Boats
30. Vedette-boats
31. Sweeps
32. Landing Craft
33. Submarines
34. Miscellaneous
35. (1) Only the federal army has been included.
36. (2) Nationals only.
37. (3) Including In-Flight Refueling Craft.
38. Conscription a/c [expansion unknown] 1980
39. Volunteer
40. Conscripted
41. 2 years
42. 1 year
43. 18 months
44. Volunteer
45. Volunteer
46. See Annex Table
47. (4) M = billions
48. (5) m = millions

Tableau annexe :

1 La marine iranienne (avant la révolution)

2	Personnels	12	30 000 h dont 3 bataillons de Marines
3	Sous-marins		1
4	Destroyers	13	3 (avec missiles surface-air)
5	Frégates	14	4 (avec missiles surface-air/surface)
6	Corvettes		4
7	Patrouilleurs		20
8	Dragueurs de mines		5
9	Débarquement		2
10	Support logistique		2
11	Hovercrafts		14
15	1 escadron de 6 P-3F Orion		
16	1 escadron de 6 hélicoptères de lutte anti-sous-marine		
17	Hélicoptères divers		55
18	Etaient en commande	19	3 sous-marins de type Tang
		20	4 destroyers de type Spruance
		21	12 patrouilleurs rapides
		22	2 navires de débarquement

Key:

1. The Iranian Navy (before the revolution)
2. Personnel
3. Submarines
4. Destroyers
5. Frigates
6. Corvettes
7. Patrol Boats
8. Minesweepers
9. Landing Craft
10. Logistical Support Craft
11. Hovercraft
12. 30,000 men, including 3 battalions of marines
13. 3 (with surface-air missiles)
14. 4 (with surface-air and surface-surface missiles)
15. 1 squadron of 6 P-3F Orions.
16. 1 squadron of 6 anti-submarine-warfare helicopters.
17. Diverse helicopters
18. Equipment on order at the time...
19. 3 Tang class submarines
20. 4 Spruance class destroyers
21. 12 fast patrol boats
22. 2 landing ships

FOOTNOTES

1. Jacques Vernant has commented in these pages, in his column of March 1980, on the scope of this commitment comparing it with the contents of the message to Congress from President Eisenhower on 5 January 1957.

2. The ayatollah Bagher Sadr, spiritual leader of Iraqi Shi'ites, is supposed to have been arrested on 5 April 1980 and executed 4 days later (LE MONDE of 24 April). According to Amnesty International, more than 60 Shi'ites were executed between July 1979 and February 1980. Finally, the purge which followed the conspiracy brought to light in July 1979 in Baghdad affected several members of this community visibly.

3. Selim Turquie: "Anxieties of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates," in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, January 1980.

4. Thus, on 3 May 1980, Yasir Arafat reiterated in Kuwait his threat to blow up the oil wells in the Gulf should the United States attempt to intervene militarily in the region.

5. On 30 June 1980, the Iraqis elected a national assembly of 250 members to serve 4-year terms.

6. On 10 January 1980, Prince Fahd also announced that a proclamation of "the basic system of government" would be drawn up, which would take the place of a constitution.

7. It is generally considered that the "non-nationals," representing some 30 different nationalities, constitute more than 30 percent of the population of the Arabian peninsula.

8. Fires, whether criminal or not, are a regular occurrence, especially in Saudi Arabia. The oil province of Khuzistan, in Iran, because of the presence of Arabs, is even more exposed.

9. For a complete study see Alvin J. Cottrell and Frank Bray: "Military Forces in the Persian Gulf," THE WASHINGTON PAPERS, Vol VI, No 60, 1978, put out by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

10. Among the numerous works devoted to this study, we mention that of Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control," in the review FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol 54, October 1975.

11. See dispatch of J. M. Durand-Souffland for the newspaper LE MONDE of 21 May 1980.

12. Prince Abdallah, second vice-president of the council, is also the second prince in the line of succession, after Emir Fahd.

13. These bases, 5 in number, should be able to hold 50,000 soldiers, 70,000 auxiliaries, and 150 combat aircraft, thus permitting the army to move rapidly from one end of the territory to the other. The overall budget for these projects would be on the order of $20 billion.

14. Mr Yvon Bourges in mid-May 1980 visited these two countries which, already equipped with French light-armored vehicles (Bahrain) and AMX-30 tanks, are thinking about completing their armaments.

15. The Baas party in particular owes the success of its July 1968 coup to the army.

16. With a very small maritime side (924 km^2 of territorial waters), and 2 small naval bases at Bassorah and especially at Qum Qasr, Iraq basically concentrated its effort on the land and air forces in order to respond to more immediate concerns.

17. This accord, concluded in 1971, and strongly criticized by the Bahraini opposition, was abrogated in October 1973, before being renewed in March 1975. On this latter date there should have been in Bahrain 475 American military personnel using 20 hectares of land surface for their installations. These latter were mostly in support of a signal facility.

18. One of the articles stipulates: "in case of circumstances endangering the peace or constituting for one of the two parties a threat to the peace or a breach of peace, the two parties will immediately consult with a view to coordinating their position to eliminate the danger or restore peace."

19. Aryeh Yodfat: "The USSR and the Persian Gulf Area," in the review AUSTRALIAN GUT LOOK, Vol 33, No 3, April 1979.

20. In April 1979, a study put together at the request of Congress (John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark: "Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf: Use of U.S. Armed Force to Ensure Supplies") contemplating armed intervention to control the oil wells, made a great stir.

21. There has been mention of a possible purchase of airplanes. Otherwise, by the terms of an accord signed 24 April 1980, the Soviet Union guaranteed to Iran that it would be able to make use of 3 primary commercial routes into the USSR, in order to be able to deal with a possible blockade by the United States of Gulf ports.

25. [sic] Admiral H. Labrousse: "Oil and Tensions in the Gulf," in the review DEFENSE NATIONALE, August-September 1979.

26. Selim Turquie: "A New American Doctrine," in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, February 1980, and, among others, two articles appearing in the magazine NEWSWEEK of 4 February 1980: "Can We Defend the Gulf?" and "Line Around the Persian Gulf."

27. Serge de Klebnikoff offered an interesting recollection of DEA [expansion unknown] from this point of view: "New Strategies and Weapons: The Case of the Arab Countries in the Gulf," September 1979.

28. The absense of a political solution to the holding of the hostages in Tehran, and the consequent possibility which cannot be excluded of a significant American military intervention, are not, on the other hand, the kinds of things to calm Arab fears.

9516
CSO: 4800

MECCA GOVERNOR DISCUSSES FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 16 Jun 80 p 15

[Interview with Mecca Governor Prince Majid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz; by Ramzi Sufiya, in Mecca; date not given]

[Text] Prince Majid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, governor of Mecca, believes in the necessity of stimulating municipal councils to make them more effective and capable of coping with the daily problems of the citizens. In this interview with AL-SIYASAH, after he became governor of Mecca following a long period as minister of municipal and rural affairs, Prince Majid presents a number of new ideas and administrative programs which he sees as more conducive to doing a better job.

He still believes in the necessity of establishing an association of Saudi contractors to replace big foreign companies which inflate prices. Prince Majid also believes in the principle of administrative decentralization which facilitates flexible and quick action in conducting general affairs.

Summarizing his administrative policy, he describes it as an "open door" policy which eliminates routine barriers between citizens and officials. In the final analysis, he says, we have to go by God's words: "Do your work [well], for God and His prophet and the faithful will witness its results."

The following are excerpts from this comprehensive interview.

[Question] Your appointment as governor of Mecca is an indication of high royal trust in you. What are your first impressions since you assumed your new position?

[Answer] I assumed my position fully aware of its burdens and the nature of the very important phase which my country is going through. It is a phase of cultural development, reconstruction, and building of a modern state. This state adopts modern methods and concepts, but retains, at the same time, its immortal spiritual values, its deep-rooted heritage and the heritage and the principles of the true Islamic religion.

I ask God the Almighty to help me carry out my duties, be worthy of the trust of my king, and fulfill as much as possible the wishes of the citizens of this country. There are many problems and concerns. But I believe that faith, sincerity, seriousness and commitment can make miracles happen.

[Question] What is the ideal climate that you deem necessary for the achievement of your goals?

[Answer] The ideal climate is represented by two very important elements: Security and stability. During these glorious years, we are carrying out the biggest operation in development which the country has witnessed in its modern times. We are doing it through very ambitious 5-year-plans and intensive economic and social development programs and projects. This can only be accomplished under secure and stable conditions, where the Saudi citizen feels that his life, money, honor, present and future are always safe.

The economy can develop and flourish, and progress and prosperity can be achieved in such a climate. Based on this, I see a very strong connection between development programs and security.

Thank God, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a paradise of security, stability and prosperity, because it is protected by God's law--the law of love, peace, brotherhood, compassion, solidarity and mercy which are the best guarantees of security and stability.

[Question] What are your expectations in the realm of development in the coming phase?

[Answer] I will do my best to offer support and assistance to all authorities concerned to help them implement their development projects and programs. I will offer all the support and control they need to maintain their progress toward their developmental objectives.

The western region has received one of the largest shares of development projects and programs in the country. Several of these have already been implemented. It is now steadily moving toward accomplishing a cultural change operation, on the basis of studied scientific plans, in this suitable climate of security and stability. As I previously mentioned, I consider such a climate essential for any constructive and creative effort. Under it, the citizen can enjoy human dignity and total security for his money, honor and life.

[Question] Your success in all responsible positions you have held makes me wonder what method you use in decision-making?

[Answer] My decisions are based on developing a complete understanding of the matter or problem at hand, and all the circumstances surrounding it.

I live in the heart of society. I stay in touch with reality. I apply to a problem both my mind and my heart, and then I make a decision. This is why I always come up with a sound and correct decision based on an ideal solution for it.

I do not believe much in "memos," "reports" and "paper work." I believe in field work and in direct contact with the problems and matters that call for a decision.

The most useful decisions are those that are inspired by reality, not those made in isolation behind a desk in a closed office.

[Question] How do you evaluate the present system in Mecca, following the period you have so far spent as governor of Mecca?

[Answer] I think a lot of changes are necessary in the emirate's system.

[Question] In what ways?

[Answer] As you know, our country is open to pilgrims, to tens of thousands of people seeking work in development projects and programs, and to others who come for different purposes and who are involved in various businesses. You can imagine the situations that are created by the arrival of these huge numbers of people in the western region. In this human flow of people, each individual has his own morals, behavior, good and evil tendencies, ideas, ideologies and beliefs which have an impact on the country. This is why I mentioned the necessity of developing the emirate's system to face all these matters.

[Question] What are the most important ideas you have relative to the cultural program you are responsible for in the Mecca emirate?

[Answer] I have the honor of being responsible for the most sacred Islamic holy places and the Great Mosque. This, in itself, is enough to give me the enthusiasm and will to work.

You ask me about the ideas I have. I will do my best to serve this holy place which bears the mark of the Prophet's mission and has a very special place in our hearts.

However, if you are asking about development projects and programs, you probably know that these are mainly the responsibility of the various ministries. Each concerned ministry sets up its projects and programs in accordance with budget allotments for these projects. My duty is to provide the best conditions for these ministries to implement their projects in the best manner, and on time.

Thus, my role in relation to projects is not related to planning or implementation. It is support, assistance and cooperation which I will offer to all the ministries concerned.

My primary concern is my ties with the people, my human relations with them, and my seeing to it that they are comfortable and safe.

[Question] As governor of Mecca, what, in your opinion, are the dimensions of this responsibility?

[Answer] It is anticipated that the law of the provinces will define the role of the governor. When this law is complete and becomes effective, one of its main features will be to define the responsibilities of the governors.

However, there are certain natural and self-evident truths regarding the governors' functions. The most important of these are: To administer justice among the people; protect their lives, property, wealth and honor; and offer all possible assistance to ministries and government agencies to implement their development projects. I may as well point out some misconceptions about the governor's duties. The governor does not punish the guilty or put those who deviate from the right path in jail. He is the one who promotes the spirit of love, affection and unity among the people; brings them together through the strong ties and teachings of the true Islamic religion; makes them aware of good and evil, and of what is harmful and beneficial to them; learns about their conditions and worries; and tries to find solutions for their problems and ways to provide them with a comfortable life. At the same time, his function is to apply God's laws against those who do wrong, become corrupt or harm society.

The ultimate goal of a wise governor is to build a happy society, protect the rights of every citizen, provide people with all means of comfort and make services available to every citizen, as these services are a natural right which must be provided.

This is one side of a governor's function as I see it. As to the other side, it is related to projects that are important to the region. These projects, as I previously mentioned, are implemented by concerned ministries and government agencies. The governor's role is to assist and support them in implementing these projects, and bringing wealth and prosperity to the whole region.

[Question] How do you see the spiritual role of the Mecca Emirate from the standpoint of organizing the lives and relations of Muslims?

[Answer] The Mecca Emirate is carrying out its full duties toward the Muslims. It has, in this respect, a distinguished 1400-year history. It annually welcomes the pilgrims and provides Muslims from all over the world with this great annual meeting place where they discuss their mutual interests. In this respect, Mecca lives up to its full responsibility to serve Islam and the Muslims. We do not have to overburden it [with other responsibilities].

[Question] How about the Emirate's role in the overall development of the area?

[Answer] I have chosen for myself a very useful method to fulfill the public's needs. This is to follow up on government projects in the region without interfering with the prerogatives of the ministries or government agencies. Thus, I go beyond the traditional concept of the governor's function, which is to act on complaints of the people and provide them with security. In this century, a governor's role must go beyond such narrow and classical boundaries.

[Question] Are you thinking of expanding the role of municipal councils to cooperate with the Emirate in studying and meeting the area's requirements?

[Answer] From my experience as minister of municipal and rural affairs, I can say that these municipal councils are almost inactive. The people of the area, in general, do not wish to participate in these councils and consider this to be a waste of time, forgetting their legal duty to give their opinions and suggestions to help in the development and progress of their area.

People keep from attending to the public interest, because they are busy attending to their private interests. This negative phenomenon prevails even among young people who are dominated by a narrow individualistic outlook. For this reason, I think we should first attempt to first stimulate these municipal councils to carry out their current primary responsibilities. We would then think of broadening the scope of their responsibilities at a later stage.

[Question] What administrative method have you chosen to carry out the responsibilities of your position?

[Answer] I have chosen to hold periodic meetings with the Emirate's officials and open meetings with the chiefs of the Emirate's districts, to discuss all matters that are important to the area. I also visit various areas in the Emirate of Mecca to establish direct contact with the people and learn their needs and requirements.

[Question] Your wise call for the establishment of an association of Saudi contractors is still echoing in all circles. Is your enthusiasm for this call still the same?

[Answer] Yes, and I still call for this and say that scattered efforts are useless. I made this suggestion when I was minister of municipal and rural affairs, and I still advocate it in my new position. I call for the coming together of Saudi contractors to replace big foreign companies that charge high prices, carried away by the spirit of greed and exploitation, especially as the Saudi contractor has proved his ability and efficiency in all the projects assigned to him.

[Question] Which method do you prefer? Total centralization or decentralization?

[Answer] I will follow, without reservation, the decentralization method, delegating certain authorities to other officials, instead of centralizing all authorities in one person who would fall under heavy pressure, drown in a sea of routine work, and spend his time signing mountains of paper. This will be achieved by applying the principle of "the right man in the right place."

[Question] The reader would be very pleased to meet the "other side" of your personality--the personal side, particularly "Prince Majid, the father."

[Answer] I have seven children. The eldest is my daughter Masha'il who, God willing, will study medicine at the University of Edinborough in Scotland, specializing in heart surgery. I also have Mash'al, 'Aziz, Basmah, Jawahir and Sarah.

[Question] What method of upbringing do you follow in raising them?

[Answer] Being their friend before being their father, teaching them the true religion of Islam, giving them independent personalities, and deepening their spirit of belonging and loyalty to this great country.

9455
CSO: 4802

OPPOSITION LEADER TALKS ABOUT INTERNAL STABILITY, ARAB UNITY

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 27 Jul 80 p 15

[Interview with Ahmad Ben Salah by Hamidah Na'na'; date and place not given]

[Text] Ahmad Ben Salah's experience in Tunisia is considered to be one of the manifestations of the crisis that faces Third World countries which gain their political and administrative independence, but maintain ties with their former colonizers through their economic structures and their political, educational and cultural orientations.

In 1960, when Bourguiba summoned Ben Salah--who was then minister of health and a well-known labor leader who had come to government from the Tunisian General Union of Labor [UGTT]--to charge him with the task of building and restoring the structure of the Tunisian economy, it was not clear in Bourguiba's mind that Ben Salah would make decisions and undertake measures that would affect Bourguiba's closest allies in the government.

It was also not clear in Ben Salah's own mind that it was impossible to reform the economy without reforming the political power. He thought he would be able to change the infrastructure of Tunisian society and that this could lead to a change in the government system. By means of what may be called socialist capitalism, Ahmed Ben Salah tried to establish a system of "mutual cooperation" which resembles the system of cooperatives. The result of that system was that the interests of the middle class were hurt. A policy of austerity was proclaimed, which primarily hurt the working class and the farmers. Meanwhile, Tunisian capitalists maintained their life of ease and comfort because they were protected by western industrial organizations.

Ben Salah was not able to touch the interests of the major capitalists and feudalists who were directly protected by the palace and by Bourguiba himself. After his experiment was attacked, he discovered that it would be difficult to build socialism in a country whose orientations and ties on the foreign policy level continued to be with the imperialist camp.

The first crisis between him and Bourguiba developed in 1969, and it worsened early in 1970. Ahmed Ben Salah was arrested on 25 May 1970, and was stripped of his ministerial and party positions and duties. He was charged with high treason and sentenced to 10 years of hard labor. However, he was able to escape from jail in 1973 and has been in exile ever since.

Ever since 1973, Ahmed Ben Salah has been considered one of the prominent figures of the Tunisian opposition. He spoke to AL-SAFIR about conditions in Tunisia, about the prospects for change there, and about his experience in government.

[Question] We will begin with the existing situation in Tunisia: the open door policy, the cabinet of Mzali, and their results.

[Answer] The regime has conditioned us to look for a relationship between violence and malevolence. I believe that major malevolence is in store at this stage. It may at first appear that there was a retreat from injustices and inequities, but the regime does not in fact intend to make any radical changes in its policy. The people who were there in the past are the same people who are [in power] now: they have not changed, including the prime minister. Very few people who work with Bourguiba have their own personal influence or political power. This is because Bourguiba is everything, and everything goes back to him.

For the last 10 years, Tunisia has been experiencing instability, unrest and trials. There have been more than 100 trials, and there have been many explosive situations. The 26 January 1978 [incidents] and the recent events in Gafsa are examples of these. It is true that there was a difference between the two eruptions: the 26 January eruption was carried out by labor elements and revealed the violent nature of the regime. Gafsa involved a group of young people who despaired of any change and rebelled against the regime. But what is new in the matter this time is the fact that non-Tunisians did intervene. I believe that Tunisian police departments had knowledge of these interventions and used them to settle domestic accounts. One of the most important results of Gafsa on the domestic scene was the disappearance of Hedi Nouira and Mohamed Sayah and the advent of new people to power.

Tunisia's crisis may be summarized in the fact that the regime, like its president, is suffering from old age. It is now experiencing political crises, since it is no longer possible to concentrate all powers in the hands of the group's leader and allow the rest [of the group] little room for action.

The Adulterated Unity

[Question] The opposition in Tunisia and abroad is living in a stage of partisanship and fragmentation. Are there programs for national unity? Have you thought about this? Is there any reality for this opposition after what happened in Gafsa?

[Answer] I do not believe that there is a serious Tunisian opposition that wants to do away with the regime. There are oppositions that dream of changing the regime, but this is a dream shared by all factions of the opposition. We did try in the past to propose a five-point national unity program. However, of 16 persons who participated with us in the discussion, we discovered that 11 were working for Tunisian intelligence. The result was that most of our fighters in Tunisia were arrested. I was sentenced to prison for 8 years, and some factions of the opposition accused us in their newspapers of dealing with the regime.

Internal unity is not in demand now. The Arabs are afflicted with the disease of unity, even if it were adulterated. With regard to the Tunisian opposition, let me say that now there are people who are professional members of the opposition inside the country and abroad. Members of the opposition cherish that position just as a minister cherishes his ministry.

[Question] There are two principal forces now on the Tunisian scene.

1. The labor movement.

2. The religious tide.

It is now known that there are communications between the regime and the labor movement. What is the nature of these communications and where could they possibly lead?

The religious tide, however, rejects all factions of the opposition, including yourself.

[Answer] Yes, for months there have been communications between the regime and the labor movement. This is an attempt by the regime to gain time. But I do not believe that the labor movement which sacrificed its people on 26 January can accept a change in its programs and in its radical position vis-a-vis the regime and its nature.

With regard to the religious tide, it is one of the factions of the opposition. If the religious movement is rejecting us all, it is welcome to make the changes by itself, and we will wait for its experiment.

The religious tide which has become active in Tunisia and in most of the Islamic countries is only the result of the disappointments that followed independence in the Arab world. People discovered that independence was no more than a superficial, administrative independence, while the substance of the culture in those countries remained colonialist. Therefore, a strict adherence to the Islamic faith and to Islamic morals was a response to the alienation that the regimes forced upon their peoples. What is unfortunate, however, is the fact that Arab reactionaries are now using these tides in their own interests to eliminate other inclinations such as Arabism and socialism.

[Question] The wife of Bourguiba, Mrs Wasilah, did contact you in Paris. What did she want? Did she suggest that you return to Tunisia?

[Answer] She did contact me 2 years ago, but there has been no contact since then. Mrs Wasilah contacted one of our colleagues and asked him if she could meet me. My response was that that was impossible for security reasons. My life is still being threatened, and it is known that there was an attempt to assassinate me in Switzerland. This attempt was made by one of the well-known figures in the regime: Bashir Rizq al-'Uyun.

[Question] What is left of the experiment you made in Tunisia? What are the reasons for its failure, and how was the regime able to do away with it so quickly without encountering any opposition?

[Answer] Much remains. If we were to try to account for things, we would find that most of the production power in Tunisia after my departure had been financed in the sixties. We tried to establish foundations that would not yield their results within a short period of time. Therefore, we imposed a belt-tightening policy, and [those who succeeded us in government] benefited afterwards from our policy. It is necessary to call to mind the fact that the socialist experiment at that time had encountered major difficulties and required many sacrifices. Tunisia was weak then, and it was coming out of a crisis. The extension of loans was forbidden; there was no oil nor were there petro-dollars. Nevertheless, we were able to a large extent to liberate the economy of Tunisia from tutelage and from ties with the West, but we were vigorously contested.

Chief among those who fought us was Bourguiba. He feared the creation in Tunisia of new conditions and powers that would be the result of the change in the economic structures, and he feared losing the power to make decisions. The regime is concentrated on the authority of one person, and it is extreme in its concentration.

One of the most important results of the experiment of the sixties may be the fact that people began to look at Bourguiba in a different way, and he began to sense the danger of that. He sensed that people had begun to assemble, to make decisions, to discuss [matters] and to dismantle the regional government upon which he builds his regime. People even went so far as to threaten strikes against personal and foreign interests. Bourguiba became very fearful, and he dealt a blow to the experiment. His objective was not to deal a blow to the policy of mutual cooperation specifically as much as it was to save his own individual power.

[Question] Nevertheless, it took him 24 hours to succeed in doing away with the experiment without encountering any resistance!

[Answer] This is not true. The foundations we tried to establish in Tunisia are still there in one form or another. The mutual cooperation systems constitute a power inside the country that is not to be ignored. The successive explosions that have been taking place since the early seventies are but an indication of the state of dissatisfaction that is prevalent among the Tunisian people.

[Question] You are being accused of giving the regime at a certain stage a progressive identity and of prolonging its life.

[Answer] I did not give the regime this identity, and I did not prolong its life. What I did was for the Tunisian people, and my actions remain as a reaction to the injustices and the attempts to liquidate me. I did believe that by changing the economic, cultural and educational structures we would have been able to change the power that was not in our hands.

[Question] You had seven ministries under you!

[Answer] But we did not have power; it was Bourguiba who had power. Nevertheless, when I came to the government, I was convinced that there was no other way for bringing about change.

Tunisia and the Arabs

[Question] The Tunisian regime has been isolated by the Arabs as a result of the pan-Arab positions it had taken and as a result of its relations with the West. But now this isolation has culminated in the presence of the Arab League in Tunisia, and the new government is making claims about pan-Arab inclinations. Do you believe that the regime has really changed its direction?

[Answer] What changed? The Arabs acknowledged that the Tunisian regime had not turned its back to the question of Palestine or to the Arabs. I think that by taking that position it is the Arabs that did turn their backs to the question of Palestine following Camp David, whereas the Tunisian regime turned its back to the question of Palestine before Camp David. Naturally, the Arab position is more serious, but it is better for us to stay quiet.

Let me say this about the previous period: the battle between us and the regime because of the positions it took on pan-Arab questions have never ceased. I was the only one who went to 'Abd-al-Nasir after the well-known crisis, and I was convinced that Tunisia could not survive apart from the Arab world. Bourguiba visited Egypt in 1965 after my mediation. I believed that there was some similarity between the experiment that we were conducting in Tunisia and 'Abd-al-Nasir's experiment. This was always the subject of the conversation between us. I believed that for the two experiments to succeed, a geopolitical solidarity was essential, and regardless of the difficulties that would face this solidarity, we would have to confront them because unity consists of battles that must be waged.

Tunisia is one of the countries whose people are most sensitive to Arab solidarity. We are Arabs and we are affiliated with the Arab nation.

This is a deep feeling amidst the people of Tunisia.

However, it was the government that stood in the way of establishing this solidarity. Bourguiba believed that the correct way for the advancement of Tunisia was what (Shaban Dalmas) or (Edgar Fur) had been thinking about. Hedi Nouira became the victim of that. Bourguiba is the product of the Arab nation's inability to confront the enemy.

[Question] Is this his own inability?

[Answer] And it is also the nation's inability. Had this not been the case, how else can we explain the existence of al-Sadat?

The Old Age of the Regime

[Question] Do you still believe in the possibility of change within the regime? What prospects for change do you see? Who are the principal powers that can contribute to it?

[Answer] No. After 25 years of independence we may say that the political regime which had forced itself on Tunisia has now reached the stage of old age and is today running the risk of a political crisis. It has become evident that its isolation is increasing daily, and the prospects for radical opposition to the regime are becoming clearer. The characteristics of the popular forces are clear despite the layers of fog that surround them as a result of the regime's oppression and the various games it plays. There are labor movement forces and young people's forces that are vital, steadfast and movement oriented even though they are members of cells that are far apart from each other.

With regard to our faith and our struggle, we in the popular unity movement are affiliated with these forces and with the future they hold. There is a group of democrats which is advocating reform and which is being courted by the regime that did approach it after deciding to restore it to the fold. We do not know what the reckoning will be that will make this group play another role in the regime's escape to a state of numbness and manipulation; nor do we know what the reckoning will be that will make it withstand illusions.

It is known that there are various groups and movements, that these groups and movements are scattered, and that they comprise various affiliations of communists who are "determined to defend the national territory" against the neighbors, and especially of those who like China and who work in every direction. We hope that these groups will go back to their Tunisian origins and to their African, Arab, Moroccan origins so that they can combine their powers and become constructive.

The Army: a Disaster!

[Question] The army took action twice: once on 28 December 1978 to subdue the labor movement and once in Gafsa. Will it take action a third and a final time? Don't you believe that Tunisia after Bourguiba is in danger of a military coup?

[Answer] I don't know anything and I don't want to know anything about the army. You talk about the army. This is the disaster of the Third World. I will fight so that the army would not come to power.

[Question] What will be your position if you were to be surprised by a military coup?

[Answer] My position will be in accordance with the direction such a military coup might take. We do not take positions before the fact. I do not think it likely that Tunisia will be surprised by a military coup unless the forces that protect it decide upon a military coup.

[Question] What is your relationship to international socialism? Is the Popular Unity Movement a member of international socialism?

[Answer] The People's Unity Movement is not a member of international socialism. We had asked for observer status so we could have a platform from which we could express our opinion without being subjected to persecution. However, I have had personal ties with a number of the leaders of this movement ever since I was in government and even before then when I was a fighter in the ranks of the labor movement. We succeeded to a large extent in influencing some of them to change their positions on the Palestinian question.

[Question] Was that done through the proposal that Kreisky and Brandt were making for a western solution to the Palestinian question?

[Answer] This was their proposal, but we have our own position. We are the ones who are talking about a solution that would be acceptable to the Palestinians--that is, if the Palestinians are interested in their cause. We cannot ask Kreisky or Brandt to assume positions that are more radical than the position of some Arabs.

8592
CSO: 4402

UN DELEGATION HEAD'S RESERVATIONS ABOUT MEXICAN PROPOSAL

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Sep 80 p 7

[Article signed S.M.: "Mr Mahmoud Mestiri's Declaration to LA PRESSE: 'Tunisia is Expressing Reservations About Mexican Proposal'"]

[Text] New York: Mr Mahmoud Mestiri, head of the minister of foreign affairs' staff, and head of the Tunisian delegation to the UN special session on economic problems, is probably best qualified to evaluate the work now in progress in Manhattan's "Glass Palace." A former chairman of the Group of the 77, Mr Mestiri has, in fact, acquired a well-established reputation at the United Nations as "an exceptional diplomat, well-briefed on the matters under discussion and, above all, an authority on all problems concerning the North-South dialogue. So Mr Juliani, spokesman for Dr Waldheim.

This is why we have asked him to give us a "general synthesis" of the session, of the problems it must face, and of the prospects it opens...

"Two major themes dominate the debates," Mr Mestiri told us, "on the one hand, the strategy of development for the decade beginning in 1981 and, on the other hand, global negotiations, first to solve the most urgent problems and, second, to give a new impetus, on new bases, to the restructuration of the world's economy so as to achieve the new international economic order advocated by the United Nations."

"This new order is all the more urgent as, at present, there no longer is any order to be safeguarded... What we have is disorder! A new order is, therefore, necessary and it can only be the order decided by the United Nations, by all countries in the world, developed and under development."

"Strategy and global negotiations are two useful steps toward a restructuration of the world's economy. This restructuration, this new order cannot take place in one day or in a short time, through a revolution, but they will result from a series of reforms spread over 10, even 20 years."

No Progress In Strategy

Can we expect concrete and positive results from this session?

"Yes, it could achieve that," Mr Mahmoud Mestiri answered. "At present, the prospects are not encouraging, but the present session might well reach an agreement on global negotiations, procedures, and the question of the central organization to coordinate and supervise development actions, in particular those of organizations which are not under UN control, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the GATT."

"However, I must be frank: while it has been possible to achieve progress with respect to global negotiations, no new development has taken place with respect to strategy. The present strategy is exactly the same as the previous two strategies... although a revolution in international economic thinking has taken place in the interval."

During this session, Tunisia has offered to aid countries which are on the verge of "taking off," while the vast majority of member countries are urgently calling for an aid to the poorest countries... Is our position realistic?

"We all believe that the poorest countries should receive particular attention," Mr Mestiri stated, "but there are also countries which--like Tunisia--have reached different stages of development, here they are called 'medium-income countries,' with 1,000 or more dinars of national gross product per inhabitant per year. Should we then give all our assistance and mobilize all our resources to aid the poorest countries? We believe that countries which have made efforts and are about to take off should not be penalized."

Aid for All, Priority to the Poorest

"In this respect, we must stress that the aid given to medium-income countries cannot hurt the poorest countries. On the contrary, it reflects the line adopted by the Group of the 77, namely: "Aid for all, priority to the poorest."

Does Tunisia support the Mexican proposal concerning a limited North-South summit meeting to break the present impasse?

"We have reservations concerning the principle of such a meeting," Mr Mestiri answered. "Each country, within the limits of its sovereignty, is free to organize meetings... some countries, such as Jamaica, have had the 'practical' idea of bringing their friends together to discuss certain problems informally. This is not a bad idea, on the contrary. It is a positive fact that each Third World country may take steps on its own to work toward the new international economic order."

"I am afraid that the Mexican proposal may be more ambitious and may clearly infringe on the role of the Group of the 77. What is at stake there, is the organization of a summit which would place itself above the United Nations and the Group of the 77 and would purport to make decisions on the line of the report of the Brandt commission."

The Brandt Report Contains Nothing New

"Besides, this commission is not representative of anybody and is not accepted by anybody, since each group of countries has subscribed only to that part of the report which suits its own interest. The Brandt commission report, this must be said, only summarizes all too well known ideas and does not contain anything new."

"This does not diminish in any way the part played by ex-Chancellor Brandt who is a man of good will and may still play an important part in North-South relations, as he did in East-West relations."

"Therefore, what is going to take place in Mexico will engage only those who will be there, certainly not the United Nations or the Group of the 77."

9294
CSO:4400

ACTIVITIES OF JOINT FRENCH-TUNISIAN COMMISSION

Tunisian Labor in France

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 3 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Jean Francois-Poncet, French minister of foreign affairs, will arrive today in Tunis to preside over his country's delegation during the proceedings of the eighth session of the General Joint French-Tunisian Commission. The Tunisian delegation will, in turn, be headed by Hassan Belkhojz, minister of foreign affairs. The meeting of this commission assumes greater importance since Tunisia is getting ready to begin the work of preparing the Sixth Plan and since it therefore needs to know in advance the financial, technical and other arragements made by its French partner, as well as the guarantees or insurance which it is in a position to furnish with regard to the Tunisian labor which is now located within France.

The level of commercial and technical cooperation between our two nations is certainly satisfactory. Nevertheless, Tunisia expects, as has been pointed out by Mohammed Mzali, its prime minister, much more from France and, above all, a much larger contribution on its part to the realization of the great industrial and agricultural projects in Tunisia which can provide employment for several thousands of individuals. In view of its political stability, its geographical location and even the goal that it has set for its social and economic development, Tunisia has indeed the right to demand that our relationships with France should be raised to a much higher level.

Now, whether we are talking about relationships between Tunisia and France or between Tunisia and Italy, these relationships between countries on opposite sides of the Mediterranean Sea can only be developed in a framework of peace and stability. This assumes and requires the existence and maintenance of political cooperation between our two countries which shall be as broad as possible. At the time that the world is practically divided into two blocs and that the most "liberal" nations resort to protective measures to safeguard their economies, Tunisia and France, which believe in the same values and share the same concerns with regard to peace and security, therefore must understand each other better in order to cooperate better.

Joint Communique

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] The General Ministerial Joint Commission, established by a joint declaration published on 30 June 1972, held its eighth session in Tunis on 3 and 4 September 1980.

The Tunisian delegation was led by Hassan Belkhoja, minister of foreign affairs. The French delegation was headed by Jean Francois-Poncet, minister of foreign affairs.

Jean Francois-Poncet was seen by His Excellency Habib Bourguiba, president of the Tunisian Republic as well as by Mohammed Mzali, the prime minister.

The work of the General Commission was conducted in an atmosphere of complete cordiality, due to the ties of mutual friendship, confidence and understanding which unite the two nations. This work illustrated the mutual desire to improve a state of cooperation which has a long history and had already achieved great success. This attitude was inspired by the historical visits of President Bourguiba to France and of President Giscard d'Estaing to Tunisia.

Both ministers were pleased to observe that both governments, at all levels, were maintaining close contact which permitted the mutual exchange of information and continuous cooperation with regard to all matters of common interest.

They proceeded to conduct a broad survey of problems dealing with international policy. They confirmed the affinity of both countries to the cause of peace and security with respect to independence of nations and their territorial integrity.

Both ministers examined the situation in the Near East and expressed their serious concern regarding the worsening situation in this region. They recognized that the solution to the Palestinian question plays a dominant role with regard to the establishment of a just and lasting peace. They emphasized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in accordance with a comprehensive settlement providing for security in the region with the participation of all the parties concerned, which implies participation of the PLO as well.

Furthermore, they reaffirmed the necessity for having Israel evacuate all of the occupied Arab territories, including the holy city of Jerusalem. In addition, they rejected the recent illegal decision to unilaterally change the status of the city.

Then, referring to the declaration issued by the heads of state and the governing body of the European Economic Community in Venice on 13 June 1980,

the Tunisian representative stated that, although this declaration did not satisfy all of the aspirations of the Palestinian people, it constituted a positive contribution to the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. With regard to this point, the Tunisian representative expressed the desire to see Europe play a constructive role in the search for peace in this area.

Both ministers brought up the situation in central Asia. With regard to Afghanistan, they observed that the events in this country imperilled detente and stuck a blow at international law. They expressed a desire that the appropriate resolutions of the United Nations be observed.

The two ministers also dealt with the situation in Africa, expressing the concern of Tunisia and France with regard to the risk of increasing tension which endangers the security of the African Continent and which constitutes a great obstacle to its efforts towards development.

Both delegations condemned the policy and practice of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa and reaffirmed the need for making every effort to have Namibia proceed rapidly, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations, to full and complete independence.

Both ministers believe it indispensable that the African Continent be maintained free of outside interference so that security and peace, the responsibility for which depends on the Africans themselves, be safeguarded and that they may work in peace towards its development.

Both parties emphasized the importance which they attached to a renewal of the European-Arabic dialog in all of its aspects including that of policy. They agreed to step up their consultations with a view to taking the initiative towards such a renewal of dialog.

Particular attention was paid to examination of the Mediterranean situation and the necessity for developing political and economic collaboration and cooperation between these Mediterranean neighbors. Both ministers repeated their conviction that European security and cooperation cannot be separated from those of the Mediterranean. In preparation for the next meeting of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), they agreed to act in unison so that the non-European Mediterranean nations might play the role incumbent on them during this meeting.

The relationships between Tunisia and the European Economic Community were thoroughly examined. The modes of application of the cooperation agreement between Tunisia and the European Economic Community signed on 25 April 1976 as well as the prospects for broadening the Community received special attention.

Both ministers agreed that it was time for the French Government to take effective action to permit agricultural and industrial Tunisian products to be sold in greater quantities on the Common Market. They desired that a

great deal of attention be paid to the security of employment and residence of Tunisian workers in the countries of the European Economic Community.

The Tunisian delegation expressed the desire that an agreement should be reached between Tunisia and the European Economic Community during the negotiations for expansion of relationships. The French delegation expressed its understanding for the Tunisian concerns and that it would refer the Tunisian suggestions to its partners in the Common Market and the Communities Commission, insisting on the need to take into account the interests of Tunisia.

The French delegation indicated that the first documents dealing with the consequences of expansion of relationships with the Mediterranean nations had been submitted by the Committee of the Communities Council. It believed that these documents constitute the first stage in taking into consideration Tunisian concerns and is part of the desire to pursue and expand on the thoughts expressed.

The Tunisian delegation expressed its interest in the French proposal for trilateral cooperation among the Arab, European and African nations and called on the parties concerned to intensify collaboration in this regard.

The French delegation expressed its satisfaction for this support and reaffirmed its backing of the implementation of the trilateral cooperative agreement recommended by President Bourguiba since 1973.

Both delegations examined all aspects of Franco-Tunisian economic and financial relationships and expressed their desires to expand the scale of cooperation between them.

In the first place, a thorough analysis has been made of the commercial exchange situation. For this purpose, both delegations studied the various means of arriving at a reduction of the unbalance of exchange rates which are disadvantageous to Tunisia and to encourage joint initiatives and actions that would permit the promotion of Tunisian exports to France.

Both ministers also agreed that economic relations between Tunisia and France should be slanted towards cooperation in the area of production. For this purpose, it was decided to encourage a policy of industrial cooperation. With this in mind, the French delegation declared that it was ready to encourage the installation in Tunisia of industrial plants simultaneously with a real transfer of technology.

While emphasizing that the new Franco-Tunisian cooperation effort should be furnished with an adequate means for permitting a quick start, the Tunisian delegation brought up the idea of creating an investment bank with which French banks would be associated. The French delegation agreed to the objectives sought by the establishment of such an organization and made known its desire to activate the study that had already been initiated.

Both delegations decided to establish a cooperative effort in the field of energy. This effort will deal particularly with economic measures as well as activities concerned with research for new types of energy.

Both ministers registered satisfaction with the promise that negotiations dealing with French governmental assistance will take place very soon in Tunis.

Both delegations pointed out that cultural, scientific and technical cooperation continues its upswing. They reaffirmed their advocacy of Arab education in French secondary schools to which the Tunisian Government would contribute its share.

Furthermore, they emphasized the interest that they had in strengthening of technical cooperation and concentrating it in the most important areas of the Tunisian development plan in order to favor the transfer of technology.

A thorough study was made of Tunisian-French social and consular relations, particularly in regard to matters dealing with labor, professional training, social security and movement of individuals.

The French delegation emphasized the importance that it attached to the problem of transferring funds that the French nations would want to send home from Tunisia and its desire that a solution to this problem be found. The Tunisian delegation made note of this point.

In order to allay the concerns expressed by the Tunisian delegation on matters dealing with the Tunisian community in France, assurance was furnished by the French delegation that the situation of Tunisian nationals would be jointly examined in an atmosphere of close ties and mutual trust between the two countries.

Joint Commission Meeting

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] The General Tunisian-French Joint Commission began its work at its eighth session last night at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the joint chairmanship of Hassan Belkhoja and Jean Francois-Poncet.

In addition to the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries, the delegations included the following members: Tunisia was represented by Hedi Mabrouk, Tunisian ambassador to France, Ahmed Ben Arfa, ambassador and director of the International Cooperation Agency, Moncef Ounayes, Office Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Noureddine Meidoub, Director of Political Affairs for Europe and America as well as representatives of the Ministries of Planning, National Economy, Agriculture, Social Affairs and the Tunisian Central Bank. France was represented by Pierre Hunt, French ambassador to Tunisia, Serge Devaix, Director of the North African-Middle

East Division, Eric Desmaret, Technical Advisor to the Office of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as representatives of various offices in this department, in particular Treasury and Industry.

Established by the joint Tunisian-French declaration of 30 June 1972, which crowned the official visit of President Bourguiba to France, the General Joint Commission meets every year, alternately in Tunis and in Paris, for the purpose of examining the various phases of the cooperative effort between the two countries and the methods of intensifying this effort.

Opening the meeting, Hassan Belkhoja first welcomed his French counterpart, assuring him of Tunisia's ardent desire "to impart new vision to our cooperation and our friendship which is ceaseless oriented into the future."

After having brought attention to the fact that the greatest portion of Tunisia's foreign trade is carried on with the member nations of the European Common Market, the Minister underscored "the uncomfortable position, to put is mildly, in which Tunisia has been placed due to the protectionist measures taken by the European Economic Community." In this context, Hassan Belkhoja launched an urgent appeal so that France might act to achieve a reexamination of these measures which contradict the terms of the cooperation agreement of 1976 between Tunisia and the European Economic Community and also contradict the concept of cooperation. He expressed the desire to have France take into consideration the interests of its close friends to whom it is linked by history and geography and to employ all of its influence to have the European Economic Community reconsider its protectionist policy with respect to Tunisia, to open its markets to Tunisian agriculture and industrial products and, together with its Tunisian partner, to exert itself to find adequate solutions to the problems of the emigrant workers.

In order to assure true economic promotion of Tunisia, this new multilateral policy should, in our opinion, be accompanied by a new spirit in our bilateral relations. In fact, we wish that our economic relations with France may develop into cooperation with respect to production. We desire that Tunisians and Frenchmen may henceforth participate in joint investments and take joint economic risks. We would like industrial cooperation to lead our two nations to the realization of great industrial projects of a type that will create the maximum number of jobs, to distribute products in French and foreign markets and to conduct a real transfer of technology. These sentiments were presented by Hassan Belkhoja who expressed the hope that, in order to assure the financing of such projects, the Tunisian proposal dealing with the creation of a Franco-Tunisian investment bank will be realized very soon.

Hassan Belkhoja indicated that, in this crisis-ridden world where sources of tension and conflicts abound, the French trilateral project recommended by President Giscard d'Estaing and the Tunisian idea of "development contract" proposed by President Bourguiba may succeed in eliminating an untenable situation.

Furthermore, the minister directed attention to the fact that the awareness that is presently occurring in Europe with respect to its worldwide role in the principal international affairs constitutes a new factor which we encourage enthusiastically.

Our desire, he said, is that Europe should take the initiative with respect to ideas and actions so as to create a stir and to deliver its message. The importance of the role that it will play will then be determining and will be able to return confidence to the Third World and dissuade it from being won over by ideologies which are foreign to it.

France and Tunisia are therefore called on today, more than ever before, to collaborate and to attune their actions so as to favor Tunisian-French cooperation in the interest of the nation itself and of world security, said Mr. Belkhoja in conclusion.

In respone to the statements made by Hassan Belkhoja, Jean Francois-Poncet noted that "Franco-Tunisian relations are those that permit reciprocal confidence. They are founded on deep friendship which binds together not only the leaders and their staffs but also unites the two peoples." He expressed the conviction that the work of the General Joint Commission will bring about a new manifestation of this friendship, emphasizing the concern for permanent collaboration which impels both governments.

After expressing great satisfaction with the intensity of Franco-Tunisian relations, Jean Francois-Poncet called attention to the fact that the reason for the existence of the Franco-Tunisian General Joint Commission is precisely this desire for permanent collaboration.

The chief of the French Diplomatic Corps considered it necessary that, by means of this General Joint Commission, it would be possible each year to take a complete inventory of this cooperative effort, pointing out that the agenda and the rate at which work is performed by the Commission reflects the evolution of relations between nations.

With regard to economic and financial questions, both delegations will have to prepare an inventory of our joint efforts, to identify carefully and precisely the difficulties encountered and to think about the future, added Jean Francois-Poncet.

"It is not without precedent that France has pleaded in favor of the interests of Tunisia before the European Economic Community. France has always done so and I will say that it does so even more now that the problem of expanding to other Mediterranean countries has been posed.

"We are familiar with the problems that such expansion can create for other Mediterranean economies. We have made it understood to candidates for expansion that these problems should be studied and dealt with together with the interested parties, beginning with Tunisia, before the final decisions concerning such expansion are made," said the Chief of the French Diplomatic Corps in essence.

"Rest assured that we will practice this policy of faithfulness with regard to Tunisia," continued Jean Francois-Poncet who recognized that one of the duties of industrialized nations is to furnish access to their markets for the products of nations which are developing their industries.

It is nevertheless believed that these nations should understand the social and economic characteristics that this policy may require and therefore accept the fact that certain stages and a certain amount of adaptation over a period of time be provided for such guidance.

The chief of the French Diplomatic Corps referred to the proposals made in June 1980 by Tunisia aimed at imparting new dimensions to the already very old and very close economic cooperation existing between the two nations both at governmental and business levels. He pointed out that these proposals furnish the basis for a very careful examination on the part of French government agencies working jointly with interested business circles. He furnished assurance that this examination is proceeding in a most constructive vein.

Mr Francois-Poncet expressed his belief that cultural and technical cooperation was an important and essential matter. He was delighted to observe that this type of cooperation was being actively pursued and was being further developed. Moreover, he announced that the Joint Cooperation Commission would meet next 29 September in Tunis to conduct an exhaustive examination of this phase of bilateral relations.

"Our concern in this area is to maintain cooperation at a very high level, to constantly match our actions to the priorities of the economic and social development of Tunisia and to take care that such cooperation does not interfere in any manner with the takeover by Tunisian staffs," he added.

With respect to social and consular matters, Mr Francois-Poncet noted that the General Commission should consider all problems met by the nationals of both nations and therefore should deal with the important subject of the situation facing the Tunisian workers in France.

In conclusion, Mr Francois-Poncet assured the Tunisian delegation that it would find that its French counterpart was extremely openminded, was anxious to be understanding and exhibit an attitude of esteem and friendship as borne out by this meeting. Finally, he declared that he felt persuaded that these contacts with the highest level Tunisian officials would permit the imparting of additional vigor the the already exceptionally active relations between France and Tunisia.

7619
CSO: 4400

SIXTY SIX THOUSAND JOBS TO BE CREATED EACH YEAR OF NEXT DECADE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Article: "Mr Mezri Chekir brings to a Close the Regional Students' Conference in Nabeul"]

[Text] Friday evening in Nabeul, Mr Mezri Chekir, head of the prime minister's staff, brought to a close the regional students' conference in the presence of the governor and of the general secretaries of the Coordination Committee and of the National Union of Youth Organizations.

During this conference, delegates discussed matters related to student life and to the state of the country in general.

Answering questions raised by the delegates, Mr Mezri Chekir stressed the importance of contacts and dialogue with the youth because, he said, youth is the leading force in the country.

He then praised the maturity, realism and moderation of the students of Nabeul. These qualities, he stated, to which the Supreme Soldier always appealed, represent decisive factors in the stability of the regime and the achievement of greater solidarity between Tunisians.

Mr Chekir also pointed out that democracy should be understood as a means of reassuring citizens as to their future, of creating conditions enabling them to live in dignity, and of giving them an opportunity to express their opinions freely. He added that all political streams could coexist within the Party, provided that they always take the general interest of the country into consideration. Mr Mezri Chekir also indicated that, in Tunisia, the press is free as long as information is managed according to principles of good faith and a sincere and constructive criticism.

Mr Mezri Chekir pointed out that the Party is open to the new ideas brought by competent youths desirous to take a part in political life.

Touching on the economy, Mr Chekir stressed that development during the next decade will require large credits which will be used to create 66 thousand jobs each year. He added that the success of the Sixth Plan depends on the social and political stability of the country and on the joint efforts of all Tunisians. Such political stability, he noted, is our best argument in

dealing with those who wish to help us in the financing of many socio-economical projects. Concerning agriculture, Mr Chekir stated that development in this sector will be a major option in the next Plan, and he announced that several measures will be taken to promote agriculture, especially with regard to the property structure of certain tracts of land, the granting of credits, the marketing of production, and an increase in agricultural product prices.

With respect to the administrative reform, Mr Mezri Chekir recalled that the government has already started implementing its policy of administrative decentralization and procedure simplification, so that the mission of the central administration will soon consist mainly in planning, programming and controlling.

Concerning Tunisia's foreign policy, Mr Mezri Chekir stressed the importance of cooperation between Maghrebian countries, and his political will to create a unified Arab Maghreb.

In concluding, Mr Mezri Chekir promised the students of the Gabes Higher School of Engineering that he would study the problems they are facing, and he stressed the necessity for them to study under good conditions, in view of the essential part they will play in the country's social and economic development.

9294
CSO:4400

MINISTER OF EDUCATION DISCUSSES VARIOUS ISSUES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French, 10 Sep 80 p 5

[Article: "Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia to the Students of Jendouba: 'Universities Will Be Located in All Areas Fulfilling Conditions'"]

[Text] Monday in Ain Draham, Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, chaired a meeting of the regional students' conference of the Jendouba governorate; also present were Messrs Abderrazak Kefi and Mohamed Hedi Ben Farhat, respectively governor and general secretary of the Coordination Committee of the area.

During the discussion which took place on this occasion, students raised several questions concerning higher education, the policy of decentralization as well as the programs, the attribution of scholarships, university selection and guidance, cultural animation and the representation of students in unions. Other questions concerning the development of industry and tourism, the balance between regions, the price and wage policy, employment, rural development and economic cooperation with Arab countries, were also discussed.

Answering these questions, Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia first stated, concerning university selection and guidance, that there are definite criteria which must be complied with--use of computers for the selection and guidance of students is not questioned--indicating that the data supplied to the computer are prepared at three different centers.

In this connection, the minister stated that every student, after one year of study in the field assigned to him the first time, may take part in the competitive examination for admission to the field of his choice, which takes place every year in May.

He also warned students against false rumors alleging that a selective policy is being applied.

Concerning the decentralization of higher education, Mr Ben Dhia stated that the government is contemplating the creation of universities in all regions, provided that the conditions for such a creation are met.

The minister went on to talk about the attribution of university scholarships; he pointed out that all applications submitted had been examined by the departments concerned within the prescribed time.

He also indicated that the amounts of these scholarships are sufficient to cover the needs of the beneficiary, taking into account the fact that room and board do not exceed 12 dinars and that the student receives 10 monthly payments in addition to the additional subsidy intended for the purchase of university supplies, the amount of which varies between 30 and 50 dinars.

As for students who have to stay down, the minister stated that Tunisia is one of the few countries where those among such students who have a grade average higher than 8 out of 20 are granted 80 percent of the scholarship amount.

Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia then talked about the UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students]: he first recalled the decision made in this respect, inviting the students to form a representative committee, and he pointed out that the prime minister himself had announced this decision which is intended to guarantee free and democratic elections.

Answering other questions concerning development, the minister stated that the reduction of the imbalance between regions is a political decision made by the government as well as one of the main objectives of the Sixth Plan. Besides, the decision of the Supreme Soldier to convene an extraordinary congress of the Party is consistent with the desire of the regime to fulfill all conditions necessary to achieve success in this direction.

As for economic cooperation with brother and friendly countries, the minister remarked that Tunisia has consistently worked toward the opening of new horizons in the field of economic cooperation. For this purpose, it has always called for the adoption of a common Arab economic strategy, for the development of inter-Arab exchanges and the creation of an Arab Common Market.

At the end of his speech, Mr Ben Dhia urged the students to take a more effective part in the animation of cultural life in the area.

Prior to that, answering questions on regional matters, the governor had suggested that a special fund be set up in the area, to finance students' activities.

The delegates to the conference also formed a Regional Students' Bureau.

9294
CSO:4400

WHEAT STORAGE PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Sep 80 p 2

[Article signed N.O.: "Agriculture: Wheat Storage Problems"]

[Text] No country can have food reserves if its infrastructure and storage capacity are inadequate.

In our country, where agricultural activities still provide jobs for over 60 percent of the active population, and to the extent that the agricultural sector still depends on climatic conditions, the creation of such reserves is considered to be a guarantee that the country will be normally supplied with food.

Once the granary of Rome, the northern area in general, and the north-western area in particular--where agricultural activities predominate--present a strange and distressing sight to the eyes of the ordinary traveller.

Thousands of wheat sacks, the result of a full year's work, are piled up on the ground, unprotected against rain and storms at a time of the year characterized by sudden weather changes. That wheat may get weevil-eaten or washed away by rainwater, yet nothing appears to have been done to remedy the problem and prevent losses.

In all centers, the storage infrastructure has not appreciably improved over the years; the street, with all its risks and hazards, becomes a place for temporary storage.

At a time when wheat is becoming a "green weapon" in the hands of the large producers who are competing against one another to sell it, it is becoming essential for a developing country like ours--striving to achieve food self-sufficiency--to create an adequate infrastructure which will take into account both production and consumption trends.

Why, then, this discrepancy between storage capacity and production?

Since wheat collecting and marketing are managed exclusively by cooperatives under administrative control, why not allocate to them the means to enable them to create a storage infrastructure which would take into account the geographical distribution of production?

The problem of storage is not new in Tunisia, and the responsibility for it is shared by all. No effective action was taken when it first occurred, and the same problems now arise cyclically each year: silos filled to the brim although production (some 11 thousand quintals this year) is far from sufficient to satisfy our consumption which is estimated at 16 millions of quintals per year--still less than anticipated by the development plans.

The actual storage capacity did not change after the country became independent. While production and consumption have almost doubled, storage capacity has increased by 15 percent, i.e. 5.4 thousand quintals, with the following breakdown:

- Grain office: 3 thousand quintals
- COCEBLE [expansion unknown]: 1.2 thousand quintals
- CCGC [expansion unknown]: 1.2 thousand quintals

Storage never got its due because investment in this sector is not considered immediately profitable; amortization is very slow. Contrary to tourism, this sector did not benefit from large capital investments.

In addition, cooperatives such as COCEBLE or CCGC do not have sufficient resources to build new silos or even to maintain existing silos when these need repairing.

The storage premium determined by the Ministry of Agriculture remains low and does nothing to encourage effective action which would change the present situation.

In addition, because of the priorities and choices they adopted, past development plans have not lent any particular attention to the restructuration of this sector.

Financial aid to the cooperatives managing this sector has now become mandatory. The immediate construction of metallic silos (not very costly) should be considered in areas where storage capacity is insufficient.

In the future, we should take a closer look at this sector and give it the place it deserves in our next development plan, now in preparation.

All the more so as the report of the Large Crop Committee (1979-1980) has stressed the necessity of:

- preparing a master storage plan which will take into account the geographical distribution of storage and marketing capacities;

- overhauling the existing storage infrastructure of the country;

- encouraging farmers farming over 200 hectares to change their harvesting method to adopt a bulk method.

In the meanwhile, we must use all means now available to us to protect the wheat exposed and reduce our losses to a minimum.

9294
CSO:4400

BRIEFS

MZALI AT UN--We have it from a reliable source that Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali will travel to New York on 3 October 1980. During the regular session of the general assembly there he will deliver an important speech from the podium. He is doing this on the invitation of UN secretary general, Kurt Waldheim. We may recall that the invitation was extended to Mr Mzali during Dr Waldheim's visit to Tunisia last July. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 1]

END

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED

October 10, 1980

D.S.